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Abstract 
Consultation is generally acknowledged both in Australia and internationally, as being 
essential if high levels of occupational health and safety (OHS) are to be achieved and 
maintained.  In Victoria, such is the recognition of the important role that consultation plays 
in OHS, that it is mandated under the Victorian OHS regulatory framework.  Indeed, all 
Australian OHS statutes now make provision, to varying degrees, for consultation to occur 
when dealing with OHS matters.  This is principally conducted through OHS representatives 
and OHS committees.  However, there is a growing body of opinion which raises concerns 
over whether such legislative provisions that provide for OHS consultation, is sufficiently 
adequate to ensure that the consultation is both meaningful and effective in terms of OHS 
outcomes.  If this is the case, what might be missing or lacking from the consultation process, 
especially in hazardous and dangerous industries where OHS success would appear to be 
imperative? 
 
The Victorian construction industry, like the construction industry in general, is 
acknowledged for its dangerous and hazardous nature.  It has a large transitory workforce 
with little permanent job security and often suffers from a multifarious and disjointed work 
organisation structure.  Such features tend to work against an environment that openly 
recognises and encourages meaningful and effective consultation.  These conditions also tend 
to confound the development of any kind of social and positive learning and communicative 
culture within the industry, leading to an underutilization of the knowledge and skill 
contained within the workforce.  As well as failing to bring to fruition the full participation of 
workers in the management of OHS, the underutilization of knowledge and skill is potentially 
one of the largest hidden costs that an organisation may incur. 
 
The notion of organisational and cultural maturity is acknowledged both internationally and in 
Australia as a useful concept that can assist organisations in achieving higher standards and 
levels of OHS.  This is especially so in high risk and hazardous industries such as the 
petrochemical, oil refinery and aviation industries.  However, organisational and cultural 
maturity is arguably a relatively new and under-researched construct in the Victorian building 
and construction industry, while the concept of consultation within both the industry and the 
organisational maturity paradigm has not yet been sufficiently explored. 
 
The role that moral and ethical principles play in consultation is now beginning to emerge and 
gain wider recognition within the literature.  This research project set out to examine how 
some of these principles were applied by senior site managers and OHS representatives of 
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five Victorian construction companies during OHS consultation at five different constructions 
sites, and whether this consultation could be considered to be meaningful and effective.  The 
companies who participated in this project were each allocated a level of organisational 
maturity, dependent upon how they managed various aspects of their business operations in 
terms of OHS.  Senior managers and OHS representatives were chosen as participants in the 
research because they are generally acknowledged as the critical vectors in the sharing and 
transferring of knowledge and skill at the workplace.   
 
The data from this research suggest that regardless of the level of organisational maturity each 
organisation was deemed to have reached, and no matter how the individual participants 
applied the particular moral and ethical principles used during this research, the OHS 
consultation that took place on the different construction sites was limited to, and focused 
primarily on, everyday operational and execution aspects of the job, rather than more strategic 
and longer term OHS issues.  The practical implications of this research are that if OHS 
consultation between senior managers and OHS representatives can be conducted in such a 
way as to openly and unambiguously recognise and apply particular moral and ethical 
principles, and if consultation is allowed to focus on more strategic and longer term OHS and 
organisational aspects of a construction project, this may yield more benefits, in terms of OHS 
outcomes, for all industry participants. 
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Chapter 1 The context of this research 
 
Historically, the concept of worker involvement by means of the consultation process was 
identified by the Lord Robens investigation in the United Kingdom (Committee on Health & 
Safety at Work 1972) as being essential to the success of any self regulatory system.  In 
essence, current Australian occupational health and safety (OHS) law still follows the general 
self regulatory philosophy of the Robens’ report.   
 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Victoria) [hereafter referred to as the Act], is 
an example of Australian OHS legislation founded on the Robens’ philosophy.  The concept 
of consultation over matters concerning occupational health and safety features prominently 
in the Act.  Indeed, one of the initial objects of the Act is to ‘… provide for the involvement 
of employees, employers, and organisations representing those persons, in the formulation 
and implementation of health, safety and welfare standards…’ (Section 2 [1] (d)).  
 
The Act places specific requirements on employers to engage in the process of consultation 
with their employees either directly or indirectly, the latter by means of duly elected OHS 
representatives.  In particular, the Act has specific requirements set out under Section 35 for 
employers to consult, so far as is reasonably practicable, with their employees over any issue 
that might directly affect them.  If those workers are represented by a health and safety 
representative, then the consultation process must involve that particular OHS representative 
(Section 36 [2]).   
 
In general, there is overall consensus that worker involvement in OHS via the process of 
consultation is vital to OHS success (Cameron, Hare, Duff & Maloney 2006; Walters, 
Nichols, Connor, Tasiran & Cam 2005; Wilkinson, Dundon, Marchinton & Ackers 2004; 
Frick, Jensen, Quinlan & Wilthagen 2000).  In its most basic and fundamental terms, OHS 
success equates to the prevention of fatalities and serious injury and disease occurring at the 
workplace, which is the embodiment of the OHS philosophy.  In hazardous and dangerous 
industries, such OHS success is imperative. 
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1.1 The Construction Industry 
The construction industry is acknowledged and renowned for its dangerous and hazardous 
nature (Safe Work Australia 2009; Australian Safety & Compensation Council
1
 2008, 2005a; 
Loosemore & Andonakis 2007; Behm 2005; Lin & Mills 2001).  It has one of the highest 
injury and fatality rates across all industries (Australian Safety & Compensation Council 
2008, 2005b; Victorian WorkCover Authority 2006).  The construction industry has been 
described by Lunt, Bayes, Bennett and Hopkinson (2008) as a ‘… complex, changing and 
challenging sector…’ (p.1), with a workforce comprising of ‘… a diverse mix of races, socio-
economic groups and cultures…’ (p.1).  The industry is heavily labour intensive and is highly 
vulnerable to economic cycles - often leading to uncertainty, high job losses and cuts to 
training expenditure and OHS resources in the down times (Rooke & Clark 2005). 
 
Both statistically and in real terms, it remains one of the most hazardous industries across 
Australia and throughout the world (Loosemore & Andonakis 2007; Australian Safety & 
Compensation Council 2005a; Lingard & Rowlinson 2005; Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2002).   Indeed, it has been estimated that in Australia those working in the construction 
industry are more than twice as likely to be killed at work compared to the Australian all-
industries average (Safe Work Australia 2010; National Occupational Health & Safety 
Commission 2004). 
 
In their analysis of all notified workplace fatalities across Australia, the Australian Safety and 
Compensation Council (2008) claimed there was an 11% decrease in fatalities across the 
workplace in the financial year 2007-08.  Unfortunately, the construction industry went 
against this trend.  While there were 18 fatalities recorded in the industry in the period 2004-
05, this increased to 37 fatalities in the period 2007-08.   
 
The fatality rates in the industry are recorded in Table 1 on the following page.  This table is 
provided to give an overall summary of all notified worker fatalities in the Australian 
construction industry from the years 2003-04 to 2008-09.  Figure 1, also on the next page, 
highlights the continued importance placed upon the construction industry by the Australian 
Federal Government peak OHS body, Safe Work Australia (2009).  Safe Work Australia have 
identified and prioritised the industry as one which requires serious improvement to curtail 
this continued high fatality rate.  Figure 2 (p.4) is provided to compare the compensated 
                                               
1 The Australian Safety and Compensation Council (ASCC) was the Australian federal governments’ 
peak OHS body.  It was replaced by Safe Work Australia in November 2009. 
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injuries of the Australian construction industry to that of the national average for the period 
1996-97 to 2003-04. 
 
 
 
Table 1:  
Reported fatalities in the Australian construction industry 2003-04 to 2008-09 
 
2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
 
24 
 
18 
 
25 
 
29 
 
37 
 
27 
         
Source: SafeWork Australia 2009 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: 
Fatality rate by industry of employer –priority industries, Australia 2003–04 to 2006–07 
 
 Source: SafeWork Australia 2009 
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Figure 2: 
Incidence rates of compensated claims 1996-97 to 2003-04 
          Source: ASCC (2005 b) 
 
 
1.1.1  The Victorian Construction Industry 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2004) reported that in 2002-03, the Victorian 
construction industry employed 7.7% of the total Victorian workforce.  This made it the fifth 
largest industry in employment terms in Victoria.  In economic terms, the industry contributed 
six per cent to the Gross State Product, making it the sixth largest industry in the state.  The 
downside to any such positive employment growth and economic activity in the industry is 
that in Victoria, there have been 62 fatalities in the construction industry from 2000 to 2009 
(Building Commission of Victoria 2010; see Figure 3, page 5).  According to WorkSafe 
Victoria (2007b), construction industry fatalities represented 21% of all reported workplace 
fatalities in the five years preceding 2007.  But it is not only the number of fatalities that 
should be of concern.   
 
The Victorian construction industry compensation claims rate in the period 2001- 02 to 2004 - 
05 under the Victorian WorkCover compensation scheme, was the fourth highest of all 
industries per 1000 workers; indeed the industry rate was 20% higher than the rate for the 
whole of the Victorian WorkCover scheme (WorkSafe Victoria 2007).  It has been estimated 
by WorkSafe Victoria (2007) that the total cost of claims in the construction industry for 
2004-05 was $120 million.   To this end, any process that can improve occupational health 
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and safety levels on Victorian construction sites needs to be fully explored and evaluated for 
its impact and validity.    
 
 
Figure 3: 
Victorian construction industry workplace fatalities 2000 - 2009 
 
          Source: Building Commission of Victoria (2010) 
 
 
1.2 The Problem 
A crucial ingredient in the control and prevention of accidents at the workplace is the active 
involvement of the workforce (Lunt et al. 2008).  The consultation process is primarily 
regarded as one of the major mechanisms for communicating and exchanging information and 
ideas between workers and management (Wilkinson et al. 2004; Hart 2002; Blewett 2001; 
Davis & Lansbury 1996).  The OHS representative is one of the major conduits for 
exchanging such ideas on behalf of workers (Walters 2006; Walters et al. 2005; WorkSafe 
Victoria 2005) and there are explicit requirements for consultation to occur under the 
legislation (OHS Act 2004 [Victoria]).  It should therefore be axiomatic that the knowledge 
residing within the confines of a workforce is recognised and utilized as a vital component in 
the endeavour to assist in the creation of safer and healthier workplaces. 
 
But there is body of opinion beginning to emerge throughout the literature, which raises 
concerns over whether or not the presence and prominence given to the consultation process 
under both the OHS legislative framework and the industrial relations environment in general, 
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is sufficiently adequate to support the philosophical underpinnings upon which the concept of 
consultation is built (Walters 2006; Johnstone 2005; Shearn 2004; Sargeant 2001).  This 
perspective is based upon the concept that legislation by itself, does not necessarily guarantee 
that the quality, richness and depth of consultation will occur
2
.   Indeed, according to Quinlan 
and Mayhew (2000) ‘… Knowledge of OHS legislation does not equate to compliance or 
even a willingness to try to comply…’ (p.194). 
 
If the consultation process does not function as expected or required, not only could there be a 
problem with knowledge transfer and knowledge utilization within an organisation, but 
potentially there is as great a problem in that the consultation process may be failing to bring 
to fruition the full participation of workers in the management of health and safety at the 
workplace.   
 
Nichols (1997) believed that while the proposal by Robens to place a statutory obligation on 
all employers to engage in consultation with their employees was certainly welcomed, Robens 
himself admitted that it was not capable of effective enforcement in any strict sense.  
Moreover, Nichols also acknowledged that even with such a statutory obligation, it was 
hardly to be expected that this would assist workers to effectively challenge dangerous 
working conditions to minimize the risk of future accidents.   
 
This argument was later reinforced by Shearn (2004), when he claimed that it could not be 
assumed that mere compliance with existing legislative requirements for consultation would 
necessarily bring about significant levels of improvement in occupational health and safety.  
In his review of the literature of workforce participation, Shearn claimed that there were 
relatively few studies that provided meaningful measures or empirical evidence on the impact 
of employee participation and improved safety performance within an organisation. 
 
Worker participation, and hence the use of a worker’s knowledge and skill, is a fundamental 
principle of the Robens’ philosophy, while knowledge transfer has been identified as crucial 
to an organisations’ performance (Salojarvi, Furu & Sveiby 2005; Jasimuddin, Klein & 
Connell 2005; Svieby & Simons 2002; Sveiby 2001;Cruise-Obrien 1995).  This latter point is 
consistent with Epstein’s (1998) view that knowledge transfer is not only a key intangible 
asset, but also a key to an organisation’s capacity to survive and prosper.  In her review of the 
                                               
2
 Without meaningful consultation occurring, there is a risk that the knowledge and skills possessed by workers 
and their OHS representatives will not be fully utilized (Walters 2006, Walters et al. 2005).  According to Smith 
(2001), the underutilization of knowledge means valuable human and knowledge resources are lost and wasted. 
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role that knowledge plays in organisations that have dominated emerging technologies, Smith 
(2001) argued that ‘…organisations that recognise and use their employees’ steady growing 
wealth of tacit and explicit knowledge to solve problems and achieve goals have a major 
competitive advantage’ (p.319).  While such a statement may be open to debate, the benefits 
to an organisation of knowledge transfer and use is difficult to ignore. 
 
According to Rooke and Clark (2005) there is a reservoir of unrecognized knowledge and 
skills possessed by workers in the construction industry.  They argued that if it continues to 
go unrecognised, it will ultimately be to the detriment of the industry, especially in terms of 
occupational health and safety.   
 
 
1.3 Meaningful and effective consultation 
It is generally accepted both in Australia and internationally that the effectiveness of the 
consultation process relies upon a set of common foundations and preconditions.  Walters 
(2006), WorkSafe Victoria (2005), Shearn (2005), Page (2002), Hart (2002), Blewett (2001), 
WorkCover NSW (2001), Walters and Frick (2000) all referenced similar subject matters 
which they believed were required to ensure the successful implementation of workplace 
consultation (see Table 2, p.15).   
 
Issues identified by many of these authors included trust, honesty, commitment, respect, 
support, sincerity, a willingness to listen, integrity and the sharing of information in both a 
timely manner and in an easily understood format.  Other issues identified included a sharing 
of power, adequate time in terms of both the timing of the consultation and the time given to 
the actual process for consultation, adequate resources, employment security, inclusiveness 
and relevant training.  All of the above were acknowledged as being necessary, albeit in 
different forms and levels, if there was to be meaningful and effective consultation.   
 
Arguably, one of the more enlightening definitions of what should encompass genuine, 
meaningful and effective consultation was given by Commissioner Smith of the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission: 
 
‘…Consultation means to appropriately inform employees, inviting and considering 
their response.  Sufficient action must be taken to secure employees’ response and 
give the employees’ views proper attention.  Consultation requires more than a mere 
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exchange of information.  Employees must be contributing to the decision-making 
process...’. 
Australian Workers’ Union v Campbell Mushrooms Pty Ltd 1183/96, Transcript of C No. 30472 of 1991 
 
When conveying this description of consultation, Commissioner Smith also emphasised that:  
‘… In relation to the concept of consultation I wish to make it clear that this involves 
more than a mere exchange of information.  For consultation to be effective the 
participants must be contributing to the decision-making process, not only in 
appearance but in fact…’. 
Australian Workers’ Union v Campbell Mushrooms Pty Ltd 1183/96, Transcript of C No. 30472 of 1991 
 
However, while the above descriptions may have indicated and indeed highlighted the 
importance of the issues required to achieve meaningful and effective consultation, some 
authors believed that the actual application of such issues during consultation was far from 
perfect.   
 
 
1.4 Consultation implementation 
Creighton and Rozen (1997) suggested that despite all the rhetoric from human resource 
managers, organisations and even governments about the value and the emphasis placed on 
trust and shared decision making in the workplace, the holistic concept of workplace 
consultation has simply not been a part of the Australian workplace culture.  They argued that 
the increasing trends towards individualism of work relations, which in Australia was given 
increasing emphasis under the WorkChoices legislation of the conservative Howard 
government (1996 – 2007), would not assist the process of shared decision making and/or 
consultation.  In their view, consultation and information is only effective and meaningful in a 
context where workers have access to what they claimed to be effective collective 
representation.   
 
The ability of workers having access to effective representation was identified by Collins 
(1997) as an important element in their endeavour to be part of a meaningful consultation 
process.  In his critical commentary on empowerment and the powerful role that management 
played in the overall control and manipulation of the consultation agenda, Collins argued that 
without free and effective representation during the consultation process, there was a real 
possibility that consultation or discussion would simply be dominated by management, with 
little consideration given to the views and opinions of workers.  Later research by Walters and 
Frick (2000) expressed similar sentiments when examining some of the more conflicting 
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strategies of worker participation.  More recent survey data have supported this belief, 
suggesting that workplace decision-making is increasingly being left to employers and 
managers alone (Gollam & Patmore 2003).   
 
Commenting on the Australian government’s 1996 changes to industrial relations legislation, 
which appeared to severely limit the role and rights of employees to be consulted, Creighton 
and Rozen (1997) argued that such changes conspired against a workplace culture that truly 
valued, welcomed and implemented workplace consultation.  Interestingly, these concerns 
were expressed back in 1997.  A decade or so later, many of the concerns that were the basis 
for Creighton and Rozen’s arguments about the acceptable industrial relations environment 
for consultation to be effectively implemented, began to appear in the Australian industrial 
relations landscape.   
 
The question of how best to engage in consultation need not be a vexed or complicated one.  
In terms of consultation in the OHS environment, there is a commonality of ideals prescribed 
by all Australian State OHS regulatory authorities, as well as international OHS authorities, of 
what is required for meaningful and effective consultation. These ideals evolve around: 
 Sharing information in a timely fashion and in a format that is easily understood by 
workers and/or their representatives; 
 Giving workers a reasonable opportunity to review this information and to express 
their views on the particular issue;  and  
 Taking those views into account and giving those same views serious consideration 
before a decision is arrived at. 
 
Sargeant’s (2001) description provided yet another approach, consistent with the above 
principles, yet formatted in a slightly different manner to encapsulate what he considered to 
constitute fair consultation.  But it was what he described as the ‘conscientious consideration 
by an authority of the response to consultation’ (p.483), that perhaps differentiates his 
descriptions from that of many other commentators.  In an endeavour to gain some type of 
regulatory response, Sargeant was arguably attempting to enforce a regulatory reaction as to 
the effectiveness and fairness of the consultation process in terms of OHS legislation.  This 
approach is what Sargeant described as the ‘conflictual model’ (p.483) of consultation.  This 
model imposes obligations on employers and gives rights to employees, as opposed to what 
he called the ‘model of mutuality of interests’ (p.483), that is espoused in much of the 
literature regarding consultation, which he believed was far less effective in terms of a strong, 
effective and fair consultation process.  
10 
 
According to Frick and Sjöström (2006) the conflictual or consensus models of consultation 
should not be seen as singular entities and interactions between management and workers, but 
merely as different perspectives and different avenues to engage in during consultation.  They 
believed that ideally, both models should be combined as effectively as possible within the 
workplace interaction and the consultation process, thereby helping to achieve maximum 
outcomes in terms of OHS solutions. 
 
Walters et al. (2005) highlighted the importance of consultation being ‘… associated with an 
implication of consequential action’ (p.x) arising from any recommendations made by 
workers during consultation, if it was to be considered to be more than just a mere one-way 
parting of information by employers to employees.  They argued that without this 
consequential action, consultation loses much of its momentum and meaning for affected 
employees.  Such an argument appears consistent with the earlier approach of Shearn (2004), 
who argued that unless workers can realise some degree of influence over decisions and 
practical outcomes, consultation and employee participation simply becomes an unviable 
proposition.  Indeed, in such circumstances, the consultation process was described by 
Walters and Frick (2000) as not too dissimilar to the worst behaviours of autocratic and 
authoritarian management.   
 
Within the literature there is strong support for the right mix of legislative rights, obligations 
and protections if the consultation process is to be successful in its own right (Walters 2006; 
Walters et al. 2005; Sargeant 2001; Blewett 2001).  Walters et al. (2005) referred to such 
obligations and protections as the pre-conditions for effective consultation, without which 
they felt the process of consultation failed to realise its true obligations and outcomes. 
 
While it could be argued that the elements or issues that Blewett (2001) considered necessary 
for effective consultation may be slightly different from that of Walters et al. (2005) or 
Sargeant (2001), they are nonetheless consistent with the general themes identified by all of 
the above parties, as well as many other authors including Page (2002), Hart (2002), Walters 
and Frick (2000) and Walters (2006).  To be part of any successful consultation process, 
Blewett (2001) considered that not only is there a requirement that the process needs to be 
clearly understood, but there must also be a willingness to participate and, within this 
participation sphere, there must also be an element of respect shown by all those participating 
in the consultation process.   
 
It was Blewett’s (2001) belief that it was not enough to have certain prerequisites to ensure 
that consultation reached its full potential.  She argued that certain qualities or characteristics 
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were still required to be displayed by all parties involved in consultation to encourage and 
instil a process that promoted effective and meaningful consultation.  Such qualities included 
sincerity, a respectful understanding and appreciation of the relationships and the 
responsibilities involved during consultation, trust, honesty, commitment, support, 
inclusiveness and a positive organisational culture that would assist in the implementation of 
effective and meaningful consultation (Walters 2006; WorkSafe Victoria 2005; Blewett 2001; 
Sargeant 2001; WorkCover NSW 2001). 
 
But while qualities such as the above may induce and encourage meaningful and effective 
consultation, what of the barriers and or circumstances that may prevent effective and 
meaningful consultation from occurring? 
 
 
1.5 Barriers to effective consultation 
While it should not be regarded as the panacea to all workplace ills, consultation is generally 
regarded as a process that can assist in the overall well being of the workplace (Walters 2006, 
Peetz 2006; Sargeant 2001; Blewett 2001; Mathews 1994).  Why is it then, as Gollan and 
Patmore (2003) questioned, that Australia appears to remain decades behind European nations 
in their developments in consultation rights at the workplace?  This is not a question that is 
easily answered, but it may be helpful to look at some of the barriers that are commonly 
identified in the literature that can restrict and impinge upon the effectiveness of the 
consultation process. 
 
Blewett (2001) was convinced that a major barrier to effective consultation was a lack of 
senior management commitment to the overall process of consultation.  This she suggested, 
can take place in a number of ways including lack of funding, a reluctance to take employee 
recommendations seriously or not at all, a refusal to give adequate time for the process to take 
place and taking a parental or even a patronising approach to the process, rather than engaging 
in a truly consultative manner.  The assertion of an association of consequential action being 
an important component of the consultation process (Walters et al. 2005; Shearn 2004; Hart 
2002; Walters & Frick 2000) also suggests that such a course of action is also considered 
necessary if meaningful and effective consultation is to become a reality.   
 
Prerequisites for effective worker participation appear to be heavily reliant upon a good 
industrial relations climate, extensive training - including suitable investment for such training 
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to take place, high management commitment, support and cooperation and an open culture of 
trust (Lunt et al. 2008: Cameron et al. 2006; Shearn 2005).   
 
In order to measure how effective or otherwise workforce involvement is in terms of OHS, 
Lunt et al. (2008) suggested that there needed to be a distinction drawn between the measures 
of the processes implemented to engage workers such as OHS committee meetings and safety 
toolbox meetings, and the measuring of the benefits that can flow from such involvement.  
According to Lunt et al. (2008), this can be done by focusing on the following five key areas: 
1. The scope of the issues covered in the consultation resulting from the work 
involvement; 
2. The objectives in developing the solutions; 
3. The depth of understanding of accident causation; 
4. The scope and quality of the solutions presented; 
5. The ability to transfer issues by involving others when actions and decisions are 
required to be made by persons not traditionally invested with the authority to make 
such decisions. 
 
However, Lunt et al. (2008) also considered that the transient nature of both the tasks and the 
workforce unfortunately mitigated against quality employee involvement in OHS in the 
construction industry.  They believed that the transient nature of the industry undermines the 
ability to establish trusting relations within and between main contractors and sub-contractors.  
Given that the construction industry is mainly built around the sub-contracting fraternity 
(Lingard & Rowlinson 2005; Quinlan & Mayhew 2000) this is a subject that needs to be 
addressed, especially if the principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect are to have 
any type of positive effect on both the quality of consultation and the outcomes or solutions to 
OHS problems. 
 
Another factor that has been identified as having a negative influence on the quality of worker 
involvement in OHS is the conflict between production dead-lines and the time that it can 
take to fully involve workers in the consultation.  Pragmatic concerns often take precedence 
over safety and the level of input or involvement of workers in OHS (Lunt et al. 2008).  
Indeed, such conflicts can often reinforce the negative attitudes that some managers hold 
towards consultation regarding OHS (Lunt et al. 2008). 
 
Managerial commitment is regarded as a key factor in the success or otherwise of employee 
consultation and participation (Cameron et al. 2006; Walters et al. 2005; Shearn 2005; Olsen 
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2001; Grison &Worland 2000;).  Other issues such as managerial prerogative and/or control, 
poor attitudes on behalf of either party to either the process of consultation or to change itself, 
poor skills in communicating, lack of training (either in communication or in the particular 
subject or industry at the centre of the consultation), lack of confidence, intimidation 
(physical or economical), lack of job security, legislative changes in employment rights and 
conditions, selective listening, value judgements of ideas, time pressures, numeracy, literary 
and language problems, have all been identified by numerous authors as contributing to the 
facilitation and the quality, depth and effectiveness of consultation at the workplace.  The 
honesty, trustworthiness and authenticity of not just the message, but also that of the 
communicator were also identified by Ivancevich and Mattson (1993) as having a significant 
influence in the success or otherwise of the consultation process.   
 
 
1.5.1  Hierarchical Inversion 
It has been suggested by Bean (2006) that the consultation process should ideally reject the 
notion of the traditional organisational hierarchy and should instead be driven by a response 
to the priorities and directions as required by the particular situation at the particular time.  In 
Bean’s (2006) opinion, true and meaningful consultation ‘…inverts the pyramid of the 
traditional hierarchy…’.   
 
This is in fact what occurs in what has become known as high reliability organisations 
(HRO’s), such as nuclear power plants and air traffic control rooms (Weick, Sutcliffe & 
Obstfled 1999).  In such organisations, in times of unexpected crisis or unexpected events, the 
top rungs of the organisational hierarchical ladder (e.g. managers, team leaders and experts) 
are often forced to invert their traditional positions of power and influence to non experts, 
who are in many cases front line workers.  In such circumstances, the unexpected crisis or 
event is resolved via a process that emphasises the knowledge and skills of all the people 
involved, regardless of the hierarchical positions that they may or may not hold within the 
organisation.  In this way, unexpected and unforseen situations are handled in ways that are 
able to prevent unintended consequences that may result from such circumstances (Weick et 
al. 1999). 
 
In many non-HRO’s, such hierarchical inversions can often be regarded as both a professional 
and a personal threat to those within the managerial department and a serious infringement on 
what is sometimes known as managerial prerogative (Rönmmar 2006; McIntyre 2005; 
Mitchell 2003; Jones 2003).   Notions of managerial prerogative have been around since the 
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industrial revolution and many professionals, those with formal qualifications and managers 
in general, do not always wish to relinquish or share their power and openly embrace this type 
of hierarchical inversion and consultative approach (Bean 2006; McIntyre 2005; Wilkinson et 
al. 2004; Mitchell 2003). 
 
A refusal to acknowledge and recognise the contribution that others may offer, especially if 
those offering the information are perceived to hold a lower hierarchical position within an 
organisation, coupled with outdated and autocratic managerial practices (McIntyre 2005; 
Jones 2003; Collins 1996), draws attention to the underutilisation of the knowledge and skill 
of the workforce.  According to both Svieby and Simmons (2002) and Smith (2001), such an 
approach represents wasted and lost opportunities for an organisation.  The refusal and non-
recognition of the knowledge and skill of others may arguably have more to do with personal 
and professional bias, or perhaps even the ego of those who are refusing to acknowledge the 
information being offered.  But if an organisation wants to truly appreciate and utilize the 
potential contribution of their employees’, it may well be worthwhile remembering what 
Chomsky (2002) claimed when he said:‘…you should decide whether something makes sense 
by its content, not by the letters after the name of the person who says it…’ (p.138). 
 
It is now recognized that the socio-economic and socio-values of society in general and the 
way work is organized around such social values, affects the levels of occupational health and 
safety that is able to be achieved at the workplace.  Lunt et al. (2008) stated that ‘…socio-
ecological research has expanded understanding of the pathways by societal level factors such 
as social inequity: societal values, social mobility and social capital can interact with 
organisational factors to ultimately affect well-being at work…’ (p.45).  The impact that this 
has upon the culture and the levels of organisational maturity displayed by organisations in 
the workplace begs further investigation and research to be undertaken in this specific area.  
Regardless of the approaches or techniques that are used, it is widely acknowledged that 
worker involvement, engagement and/or participation, will not be effective where there exists 
an environment of distrust, which has come to characterize less mature safety cultures (Lunt 
et al. 2008; Hudson 2003a; Reason 1997). 
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Table 2: Summary of issues commonly identified as being necessary for effective and meaningful consultation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Walters and 
Frick 
(2000) 
Statutory 
Authorities 
(e.g. HSE 2000; 
Worksafe Vic 2005,; 
WorkCover NSW 
2001) 
Sargeant 
(2001) 
Blewett (2001) Page (2002) Hart (2002) Shearn 
(2004) 
Walters et al. 
(2005) 
Walters (2006) 
Trust  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Honesty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commitment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respect  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Considered 
account of all 
opinions and 
points of view 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adequate and 
appropriate time 
and opportunities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Training and 
sharing of 
information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade union 
support 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legislative 
support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Employment 
security 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
It should be noted that the issues in this table that have been attributed to the various authors as listed, have been interpreted, rather than being directly 
extracted from their respective pieces of literature.
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1.6 The Cultural Influence 
Managerial prerogative, reluctance for hierarchical inversions, poor consultation mechanisms, 
lack of training, poor communication and low levels of trust, honesty, commitment and 
respect, may be symptomatic of a greater systemic problem for an organisation, highlighting 
issues to do with the culture of the organisation, especially in terms of OHS. 
 
Over the past four decades or so, there has been a subtle change of emphasis regarding 
accident causation and explanation.  The common approach throughout the 1960s generally 
focused on the awareness of the interaction between worker and machines.  In the 1970s a 
more systems-based approach began to occur, which looked at the interaction between 
worker, machine, the environment and the organisation.  Today, the focus has moved towards 
a cultural explanation in an elucidation of workplace accidents and incidents (Hielderandt-
Eriksen & Baarts 2001).  Indeed, this increased focus on organisational culture as a valid and 
forthright explanation of accident causation came into great focus following the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster and the Challenger space shuttle disaster, both of which occurred in 1986 
(Mearns, Whitaker & Flin 2003; Cooper 2000; Clarke 2000; Weick et al. 1999; Pidgeon 
1998). 
 
Effectively, the cultural approach to occupational health and safety supports the paradigms of 
social and cultural relations at the workplace (Hvid 2001).  In terms of accident and illness 
explanations, while it is generally accepted that the cause of most occupational accidents, 
injuries and illnesses are complex and multi-causal (Cowley & Leggett 2003; Keltz 2001; 
Baarts 2001; Reason 1997; Quinlan & Bohle 1991), it is also suggested that there is generally 
a chain of events that leads up to an accident (Keltz 2001).  In theory, if a link in this chain 
can be broken, then the accident may be prevented.  One link in this conjectural chain is the 
organisational philosophy or organisational culture of the organisation.  This is a philosophy 
or culture which helps shape the safety culture of the organisation, whereby management 
commitment and attitude not only towards safety, but also towards employee involvement via 
the consultation process and the use of the employees’ knowledge and skill, can achieve 
better OHS outcomes (Hopkins 2006; Clarke 2003; Gadd & Collins 2002). 
 
 
1.7 Hudson’s Evolutionary Safety Culture Model  
A model that espouses the virtues of the social and cultural relations paradigm, is the 
evolutionary safety culture model provided by Professor Patrick Hudson of Leiden 
University, Netherlands. This model is primarily based upon a model originally developed by 
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Westrum (1993).  While the Hudson model essentially revolves around the attitudes to the 
importance of safety, in conjunction with the roles and efficiency of the individual and the 
importance attached to the organisations’ systems and their associated processes, it also relies 
upon the recognition of a number of steps on a ‘ladder’ of cultural and organisational maturity 
(Hudson 2003a). 
 
Westrum’s original model identified only three stages or levels of such an evolution – the 
pathological, the bureaucratic and the generative culture levels (Hudson 2003b).  However, 
Hudson (2003b) felt that the bureaucratic level was better replaced by what he called the 
calculative level because he believed it would be easier for people to accept that they were 
being calculative as opposed to being bureaucratic. Later on, two more levels were added - 
the reactive and the proactive levels.  According to Parker, Lawrie and Hudson (2006), this 
also gave the model more depth and allowed for a  
 ‘…more subtle classification and increasing the accessibility of the framework to 
industry employees by including terms they would be familiar with, and so clarifying 
the idea that organisations would be expected to progress through the levels of safety 
culture with increasing maturity…’ (p.555). 
 
While Hudson (2001b) described his model as part of a process of an organisations’ evolution 
towards a full safety culture
3
, it is also important to recognise that the model itself forms part 
of a safety management system.  Ideally, a safety management system should assist in the 
development of an ‘… organisational culture that supports higher processes such as “thinking 
the unthinkable” and being intrinsically motivated to be safe, even when there seems no 
obvious reason to do this… ’ (Hudson 2001a, p.29). 
 
According to Hudson (2003a), the notions of organisational culture and the understanding of 
safety management will differ according to the levels of cultural maturity that an organisation 
may or may not possess.  He argued that true safety cultures are characterised by good 
communication and consultation between management and workers of an organisation, which 
he believed, not only enhanced safety but elevated morale and productivity.  As 
communication failures and problems are commonly identified as a source of problems for 
many organisations, it makes perfect sense for an organisation to have a definitive focus on 
improving communication and consultation, which in turn should assist in improved 
performance (Hudson 2001a).  As an organisation progresses up the ladder of the Hudson 
(2003a) model, which is also a progression along Westrum’s (2004) continuum of 
                                               
3
 Hudson (2001a) believed that a safety culture could only be seriously considered in the latter stages of the model. 
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evolutionary safety culture, the quality of communication, consultation and overall workforce 
involvement should also progress to a higher level and better quality (Hudson 2003a).   
 
Hudson (2003a) saw the process of moving up his ladder of organisational and cultural 
maturity reliant upon the generation of trust and the development of what he called 
informedness; essentially meaning an increase in the flow of up-to-date knowledge and 
information about any issues, events, incidents and/or occurrences that may potentially affect 
how the organisation operates or performs.  This informedness constitutes the cultural 
approach of trust in which a no-blame culture begins to be implemented and information, 
regardless whether it is good or bad, is not only welcomed but actively encouraged (Reason 
1997).  Hudson (2003a) argued that the evolution of a safety culture, via his model, is a 
process whereby informedness and trust leads to better communication and consultation 
throughout the entire organisation, which in turn results in a safer workplace and a better 
quality organisation.  The more advanced and mature an organisation’s safety culture is, the 
higher the level the organisation can reach in the evolutionary safety culture model provided 
by Hudson.  In turn, the organisation should be more willing to seek out information and 
knowledge and increasingly seek the opportunities to ensure incidents do not turn into 
accidents (Hudson 2003b).   
 
The Hudson model is not the only organisational and cultural maturity model in existence, 
however for the purposes of this research, it was considered to be a suitable and appropriate 
model to assist in analysing how particular moral and ethical principles were applied by 
senior management and OHS representatives of different construction companies, during 
OHS consultation.  It also provided a framework of safety culture maturity that had been used 
in past research (Lawrie, Parker and Hudson 2006) and appeared to nicely fit within both the 
boundaries and the structure of this research project
4
.   
 
 
1.8  The Research Project 
In determining the context of this research, many questions about consultation, organisational 
and cultural maturity and the Victorian construction industry began to emerge.  Questions 
such as ‘how is consultation defined and played out at the different levels of organisational 
                                               
4
 For the purposed of this research, the terms organisational maturity, cultural maturity and organisational and 
cultural maturity were used synonymously with one another with the same meaning and intent applied to each 
term.   
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and cultural maturity within the Victorian construction industry?’  ‘What is the type of culture 
that an organisation requires so that the issues or principles that are acknowledged and 
recognised as being required for effective and meaningful consultation, can be applied to 
ensure that meaningful and effective consultation takes place?’  ‘Does consultation provide 
participants with an equal opportunity to influence and affect the outcomes, decisions and 
processes at the workplace and which fully utilizes their knowledge and skills?’  ‘Why is it 
that some organisations tend to be more inclusive and better at consultation than others?’  
‘Does organisational and cultural maturity provide a foundation that will assist in the 
implementation of meaningful and effective consultation?’  ‘What role does power and 
control have in the consultation equation?’ 
 
It was considered that the most effective means to answer these questions, would be if they 
were consolidated into a more manageable, yet sufficiently robust single question, which 
would accurately portray and reflect the overall themes emerging from both the literature and 
the industry itself.  Hence, the research question of this project is:  
How are issues or principles, that are generally considered necessary for meaningful 
and effective consultation, particularly in the area of occupational health and safety, 
applied by senior managers and OHS representatives of Victorian construction 
companies, who were deemed to have reached different levels of organisational 
maturity? 
 
The commercial and industrial sector of the Victorian construction industry was chosen as a 
suitable industry for this research for a number of reasons. Firstly, as has already been stated, 
the construction industry is generally acknowledged for it dangerous and hazardous nature.  
This creates great challenges for all industry stakeholders in creating and maintaining a safe 
and healthy workplace.  Secondly, due to the authors’ professional and industrial background, 
he had ready access to construction companies and the OHS representatives and construction 
workers who work in the industry
5
.  Thirdly, while the industry has a reputation for being 
both vibrant and enthusiastic in its operations and undertakings, it also has a reputation for 
being a rough, tough and sometimes brutal industry – one where employee representation and 
hence consultation, is considered to be vital in maintaining and improving workplace 
conditions (Ross 2004).  In terms of this later point, it is also acknowledged that there is a 
high level of trade union involvement and influence in the commercial and industrial sector of 
the Victorian construction industry (Ross 2004; Cole 2003). 
 
                                               
5
 Also see authors’ Declaration of Belief (p.xii) 
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In general, the larger the construction site, the greater the potential for major hazards and risks 
to occur (WorkSafe Victoria 2007).  Larger construction sites are generally found within the 
commercial and industrial sector of the construction industry.  Some of the hazards and risks 
encountered on a daily basis within this sector of the industry include: the use of large, heavy 
machinery such as cranes and excavators; working at extreme heights; the use and handling of 
large concrete panels (many weighing in excess of 15 tonnes each); and, the regular use and 
handling of hazardous and toxic materials – including the removal of asbestos.  Large 
commercial and industrial construction sites also engage large numbers of workers at any one 
time, working for large numbers of sub-contractors, which in itself represents significant 
challenges not only in the day-to-day management of a commercial and industrial 
construction site (WorkSafe Victoria 2007; Lingard & Rowlinson 2005), but also in creating 
an environment whereby effective and meaningful consultation and a positive learning culture 
may flourish and prosper (Hager 2001; Mayhew, Quinlan & Bennet 1996). 
 
Using the commercial and industrial sector of the Victorian building and construction 
industry as the vehicle, this piece of applied research examined the various forms and 
approaches of consultation that occurred at the various levels of organisational maturity.  In 
particular, this project looked at how the principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect, 
which are generally accepted as foundations for effective and meaningful consultation 
(Walters 2006; Shearn 2005, 2004; Page 2002; Hart 2002; Blewett 2001) were applied at the 
different levels of the Hudson model.   
 
In doing so, the research also examined how the process of consultation between the most 
senior site management personnel and the OHS representative, who are arguably the critical 
vectors in the sharing and transferring of knowledge and skill of OHS on a construction site, 
was played out and conducted in the industry and whether it assisted in the enhancement of 
levels of OHS.  The research also sought to identify some of the potential factors that had an 
impact upon the quality of consultation within the industry as a result of using the Hudson 
model.  
 
While it may be argued that the process of consultation, at least in the occupational health and 
safety context, has been explored and researched sufficiently in the past, it is important to 
recognise and acknowledge that employment conditions and working life in general is rapidly 
changing, and past theories, models and empirical evidence may not be as applicable in these 
new and changing environments (Härenstam, Marklund, Berntson, Bolin & Ylander 2006).  
In their exploration of some of the problems and difficulties that are inherent in 
organisational-oriented research of work and health, Härenstam et al. (2006) noted that it was 
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necessary to acknowledge that not all factors that affect levels of occupational health and 
safety are equally as easy to change.  It is therefore necessary to focus on those factors which 
both employers and employees and their representatives can, and are willing to, adjust.  And 
while different paradigms may well uncover similarities and regularities of their units of 
analysis, they do not always look at how the different units interact (Härenstam et al. 2006).   
 
Social scientists continue to carry out in-depth studies of workplace behaviours because the 
workplace is identified as being central to our existence (Pasmore 2001).  Within the 
workplace, the phenomenon of consultation throughout the different levels of organisational 
maturity has not yet been well explicated.  It is the interaction between the mechanism of 
consultation, organisational maturity and the application of the principles or issues of trust, 
honesty, commitment and respect that this research set out to investigate.  In doing so, this 
research has also attempted to give definition and clarity to what effective and meaningful 
consultation means in the context of the Victorian construction industry.  
 
 
The first step in answering the research question begins with a literature review in Chapter 
Two. 
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Chapter 2  Literature Review 
2.1 Conducting the literature search 
The search for relevant literature applicable to this research involved a systematic inspection 
and review of the following electronic databases located via the University of Ballarat 
Navigate Plus database, which is part of the AARLIN portal project.  Databases accessed via 
this process included: 
Academic Search Premier (EBSCO) 
APAFT (Infomit Search) 
Emerald Fulltext (Emerald) 
JSTOR 
Masterfile Premier (EBSCO). 
 
Computer-based searches were also conducted via popular search engines Google, Google 
Scholar and AltaVista.  Keywords used to locate relevant literature included, but were not 
limited to, the following: consultation, employee consultation, workplace consultation, 
employee participation, industrial democracy, OHS representatives, organisational maturity, 
organisational and cultural maturity, culture, organisational culture, safety culture, 
evolutionary safety culture, safety climate, building and construction industry, Victorian 
construction industry, knowledge, tacit knowledge. 
 
Articles that were identified as relevant and useful to the research were noted both for the 
article itself and the published journal within which it appeared.  The article, the journal and 
the publisher were then subsequently examined and searched using the key words as 
identified above for other potential relevant articles and journals 
 
Relevant journals were also identified and located using the University of Ballarat Library 
Databases and e-Resources sector located within the University library web site.  Articles that 
were located online were printed in full where possible.  A range of academic libraries were 
also utilized throughout the project including the University of Ballarat, RMIT, the State 
Library of Victoria and the University of Melbourne. 
 
This literature review will expand upon the information and evidence already provided in 
Chapter 1 on the topics of workplace consultation, organisational and cultural maturity and 
the building and construction industry.  It will focus on how workplace consultation is defined 
in the literature and describe the different approaches and mechanisms of consultation that are 
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generally undertaken in the workplace.  The review will examine how consultation fits within 
the realms of both the industrial relations and the occupational health and safety 
environments, and discuss the separation that is often claimed to exist between these two 
workplace domains.  The literature review will also focus on the management and use of the 
knowledge and skill base available to organisations at the workplace and why this is 
considered a vital component in the endeavour to improve levels of occupational health and 
safety.  Further literature on organisational and cultural maturity will also be examined and 
discussed.  The principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect are continually 
interspersed throughout the chapter to highlight where they fit within the structure of this 
literature review and how they relate to this particular project
6
. 
 
 
2.2 The perplexity of consultation 
The definitions and interpretations of terms such as industrial democracy, employee 
participation, employee democracy, workplace participation, employee involvement and 
consultation have long been identified as issues of debate and discussion, yet they are often 
used synonymously (Gollan & Patmore 2003).  Collins (1994) suggested that the fluidity of 
such terms have been used as part of an interchangeable dichotomy.  However, it is not 
proposed to dissect and distinguish between the terms in this research; rather the terms will be 
used, as Davis and Lansbury (1996) suggested, to express a common approach that aims to 
achieve greater worker involvement and influence in the decision-making process in the 
workplace.   
 
Collins (1994) described industrial democracy, employee involvement and consultation in 
terms of ‘…a continuum to help express the fluidity of the concept as a whole…’ (p.17).  His 
continuum highlighted the different levels or stages of consultation from where workers had 
virtually no input or influence over decision making, through to where workers had equal 
control to that of management.   Walters et al. (2005) expressed a similar employee-
involvement continuum when they described the role of employee consultation as being best 
understood as mutually supportive elements of a continuum of participative activity, rather 
than as distinct and exclusive arrangements.   
 
By the early 1980s, ‘industrial democracy’ had become a common term in the lexicon of 
industrial relations, but because of the implications of interfering with managerial prerogative, 
                                               
6 Chapter 3 provides more detail on the literature on the issues of trust, honesty, commitment and respect in 
relation to this project. 
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it was progressively replaced by the term ‘employee participation’.  However, in their review 
of the literature on employee involvement and industrial relations reform in Australia, Davis 
and Lansbury (1996) saw both terms as simply different aspects of the same concept arguing 
that ‘…industrial democracy is the ideal….employee participation describes the process…and 
is an essential part of the process…employee participation means employees having the 
opportunity to have a genuine say and influence on decision making …’(p.6) 
 
Whilst this critical analysis of the Australian experience of employee involvement and 
industrial relations reform by Davis and Lansbury noted this gradual replacement of terms in 
the terminology of industrial relations, they argued that the concern should not be over the 
terms or labels used to describe the process, but rather should focus on the amount of 
influence employees could exert on the decision-making process.  This, they suggested, was 
best gauged by the degree of influence the employee or employee representative had and the 
sorts of issues that they were capable of influencing.  As Butler (2005) commented in his 
examination of the efficacy of non-union forms of employee participation: ‘…when seeking 
to examine the extent of employee participation in management decision-making, it is crucial 
that the researcher is able to locate the point at which decisions are actually made, rather than 
formally taken’ (p.280).   
 
Both Lunt et al. (2008) and Cameron et al. (2006) held similar views when they described 
worker engagement as the degree of input that workers have into the very decisions that affect 
them, which is best measured via the degree of control that those workers have over such 
decisions.  Both parties also believed that the level of worker involvement and/or engagement 
into the decision-making process was a reflection of the cultural maturity of an organisation.   
 
Worker engagement was defined by Lunt et al. (2008) as ‘… the extent to which the 
workforce contributes to decisions that affect their health and safety…’ (p.x).  In their 
opinion, such engagement allows more effective control solutions to be generated while 
positively motivating the workforce.  However, they also believed that effective worker 
engagement does not automatically occur, arguing that it requires continued communication 
and strong commitment from high level management. 
 
Earlier research by Shearn (2005) demonstrated that workers generally respond positively to 
being in a position whereby their influence helps shape or veto workplace decisions.  In his 
research, Shearn provided valuable insights into the issues that surround and influence worker 
participation in the management of OHS.  While it could be argued that his findings, being 
based only on a single case study, may be limited, the research identified a range of 
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mechanisms and strategies that organisations could apply when attempting to implement the 
process of workforce participation and consultation.   This work supported his earlier research 
(2004), which claimed that participation by itself, regardless of the mechanisms used, is an 
unviable proposition unless workers actually realise some degree of influence over decisions 
and practical outcomes.   
 
Walters et al. (2005) concurred with this approach when they argued that consultation must be 
much more than just a mere imparting of information, arguing that it must be associated with 
what they called an implication of consequential action.  Some employers have an unfortunate 
tendency to either fail to take heed of suggestions or recommendations eventuating from 
consultation, or simply commit to information and consultation only after decisions are made 
without any input or consideration of employee points of view (Cooling 2005; Sargeant 
2001).  Similar sentiments were expressed by Walters and Frick (2000), who argued that 
while the provision of information is important, without the right of input and influence into 
the decision-making process, this constitutes a very weak form of participation.  Indeed, they 
saw the only difference between such a process and that of authoritarian management was 
that in the former circumstance, the orders or information are generally explained. 
 
In his critical analysis on how the changing labour market affected levels of OHS and 
participation of employees at the workplace, using evidence from Sweden, Norway and Italy, 
Johnstone (2005) argued that participatory mechanisms with high levels of worker 
involvement were far superior to those where worker involvement was more circumscribed.   
It is generally accepted that worker involvement and positive cooperation between employers 
and workers results in greater levels of occupational health and safety (Johnstone 2005; 
Walters et al. 2005; Wilkinson et al. 2004; Frick & Walters 1998).  Research conducted by 
the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety Executive, found that where workers had been 
involved in consultation and decision making, those workers felt more valued, resulting in 
greater commitment, leading to greater job satisfaction and a lower likelihood of those 
workers voluntarily leaving the organisation (Cooling 2005). 
 
Such rationale was arguably corroborated by the research of Shearn (2005), in which he 
reported that a number of previous case studies had repeatedly identified the benefits of 
workforce participation and decision making by employees.  Cameron et al. (2006) suggested 
that the involvement of workers in the management of OHS should not only be based on legal 
grounds, but was also required under ethical and moral considerations.  They believed that 
such interaction between management and workers can result in a greater distribution and 
acquisition of the knowledge and skills of workers, which may also be used as a means to 
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‘check-up’ on management performance, which can lead to increased productivity, efficiency 
and motivational levels as well as lower workforce turnover. 
 
According to Mitchell (2003), the rationale for employee democracy, participation or 
involvement is primarily based upon the concepts of democracy and power.  The definition of 
this power was described as the inherent power imbalance in an employer/employee 
relationship and the authoritarian nature of the employment relationship, which he suggested 
must be checked by applying democratic principles in the workplace.  In such an approach, 
the principles of democracy are applied, drawing upon the notions of democracy of the 
parliament and transferring them to the workplace to draw a parallel between a citizen’s 
relationship with the state, to that of a worker’s relationship with their firm or organisation.  
In this way, Mitchell (2003) implied that employees should be entitled to a voice in the direct 
control of their workplace as they arguably have over their state.  The notions of a re-
distribution of power at the workplace were also seen by Morgan and Zeffane (2003) as an 
important element for employee involvement, especially in terms of workplace decision 
making. 
 
The rationale for any type of worker involvement was perhaps best encapsulated by Hearn 
and Lansbury (2005) in their social commentary on workplace rights and social citizenship.  
They believed that a worker’s role both at the workplace and in society in general, was far 
broader that the limited effect that was generally attributed to them, stating that ‘…workers 
should have the time and appropriate forms of representation and self expression, to be able to 
influence the conditions that affect them both in the workplace and in the wider 
community…’ (p.258).   
 
 
2.2.1  Social and industrial implications 
... An employee’s ability to participate in decision making at work is arguably as 
critical to his or her citizenship in a democracy, as is the right to vote… (ACTU  
2001). 
 
In making this statement, Greg Combet, who at the time was the Secretary of the peak trade 
union body in Australia, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), also recognised the 
relationship that consultation had in relation to both the workplace and the wider social 
environment.  Just as voting in a democracy can and does result in change of one type or 
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another, so too can workplace consultation affect and change the workplace.  The recognition 
between consultation and society values was also acknowledged by the United Kingdom’s 
Health and Safety Commission in their document ‘Strategy for Workplace Health and Safety 
in Great Britain to 2010 and beyond’.  In this document, employee involvement was cited as a 
fundamental factor in aiming to make health and safety the cornerstone of a civilised society.    
 
However the relationship between consultation and the role it plays in society should not be 
considered as a new phenomenon.  Over 40 years ago, noted British philosopher Dorothy 
Emmet (1966) suggested that consultation must take into account aspects of both society and 
social behaviour.  According to Emmet (1966), social behaviour was not just about how 
individuals behaved, but was founded in part about the ideas people had about what was 
useful and proper.  Emmet defined society as ‘…more or less an ordered way in which people 
live together, where the order depends upon their being able to entertain generally fulfilled 
expectations about how others should behave, so that they can co-operate or compete with 
some reasonable forecast of the sorts of things others are likely to do…’ (p.7). 
 
Using this definition, consultation in a social context arguably hinges upon the expectations 
and understandings of what types of behaviour are acceptable or otherwise between two or 
more persons or parties.   The process as to how persons or parties agree what is, or is not 
acceptable, arguably becomes the basis for consultation.  Almost four decades later, a similar 
definition was provided by O’Donnell, Porter, McGuire, Garvan, Heffernan and Cleary 
(2003) when discussing the Habermas ‘communicative action’ strategy.  They described 
communicative action as ‘… the set of symmetric and reciprocal relations within the 
communicative relation between at least two people…’ (p.84).  O’Donell et al. (2003) 
believed that communicative action was a central component in the understanding of how 
people communicate and consult with each other in order to gain knowledge and 
understanding.   
 
The definition used by the Canadian Institute for Work and Health (2005) to describe the 
consultation process in participatory ergonomics is also worth noting.  They claimed that it 
was ‘…the involvement of people in planning and controlling a significant amount of their 
own work activities, with sufficient knowledge and power to influence both processes and 
outcomes in order to achieve desirable goals…’ (p.5).  By influencing both the process and 
the outcomes, consultation can be seen as a means not only to achieve particular outcomes, 
but also as a process that helps solve problems, which in turn relates to change.   
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However, as Emmet (1966) indicated, change is not always easy to facilitate because moral 
and social values affect not only the means to a solution, but also what is trying to be 
achieved.  As all members of a society are individuals with minds and wills of their own, 
some of whom may be quite recalcitrant, the natural harmony and balance of society when 
indeed it is in this state, cannot be taken for granted (Emmet 1966).    
 
To maintain such harmony, Wall (1978) suggested that because most people respond in a 
positive manner to those who are considerate, warm, friendly and concerned, it stands to 
reason that during the consultation process, all parties should be treated with mutual respect 
and dignity, regardless of opposing viewpoints, qualifications, experience or positions that 
they may hold within that society.  Such an approach reinforces the beliefs of many authors 
(Walters & Frick 2000; Sargeant 2001; Blewett 2001; Page 2002; Shearn 2004; Walters et al. 
2005) that the notions of trust and respect are part of the prerequisites that are essential if 
effective and meaningful consultation is to take place within the workplace. 
 
However this may not always be the case at the workplace, because notions of managerial 
prerogative can potentially outweigh, overrule and unduly influence the workplace 
consultation and decision-making process (Butler 2005; Jones 2003; Collins 1996). 
 
 
2.2.2  Managerial Prerogative 
Creighton and Rozen (1997) believed that the consultation process in the original Victorian 
OHS Act (1985), was potentially one of the most important rights given to the OHS 
representative in the legislation, because of the potential to promote what they described as 
participative democracy at the workplace.  However they also recognised the potential that 
such a process could have in significantly encroaching and impinging upon the traditions of 
what is sometimes known as managerial prerogatives (Creighton & Rozen 1997; Gunningham 
& Johnstone 1999). 
 
Collins (1996) had earlier inferred that the notion of managerial prerogative existed because 
management have always had an ongoing struggle to secure control over output levels and 
labour discipline.  He suggested that employee participation was merely set up to deflect or 
temper worker aspirations and was simply another managerial control initiative.  In his 
critical appraisal and evaluation on the concept of employee empowerment, Collins (1996) 
argued that it was management who generally controlled the workplace and unilaterally set 
the conditions of employment, thereby having the greatest influence over the workplace 
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environment.  He suggested it was the degree of empowerment and what issues employees 
actually had any influence over that should be questioned and challenged, rather than whether 
employees were engaged in any type of employee participation programme.  He further 
argued that the rhetoric of employee empowerment has been used by management for their 
own ideological purposes, without any clear evidence that the process had actually benefited 
workers in any meaningful way.   
 
A similar belief was presented by McIntyre (2005), albeit in a slightly different manner, in 
which he described managerial prerogative as managements' power to define efficiency and 
the nature of the labour process.  He suggested that it was the definition of these particular 
terms, which was the cause of much antagonism between management and workers.  Indeed, 
in his longitudinal study of a NSW State Transit bus company and how notions of managerial 
prerogative affected stress levels of workers, McIntyre found that the discourse that takes 
place over OHS is ineffective in the face of the hegemony of the discourse of managerial 
prerogative and the power of managers to ultimately define efficiency.  He believed that to 
some members of management, the mere questioning of managerial prerogative, especially by 
employees, was akin to questioning ‘truth effects’ such as the law of gravity.  Such an 
approach corresponds with Butler (2005), who argued that managerial prerogative is ‘…the 
dominance and ideological hegemony of management, serving to routinely privilege 
managerial interpretations of given situations…’ (p.285). 
 
In general, managerial prerogative is readily identified with autocratic management, which as 
a consequence, tends to restrict the benefits that accrue from employee participation and 
consultation.  Jones (2003) believed that organisations that operate in this manner are more 
focused on the organisations’ bottom line, as opposed to strengthening the longer term 
strategic goals, which can often be achieved through the utilization of the knowledge and 
skills that are readily available throughout the organisation.  In demonstrating the negative 
effects that this type of managerial approach has on the transferring of knowledge and skill 
within an organisation, Jones found that there are implications for the level of trust between 
workers and management, and that at times, there was a complete lack of trust between the 
parties in such an environment. 
 
Many managers have indicated that the participatory and consultation process had 
significantly impinged upon their roles and responsibilities, ending in frustration and 
resentment by many in the managerial melting pot (Grison & Worland 2000).  But according 
to Sargeant (2001), workplace consultation is not about stopping managerial prerogatives; 
rather it is about making management decisions subject to a process of an exchange of views 
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with employee representatives.  In essence, it is about establishing a dialogue process that is 
considered and accountable, prior to decisions being made and subsequently implemented.  
This is in some ways consistent with an earlier approach taken by Lashley and McGoldrick 
(1994).  They believed that employee empowerment was about embracing a wider variety of 
ideas and practices, including the notions of consultation and communication with employees, 
and should be seen not so much as a way of doing away with the more traditional and 
conventional ideas of managerial control, but rather as a way of varying the forms of the 
exercising of that control.  As Gollan and Patmore (2003) suggested, consultation is nothing 
more than employees having ‘…a right to know at an early stage and to have meaningful 
input into decisions which fundamentally affect their lives and livelihoods…’ (p.15). 
 
Indeed, Larsson (2000) suggested that it is a myth that employers exist to provide a ‘good 
shepherd’ type-role in protecting the health and safety of all workers at the workplace.  He 
believed that what was required was a combination of a new regulatory regime and the 
application of health and safety management systems that would not only stabilize work 
activities, but also utilise both practical and scientific research, in an effort to provide the ‘… 
necessary preconditions for successful injury prevention…’ (p.225).  He went on to suggest 
that future regulatory systems need to find a way of linking the work activities to the internal 
control routines of an organisation.  He believed that this was best carried out by returning the 
main responsibilities of the health and safety management system back towards the actors (i.e. 
both managers and workers) at the workplace, so they could authorise the necessary decisions 
for the prevention of injuries and catastrophes.   
 
It was considered by Booth (1996) that consultation initiatives had at least given women, who 
were the subjects of her research, a greater say and input into planning processes.  Booth 
considered that her three case studies had several lessons that should be learnt, including that 
if consultation was to be successful, it required the elements of education, training and 
confidence building.  According to Booth, effective consultation involved elements of 
sustained dialogue and interaction between the parties and importantly, required widespread 
political support to secure its long term future.   
 
Compared to Europe, the process of joint decision-making practices are very much 
underdeveloped in Australian workplaces, with survey data indicating that workplace 
decisions are increasingly being left to employers and managers alone (Gollan & Patmore 
2003).  This, according to Gollan and Patmore has led to ‘…a representation gap…’ (p.16), 
which they believed was a very serious omission in Australian corporate decision making and 
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one which they felt had left Australia decades behind European Union (EU) developments in 
workplace consultation rights. 
 
 
2.2.3 Consultation and industrial relations: control, 
power or consensus? 
Historically, compared to the rest of the world, Australian managers have lagged in their 
appreciation and support of employee and democratic participation in the workplace (Morgan 
& Zeffane 2003, Davis & Lansbury 1996).  This is perhaps surprising because it is generally 
acknowledged that employee representation schemes can produce great social, economic, 
cultural and health and safety benefits (Arthur & Dong-One 2005; Combet 2003; Gollan & 
Patmore 2003; Blewett 2001).  However, while society may often outwardly promote 
‘democracy’, in some cases, at least in the workplace, its practice may be less evident 
(Cooling 2005).   
 
In Australia, Buchanan (1996) argued that the rhetoric about the need for employee 
involvement and participation has not always been matched in practice, because managerial 
and human resource management ideology has meant that in reality, consultation and 
employee participation has largely been based on management terms or subsequently not at 
all.  As Wilkinson et al. (2004) noted, ‘…the levels at which employees have a say remains 
the preserve of managerial control…’ (p.299). 
 
In 1996, the Australian conservative federal government unilaterally removed all provisions 
dealing with employee consultation from federal industrial awards.  Gollan and Patmore 
(2003) argued that that unlike citizens in European democracies, this meant that employees 
under Australian Commonwealth law had no general right to be consulted in their workplaces 
or become what they called ‘industrial citizens’.  Effectively, the 1996 changes meant that 
Australian industrial law failed to recognise the basic right of employees to be informed and 
consulted when organisations failed or engaged in major restructuring (Forsyth 2003).  
 
The then Dean of Law at Sydney University, Emeritus Professor Ron McCallum, felt the 
1996 changes were not in keeping with the general philosophies of consultation and employee 
participation, stating that: ‘It has always seemed incongruous to me that while Australian 
citizens are able to elect their governments, when they enter their work and become industrial 
citizens, they have no legal right to elect a consultative body to participate in workplace 
governance…’ (ACTU 2001). 
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The changes also belied evidence that collective employee representation can assist with 
better OHS performance, higher rates of economic growth and is positively associated with 
organisational performance (Peetz 2006; Walters et al 2005; Wilkinson et al. 2004; Gollan & 
Patmore 2003; Walters & Frick 2000).  According to Gollan (2003), where employee 
participation has been introduced, it had not only proved beneficial to an organisations 
performance and productivity, but had also improved employee morale and contributed to the 
effectiveness of organisational change.  Such organisational change and the positive link with 
the process of consultation had earlier been highlighted by Mathews (1994).  He argued that 
commitment to consultation had been a key factor in the success of organisational change and 
innovation in many organisations.  While such co-operative tendencies do not altogether 
eliminate adversarial and conflicting elements, it does tend to channel conflict in such a way 
as to assist in the solving of conflict in a more co-operative and consensual manner (Gollan 
2003).   
 
In his paper discussing employee rights, Rowan (2000) argued that one of the most 
fundamental rights of all employees is the right of health and safety at or in the workplace, 
and that all employers have a duty to provide a safe working environment and to make 
improvements as necessary.  He believed that failure to do so amounts to a deliberate attempt 
to mislead employees in an effort to simply hold down labour costs.  It was Rowan’s belief 
that the moral and ethical importance of the rights and interests of employees cannot and 
should not be separated once they enter a workplace because employees are persons first and 
foremost, and must therefore be respected and must never be treated only as a means of 
production.  Rowan saw the rights of an employee’s freedom, well being and equality being 
captured under what he called a ‘rubric of respect’ (p.357). 
 
According to Collins (1997), interest in employee empowerment has not just been about 
employee democracy or empowerment, but more so represented an acknowledgement that 
workers were basically smarter than management may had ever wanted to admit.  Indeed, 
Collins suggested that in some circumstances, management have even been forced to 
restructure different control initiatives in order for their larger business and organisational 
goals to be attained.  This, Collins suggested, has shown that the true interest and motivating 
forces in employee empowerment has often been driven around managements’ need and 
desire to secure control, while simultaneously ensuring co-operation. 
 
Ideological, political and economic structures and factors are acknowledged and recognised 
as important influences in the shaping of managerial strategies and the degree of the levels of 
involvement in representative structures and decision-making processes at the workplace 
33 
 
(Härenstam et al. 2006; Peetz 2006; Gaventa & Cornwall 2001; Walters & Frick 2000).  It is 
also argued that power and knowledge at the workplace are inextricably intertwined 
(Antonsen 2009; Gaventa & Corwall 2001; Park 2001) and need to be carefully analysed and 
considered in any study of industrial relations and organisational culture (Antonsen 2009; 
Alexander & Lewer 1994). 
 
In light of this, the definition of power is often taken to be an ability to dominate or benignly 
control the nature of social relations; including that of the relations that occur at the 
workplace, or what is more commonly referred to as industrial relations (Antonsen 2009; Park 
2001; Alexander & Lewer 1994).  If certain voices are therefore excluded from the workplace 
debate, such non-participation can often be mistakenly interpreted as apathy or inefficacy, 
rather than a process of exclusion in what is essentially a political process (Gaventa & 
Corwall 2001).  Indeed, Gaventa and Cornwall claimed that the hidden face of power is not so 
much about who wins or loses on an issue, but rather who is prevented from becoming 
involved in the discussions in the first place.  In their view, ‘…empowerment through 
knowledge means not only challenging expertise, but it means expanding who participates in 
the knowledge-production process…’ (p.71). 
 
According to Gaventa and Cornwall, the exercising of power over grievances involving a 
conflict between the powerful and the powerless, cannot been seen as isolated from the 
concept that the prevention of such conflict arising in the first place is as insidious, if not 
more so, than the conflict itself.  They believed that the powerful are often not only able to 
adversely influence who in fact acts upon the grievances, but are also able to initially 
influence the level and degree of consciousness and awareness of the grievances. 
 
Antonsen (2009) believed that power, like culture, was notoriously difficult to neatly define 
and classify.  This led him to provide some useful insights into the types of power that is often 
encountered throughout an organisation.  Included in these views were: 
 
1. Positional power: being how organisations distribute different levels of formal 
authority to the various positions within their hierarchy. 
2. Information and expertise power: described as the power of ‘know how and know 
what’.  It is the ability to control the knowledge or information flow that is crucial to 
the organisation. 
3. Control of rewards and resources power: Control over material and resources (e.g. 
money, employment) and immaterial resources (e.g. recognition, political support).  
Antonsen believed that this was the most common and visible source of power. 
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4. Coercive power: Considered as the power most closely connected to the ability of the 
actors or groups to have control over sanctions which are primarily reliant upon the 
ability to constrain, block, interfere or punish. 
5. Alliances and networks power: Described as the power of ‘know who’, allowing 
actors the ability to tap into other actor’s sources of power;  and finally 
6. Personal power: considered as the charisma, energy, political skills and verbal 
facility amongst individuals that constitutes the source of the power. 
 
The above points provide examples of why, when examining organisational culture and 
subsequently the safety culture of an organisation, the issue of power within the organisation, 
needs to be carefully considered.  Indeed, Antonsen (2009) suggested that ‘… the strength of 
power-based approaches lies in their emphasis on questions regarding whose interests 
organizations serve.  Organizational culture is never politically neutral, but is likely to be 
biased in reflecting the values and world-views of dominant groups in the organization.’ 
(p.187).   
 
Buchanan and Thornthwaite (2001) had earlier suggested that economic and political 
conditions profoundly constrain and shape the behaviour of an enterprise.  However this is 
hardly a new revelation.  Karl Marx firmly believed that ideology was inextricably linked to 
the economic base of society and through this, those that held the economic and political 
hegemony were therefore able to shape and manipulate the perceptions and views over those 
who did not (Crotty 1998).  In this regard, in terms of how power relates to, and potentially 
influences and affects the application and indeed the effectiveness of consultation and 
employee empowerment, Collins (1997) was of the opinion that: ‘…moves towards 
empowerment, so called, are actually predicated on control and, in making the best use of the 
new politico-economic environment of employee relations, the various schemes are often 
representative of attempts to sideline trade unionism, or are attempts to disguise or obscure 
the true nature and spirit of management…’(p.25).   
 
 
2.2.4 Direct and collective representation and 
participation 
According to Härenstam et al. (2006), the issue of employee participation, be it direct or 
indirect, (the latter most commonly via a trade union and more commonly known as 
collective representation) has been, and continues to be, of great interest in studies of working 
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life.  Within this debate on consultation and employee participation, the literature indicates 
that over the past decade or so, there has been a gradual move away from collective 
representation to an increasing focus on the individual (Peetz 2006; Walters et al. 2005; 
Wilkinson et al. 2004; Morgan & Zeffane 2003).   
 
Collins (1994) believed that the focus on the individual was mainly to do with ‘…some 
restricted form of information exchange, by which managers communicate directly with 
workers in order to smooth the path to some form of change or development within the 
organization…’ (p.18).  He felt that the term participation too often equated only with a very 
limited and restricted form of quality employee representation and that overall, the very 
notion of employee participation was simply used as a process to legitimise the managerial 
controlled agenda, rather than a full and true representation of employee involvement in the 
overall decision-making process. 
 
In comparing the quality and efficacy of direct and indirect consultation, whilst Cameron et 
al. (2006) noted that while direct consultation can be effective, they also recognized the 
limitations and the logistical difficulties that can and do eventuate in implementing such a 
form of consultation.  This is especially so when a workplace, or indeed an industry such as 
the construction industry, is based upon a transient workforce and has an abundance of 
subcontractors, smaller contractors and many other individual subcontracting workers that 
make up the majority of the workforce population (Lingard & Rowlinson 2007; Quinlan & 
Mayhew 2000).  Such individual or direct consulting can be both expensive and extremely 
time consuming, which are arguably two of the main considerations and concerns for any 
subcontractor in the construction industry (Frick et al. 2000; Quinlan & Mayhew 2000; 
Quinlan & Bohl 1991).  According to Cameron et al. (2006), on large commercial and 
industrial construction sites, which generally have large numbers of workers working for a 
multitude of sub-contractors, individual consultation generally appears to be only superficial, 
thereby reducing the effectiveness and meaningfulness of the consultation process. 
 
Whilst Cameron et al. (2006) believed that ‘it is only through direct worker engagement that a 
‘blame-free’ culture can be developed to engender trust and openness…’ (p.6), the issues of 
transiency and insecurity of employment that typify the construction industry need to be 
positively addressed if such consultation is to be successful (Lingard & Rowlinson 2007; 
Quinlan & Mayhew 2000).  These issues have previously been identified as negatively 
affecting the ability and inclination of individual workers from speaking up against unsafe 
and unsavoury working conditions (Quinlan & Mayhew 2000).  Nonetheless, Antonsen, 
Almklov and Fenstad (2008) claimed that a more inclusive and direct approach in terms of 
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worker input and participation, in both the formation and implementation of actual working 
practices, can still be beneficial to organisations, provided it is implemented in a structured, 
systematic and comprehensive manner.   
 
While the approach of consulting with individual workers is promoted by many industry 
bodies, trade associations and politically and ideologically conservative lobbying groups as 
being successful and effective, there still appears to be a lack of empirical data that 
adequately demonstrates this.  Conversely, there is strong evidence that continually reveals 
the success and effectiveness of collective representation and consultation – especially over 
OHS (Quinlan 2009; Lunt et al. 2008; Walters 2006; Wilkinson et al. 2004; Quinlan & 
Mayhew 2000; Walters & Frick 2000).  In terms of such evidence, Cameron et al. (2006) had 
earlier referred to numerous studies which they claimed provided clear verification that 
effective worker involvement and consultation is reliant upon committed trade union activity 
in the workplace; hence the notion of collectivism and, through this, indirect or collective 
consultation via duly elected OHS representatives.   
 
However, while they recognized the importance of trade union involvement and the collective 
idealism that is fundamental to trade unionism, they also cautioned that this approach would 
not automatically guarantee lower rates of accidents and incidents or indeed increased levels 
of occupational health and safety.  Nevertheless, they believed the trade union still remains 
one of the main sources of OHS advice and information for many affected workers, even 
though the evidence of trade union involvement is perhaps not as overwhelming as some may 
like to portray. 
 
Gill (2009) claims that the strength of collective representation is that it allows workers to 
initiate issues and grievances and enables them to confidently seek advice over issues and 
grievances without the fear of company reprisals.  Interesting, she also indicated that there is 
substantial evidence that shows that a collective voice and group representation actually 
compliments the individual voice.  Rather than seeing the individual voice as a substitute for 
the collective voice, Gill believed that the two forms of employee voice should be seen to 
complement one another.  Instead of debating the positives and negatives of either collective 
representative or individual employee engagement, Cameron et al. (2006) believed it was the 
issue of competent advice which was the real factor in determining whether or not effective 
and meaningful worker engagement and consultation occurred.   
 
It is generally accepted that representative participation at the workplace has generally 
evolved from trade union and organised labour activities both within and outside the 
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workplace.  Walters et al. (2005) have linked such activities with ‘…the development of the 
institutions of socially democratic welfare societies…’(p.9).  In drawing a distinction between 
the two forms of employee participation, they believed that while collective or representative 
participation primarily helps workers achieve a degree of protection from exploitation by 
employers, research continues to suggest that direct arrangements for participation will only 
protect workers and give them any degree of influence if workers are in a strong bargaining 
position, ably supported by a strong and active trade union.  But such trade union strength or 
influence is not always seen as favourable or indeed necessary. 
 
A point in case was the large scale structural changes in both the economic and industrial 
contexts that took place in the UK under the conservative platform of the Thatcher 
government during the 1980s.  According to Collins (1997), these changes were designed not 
only to combat inflation, but to de-collectivize and deregulate the economy and restrict trade 
union voice and activity in the workplace.  The emphasis on these changes brought about a 
refocus on the individual worker’s commitment to managerial goals, attempting to hold the 
individual worker accountable for their personal contributions and efforts towards achieving 
the managerial and business goals of the organisation.  Collins argued that these changes had 
little to do with improving worker conditions, rights and interests, and provided little, if any, 
level of worker involvement and influence in decision making.  Taken in this context, such an 
approach appears to support the later findings of Page (2002), who argued that many of the 
meanings and interpretations given to the terms consultation and worker representation, 
appear to have been driven largely by ideological philosophies and agendas.   
 
At the time of the UK changes, Collins (1997) noted that the British system was in marked 
contrast to that of the majority of other western European nations, who operated on the basis 
of openly including, as opposed to excluding, collective representation.  It is difficult to know 
whether such a process made UK organisations any more productive and profitable than their 
western European counterparts.  While admitting that the indicators for success or otherwise 
on such matters is difficult, Collins highlighted the very competitive record of a range of 
many western European companies who did not follow the path of excluding collective 
employee representation over the same period.  In his opinion this ‘…certainly gives food for 
thought…’ (p.21), about the benefits or otherwise of excluding collective representation. 
 
Given the nature of the economic and industrial changes that the UK underwent during the 
1980s, it is perhaps understandable why scribes such as Collins (1997) who, while generally 
sympathetic to the concept of employee empowerment, appear to find it difficult to 
unequivocally and wholeheartedly support a concept that in his view, too often controls and 
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suppresses true employee voice, participation and involvement.  It is perhaps too early to 
accurately determine just what long-term effects, if any, the Australian conservative federal 
government industrial relation changes in March 2006 may have had on the concepts of 
consultation and employee participation.  But in the UK, the Health and Safety Executive 
(2000) claimed that the changes in industrial relations laws that took place during the 
Thatcher government regime, together with the restructuring of their economy and the 
resulting changes in the patterns of work organisation that have occurred preceding the year 
2000, have all made it increasingly difficult for consultation to succeed - even where there are 
statutory arrangements in place for consultation to occur. 
 
While there may never be complete agreement over whether representative employee 
participation or direct employee participation or consultation is more effective or efficient 
than the other, Walters and Frick (2000) claimed that ‘…research on direct participation in 
general indicates enormous variation in the degree of participation experience and only in a 
minority of cases, is there a high degree of worker involvement’ (p.48).  Indeed, Quinlan and 
Bohle (1991) were of the firm belief that regardless of the type of environment workers may 
find themselves in, some workers, by themselves, will simply not be in a position to either 
articulate or defend their interests against managerial and or corporate directives and 
philosophies. 
 
The need to have constructive and positive engagement between employers and employees, 
regardless of whether it be by a direct or indirect approach, would appear to be a crucial 
element in the success or otherwise of consultation and employee participation.  While there 
is always the potential for conflict and disputation to occur within all organisations, especially 
over particular philosophies and directives, the process of consultation and worker 
participation does provide a foundation upon which better industrial relations can be 
established (Shearn 2005).  One such approach, which has created a great deal of debate and 
interest between industry players in Australia, has been the notion of a European-style 
partnership arrangement at the workplace (Gollan & Patmore 2003).   
 
 
2.2.5  A partnership approach 
In the industrial relations environment of Europe, the participants in a partnership 
arrangement are often referred to as social partners, a term which Gollan & Patmore (2003) 
described as encompassing government, employers, employees and trade union 
representatives.  They believed that this European-type model embraced not only industrial 
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issues, but also took account of the broader social implications that work has on everyday life, 
thereby highlighting the important social rights and responsibilities of both employers and 
employees.  However, this approach is quite different from that of the traditional Australian 
methodology of dealing with industrial relation issues.  The European partnership is primarily 
based upon a consultative and consensus methodology, which, according to Gollan and 
Patmore, may be incompatible with the free-market economic approach of Australia.  In their 
opinion, the Australian industrial relations environment has been founded upon the basis of 
conflict, rather than consensus.  The consensus approach, such as that found in the 
Scandinavian model, has always had a very high degree of worker involvement and 
participation.   
 
One model often cited in the literature, which reflects the Scandinavian approach, is the 
Norwegian OHS regulatory framework (Hart 2002).  The Norwegian model is seen as unique 
in an international context, requiring what Hart (2002) considered an unusually high level of 
worker involvement, with unions actively integrated into the safety regime in a true tripartite 
decision-making process.  Norwegian regulation has been founded very much upon a 
democratic tradition, requiring a high degree of participation, co-operation, dialogue and 
workplace democracy between the parties (Saksvik & Quinlan 2003).  This approach 
continues today, and according to Saksvik and Quinlan, underlies the importance of collective 
participation and involvement from all parties to help implement positive change at the 
workplace.   
 
It is generally acknowledged that the Scandinavian model has achieved much of its success 
and acceptance primarily because of the historical industrial democracy programmes of 
Scandinavia, programmes that Australia has arguably failed to successfully implement and 
achieve (Gunningham & Johnstone 1999).  But this failure should not be seen as a 
disincentive or an unassailable impasse for the principles and fundamental philosophies that 
industrial partnerships are based upon to be further explored and examined, provided this is 
done with a full understanding of any limitations that a partnership program may incur.   
 
While some claimed that the partnership approach tends to foster a more positive consultative 
arrangement amongst industry players (Gollan & Patmore 2003; Combet 2003; Fuller & 
Vassie 2002), others believe this can only occur if the partnership arrangement encapsulates a 
number of key features (Suff & Williams 2004; Martinez-Lucio & Stuart 2002; Oxenbridge & 
Brown 2002).  These features include: 
 A joint commitment of the parties to the success of the enterprise; 
 The building of trusting relationships by recognising legitimate roles and interests; 
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 Addressing the quality of working life; 
 Equal opportunities and fair treatment for all; 
 Employment security; 
 Provision of quality-enhancing training programs; and 
 The provision for information sharing and joint problem solving between managers 
and employees. 
 
In recognition of, and in an attempt to address these features, the research of Martinez-Lucio 
and Stuart (2002) found little evidence to suggest that the partnership arrangement actually 
improved employment security, transparency and employee involvement and the quality of 
working life for employees.  In particular, they found very low managerial commitment to 
any type of training or investment in the partnership concept, suggesting this could also be 
reflective of a lack of trust by management in both their workforce and the overall partnership 
concept.  The requirement for adequate levels of trust and commitment before the 
complimentary yet different objectives of the partners are able to be met, would in fact appear 
to be crucial to the success or otherwise of any type of industrial partnership arrangement 
(Gill & Meyer 2008; Vassie & Fuller 2003; Guest & Peccei 2001).   
 
An assessment framework was considered by Fuller and Vassie (2002) as a necessary and 
almost fundamental tool in their attempt to explore what inputs were required, and what 
outputs were actually being achieved, in a partnership arrangement.  They believed the more 
mature an organisational culture was in terms of issues such as commitment, trust, co-
operation, control and the attitudes of managers and safety information in general, the more 
successful the partnership arrangement would be.  They claimed that the success of any 
partnership arrangement was ultimately dependent upon the levels of cultural maturity 
displayed by each of the organisations within the partnership arrangement.  In later research, 
Vassie and Fuller (2003) concluded that the adoption of cooperative partnerships, which they 
saw as being reflective of organisational maturity, represented the best approach for achieving 
the goals of each of the partners. 
 
It has also been suggested that a major contributing factor to low levels of trust in any 
effective partnership arrangement, is the level employment security (Suff & Williams 2004; 
Martinez-Lucio & Stuart 2002).  While job security may well be problematic due to market 
forces and international processes making it virtually impossible for any management to 
uphold the promise to sustain jobs in the long term, this issue, together with the types of 
supporting mechanisms and strategies that may be expected to at least provide some level of 
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comfort and support to workers, does not appear to have been adequately addressed in many 
partnership arrangements (Suff & Williams 2004; Martinez-Lucio & Stuart 2002).   
 
Effective partnerships have been recognised and acknowledged as a key factor in increased 
levels of occupational health and safety as well as contributing to positive business 
performance (Fuller & Vassie 2002).  But if the partnership arrangement is to continue along 
such lines, Rimmer (2005) believed that the partnership itself must be ‘... explicit, of mutual 
benefit and should seek to identify and build on the strengths of each partner to create a more 
substantial and effective output than either party could achieve on its own’  (p.36).   
 
In contrast to this, the research of Stuff and Williams (2004) found that in the UK at least, the 
majority of partnership arrangements appeared to be more of a management device or tool, 
which enhanced organisational and business performance, rather than being an offer of 
genuine mutuality.  They concluded that while the partnership arrangement was meant to 
deliver better outcomes for each partner, this was not always the case – especially for the 
trade union.  While meaning to deliver a sense of security guaranteeing trade union presence 
and involvement at the workplace, Stuff and Williams believed that most partnership 
arrangements challenged and undermined trade union organisation.   
 
Such findings were consistent with the earlier research of Oxenbridge and Brown (2002), who 
believed that partnership arrangements had more to do with organisational change; with the 
benefits of those arrangements generally flowing only to management.  In their research, also 
conducted in the UK, they found that while trade unions were often offered easier access to 
the workplace for recruitment of membership, the partnership arrangement tended to restrict 
trade union activity and involvement in employment relation matters.  Over a period of time, 
there was a subtle limitation or down grading of the status of the union partner, explicitly 
curbing the power and influence of the trade union at the workplace (Oxenbridge & Brown 
2002).   
 
In terms of an effective partnership arrangement, Sargeant (2001) believed that the challenge 
for management was to fundamentally review their organisation in such a way as to assist in 
the creation of a climate of mutual trust and partnership based upon the concepts of flexibility 
and security.  He believed the challenge for trade unions was one of ensuring that they 
exercised a constructive and active role in the innovation and modernisation process within 
organisations, a role that would assist in the achievement of a sustainable balance between 
both society and their own member’s social and economic objectives.  Martinez-Lucio and 
Stuart (2002) also believed that the partnership arrangement represented the opportunity for 
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linking organisational effectiveness with social considerations, via the establishment of a new 
voice for labour in what they described as the corridors of corporate and workplace life.  
Accordingly, they claimed the debate on partnerships should be ‘…premised on detecting and 
establishing firm foundations for the renewal and extension of labour participation within 
employment relations on matters such as communications, involvement, the quality of 
working life and business objectives’  (p.308). 
 
The challenge in an Australian context, as Gollan and Patmore (2003) highlighted in their 
literature review and analysis of consultation and employee participation, was to create a 
partnership in the workplace where workers and employers are prepared to deal with each 
other as equals, in an atmosphere of trust, mutual recognition, respect, honesty and genuine 
commitment.  According to Gill (2009), this would effectively mean moving away from a 
strict pluralist industrial relations model, encompassing the characteristics of autocratic 
management and hostile unions and confrontation, but also moving beyond a strict unitarist 
model, which has no role for trade unions at all.  In short, she believed it would mean moving 
to a more co-operative partnership approach with unions, an approach she believed would 
better facilitate the sharing of benefits and gains for all partners.  The task for government in 
any such partnership arrangement, is not to create divisions within the community, but rather 
to put in place a more co-operative industrial relations framework; a framework that would 
assist in the building of a genuine partnership approach (Gollan and Patmore 2003). 
 
 
2.3 Consultation in the OHS environment: bridging the 
divide between industrial relations and occupational 
health and safety 
Within the occupational health and safety milieu, there is general consensus that worker 
involvement via employee representation and consultation is vital to OHS success (Johnstone 
2005; Walters et al. 2005; Wilkinson et al. 2004; Page 2002).  In this respect, while it is 
important to abide by the legal requirements to include worker representation in participatory 
mechanisms, it is equally important to include workers because of their first hand knowledge 
of the hazards they face and, often, their solutions of the best ways of abating them 
(Johnstone 2005; Cooling 2005; Committee on Health and Safety at Work 1972).  It is also 
acknowledged that when workers are involved with health and safety at the workplace, it 
further stimulates their interest, which has been found to have a positive effect on the 
preventative approach taken by management over OHS (Walters 1998b). 
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The notion of involving workers in the improvement and maintenance of their workplace 
conditions is neither a new, nor indeed a radical, proposal.  Evidence from the UK suggests 
that miners were allowed to inspect their workplaces as far back as 1872 (HSE 2000).  But for 
some parties, worker involvement in OHS should somehow be treated as separate and 
distinctly different from worker involvement in industrial relations.   
 
Historically, the distinction between industrial relations and OHS commenced in the UK in 
the early nineteenth century and was carried over and continued in Australia and other British 
colonies (Quinlan 1993).  In Australia, this distinction between industrial relations and OHS 
was also founded upon the notion that OHS legislation should largely be developed 
independently of industrial relation laws (Quinlan & Bohle 1991).  However it is now 
generally acknowledged that OHS is an industrial relations issue and should not be treated 
separately or in ways different to that of other industrial relation matters, since the social and 
health and safety implications of work organisation cannot be separated from the labour 
relations context (Frick et al. 2000; Hopkins 1995; Creighton & Gunningham 1985).  Indeed, 
Quinlan (2009) suggested that while there has been a long standing position that health and 
safety should be quarantined from the industrial relations agenda, such an argument is 
fanciful because it ignores the realities of how OHS is implicated via the very means of the 
way work is organized and carried out.   
 
In an earlier study, Gunningham and Johnstone (1999) believed that the link between 
industrial relations and OHS was reinforced by reason of the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act 1985 (Vic) originally giving OHS representatives extensive powers
7
 at the workplace.  In 
their opinion, this significantly eroded notions of managerial prerogative and explicitly 
reconnected OHS and industrial relations.  Quinlan (1993) had earlier argued along similar 
lines, believing that the participatory model of OHS legislation had implicitly reintegrated the 
subjects of OHS and industrial relations with its emphasis on worker involvement.  Quinlan 
further highlighted how effective he believed collective industrial representation had been in 
putting forward what he called ‘normative judgements’ in OHS standard setting, thereby 
helping to decide what was, or was not, an acceptable risk in an occupational setting.   
 
A more recent paper by Härenstam et al. (2006) suggested that the recognition of 
occupational health and safety as an industrial relation issue goes back even further, when 
they highlighted research undertaken in the first half of the twentieth century.  They claimed 
that this research used field studies to look at how work practices affected the health and 
                                               
7 The Occupational Health and Safety Act (2004) Vic retains and builds upon these original powers of the OHS 
representative. 
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welfare of workers, as well as the productivity capacities of their organisations, thereby 
joining the two elements as one industrial issue.  The mere fact that work practices and work 
organisation are now considered to be interdependent, further strengthens the argument that 
OHS should be treated in the same way as any other industrial relations issue (Quinlan 2009; 
Härenstam et al. 2006, Frick et al. 2000; Hopkins 1995; Quinlan & Bohle 1991). 
 
The commentary on the general philosophy behind consultation in the OHS context was 
described by Blewett (2001a) as ‘…encouraging a collaborative approach to problem solving 
between management, workers and their representatives to make the working environment 
healthy and safe…’ (p.55). Predominantly, Lord Robens’ investigation in the UK (Committee 
on Health and Safety at Work 1972) recognised the importance of worker and trade union 
involvement and the crucial role workers play in any self regulatory type system if such a 
system is to be successful (HSE 2000).  One of the outcomes of the Robens’ report was the 
practice of OHS representatives being elected at the workplace arranged through trade unions 
or through workgroups. The OHS representatives’ role was, and still is, primarily to represent 
employees in the process of consultation in the management of workplace health and safety.  
According to the Health and Safety Executive (2000), health and safety representatives have 
been, and continue to be, the cornerstone of consultation over occupational health and safety.   
 
 
2.3.1  OHS representatives and their trade union 
Evidence available today indicates that one of the most effective means of making workplaces 
safer is for the workplace to be unionised and have elected trade union OHS representatives 
(Hillyard, Pantazis, Tombs, Gordon & Corling 2005; Walters & Frick 2000; Quinlan & 
Mayhew 2000).  According to Wilkinson et al. (2004) the presence of recognised trade unions 
and union representation on formal joint consultative committees also ensures a fair and 
independent voice is heard in such forums.  While this evidence may indicate the importance 
of trade union involvement, the mere presence of trade union representation at the workplace 
does not automatically guarantee improved levels of OHS and overall OHS performance 
(Cameron et al. 2006). 
 
What is required, is what Gill (2007) described in her research as strong and competent trade 
unions that can not only improve safety, but are also able to assist in the creation of high 
levels of trust and commitment at the workplace.  This, in turn, provides a more cooperative 
relationship between all the parties.  This would appear to reinforce and support the earlier 
work of Gollan and Patmore (2003) who claimed that ‘… trade union representation of 
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employees is of obvious importance in building an improved system of employee 
participation’ (p.26).  
 
Lunt et al. (2008) believed that there was ample evidence that indicated that workplaces, with 
trade union OHS representatives and safety committees, performed far better in terms of 
fewer accidents and incidents of ill health than non-union sites.  They argued that trade unions 
had a particular role to play in supporting and training the OHS representatives so that 
effective workforce engagement could take place on construction sites, claiming that ‘… in 
cases where trade unions were present, more meaningful worker consultation and 
representation on health and safety has been found…’ (p.40).  Empirical evidence collected 
from the UK tends to support such claims, showing that where trade union safety 
representatives work together with employers, accident rates are up to 50% lower than where 
managers alone make decisions over OHS (Health and Safety Executive 2000).   
 
The research of Walters, Kirby and Daly (2001) indicated that the effective involvement of 
trade union OHS representatives relied heavily upon the quality of the training and the 
support that the trade union provided to them.  Trade union training appeared to give OHS 
representatives the knowledge, confidence, power and ability to challenge and question the 
decisions made by management in relation to their member’s health and safety (Walters 2003, 
1998b).  The work of Walters and Frick (2000) appeared to support this, stating that ‘…the 
significance of both the quality and quantity of trade union training has emerged very clearly 
from European surveys as crucial to both the development and integration of representation in 
health and safety at the workplace level…’, and that ‘…this training is also unmatched by any 
other source of provision’ (p.48). 
 
This sentiment was also supported by Shearn (2004), who claimed that worker participation 
was more effective where trade unions provided training and support for workers.  He 
believed trade unions and trade union OHS representatives in the UK appeared to have a 
positive impact upon safety performance when compared with non-union workplaces, which 
in general appeared to have poorer levels of OHS.  Hall, Forrest, Sears and Carlan (2006) 
considered that the most effective OHS representatives were those whom they described in 
their research as ‘knowledge activists’.  Their research was based on unionised 
representatives in the automotive industry, where they described the activities of these 
representatives as a form of ‘...political activism organised around the collection and use of a 
wide variety of health and safety knowledge...’ (p.425).  Hall et al. considered that the 
strength of these representatives lay in their ability to contest management decisions via 
persuasion and argumentation, through their capacity to strategically collect and tactically use 
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technical, scientific and legal knowledge; especially when their organisations were planning 
large scale organisational and technological change. 
 
While it is generally acknowledged that having workers involved as genuine partners via 
direct worker participation will only succeed if adequate legal protection is provided under a 
legislative framework, it is also important to note that such legislative protection is much 
more effective in industries where trade unions are strong and safety conscious (Tombs 2005; 
Walters et al. 2005; Gunningham & Johnstone 1999; Quinlan & Bohle 1991).  Indeed, the 
Robens’ philosophy on OHS legislation and the general move towards OHS self-regulation 
was in fact predicated upon a strong and active trade union movement (Shearn 2004).   
 
However, as has been pointed out by Gunningham and Johnstone (1999), the decline in trade 
union membership and changes in industrial relation legislation is making strong trade 
unionism in many industries much more difficult to achieve.  According to Saksvik and 
Quinlan (2003), Australia has experienced a dramatic decline in union density and collective 
employment regulation over the past twenty years, especially with the election of 
conservative governments in the 1990s.  They argued that this has lessened participation and 
co-operation between the parties, and while the full effect that this may or may not have had 
on levels of OHS in the Australian workplace is yet to be fully and critically assessed, they 
believed that there is enough evidence to suggest that there are fewer effective workplace 
OHS committees and employee representatives.  Saksvik and Quinlan also argued that the 
lessening importance of tripartite collaboration has reduced the influence and the role that 
workers have been able to play in terms of vetting OHS management systems.   
 
The increasing trend towards outsourcing and the increasing proportion of small and medium 
enterprises in most economies is also believed to have contributed to the above situations.  
Indeed, both of these concepts are considered to be the antithesis of strong trade union 
participation in workplace health and safety (Cooling 2005; Walters & Frick 2000; Quinlan & 
Mayhew 2000).  But while the decline in trade union membership and influence is 
increasingly put forward as part of a politically conservative policy platform, Shearn (2004) 
argued that the trade union has yet to be replaced by any sustainable or indeed workable 
alternative. 
 
Quinlan (2009) believed that trade union presence and influence is essential to workplace 
safety.  He claimed that in reality, you do not find too many OHS representatives in 
workplaces where there is no union presence and stated that ‘… where you don’t have 
effective worker and union input, you have serious problems with health and safety…’ (p.24).  
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He further argued that having effective trade union and worker representation in matters of 
OHS at the workplace is essential if high levels of OHS are to be achieved and maintained.   
 
For example, the benefits of worker representation and effective trade union involvement in 
the off-shore oil industry has been well documented (Hart 2002).  Much of this was as a result 
of Lord Cullen’s Report in 1990, produced after the 1988 Piper Alpha offshore oil platform 
disaster (Hart 2002), in which Lord Cullen openly espoused the benefits and advantages of 
such representation and involvement between employers, workers and their trade union.   
 
Scandinavian countries such as Norway have a great tradition of such positive co-operation 
between employers, employees and their trade unions and the government.  However, the 
Scandinavian approach relies upon strong centralized unions, regulation-oriented governing 
authorities, governments having a close relationship with trade unions and an extensive 
formal agreement between what is known in Scandinavian countries as the work-life partners, 
based upon a true tripartite model (Saksvik & Quinlan 2003).  The Scandinavian model and in 
particular the Norwegian guidelines, is based upon the concept of employee participation 
throughout all stages of the work activities, with employee-elected representatives being 
given the real possibility to exercise influence on the working environment of their enterprise 
(Hart 2002).   
 
This approach is somewhat in contrast to the Australian federal industrial relation laws 
implemented under past conservative governments which have generally entailed very limited 
employee participation and involvement (Gollan 2003; Forsyth 2003; Gollan & Patmore 
2003; Buchanan 1996).  However, under Victorian occupational health and safety legislation, 
there is still quite a strong emphasis on employee involvement and consultation with OHS 
representatives over matters of OHS. 
 
 
2.3.2  Consultation and Victorian OHS legislation 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) recognises and acknowledges the 
importance of both consultation and employee representation.  In part it states: ‘… Employers 
and employees should exchange information and ideas about risks to health and safety…’ 
(Section 4 [1]), and ‘… Employees are entitled, and should be encouraged, to be represented 
in relation to health and safety issues’ (Section [4]5). 
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These statements are intended to build a framework to support the basic principles and 
concepts of both consultation and employee representation.  Such concepts and principles 
appear to be common throughout all Australian OHS jurisdictions, albeit with slight 
variations.  However, all State OHS jurisdictions agree that the fundamental approach to 
obtaining health and safety workplaces are in general, developed and maintained via 
consultation and employee representation.  
 
Under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) employers must consult, so far as 
is reasonably practicable, with their employees over any OHS issue that may affect those 
employees.  Consultation not only means providing employees with information about the 
OHS issues, it also means taking account of the employee’s points of view before any 
decision is made about a particular issue (WorkSafe Victoria 2005).  Significantly, the term 
employees now includes all independent subcontractors that are engaged by the employer and 
any of the employees of that subcontractor and or any persons employed through labour hire 
companies who perform work over which the employer has, or ought to have, control 
(WorkSafe Victoria 2005).   
 
The OHS Act 2004 (Vic) provides both the legal structure and the institutional framework to 
enable worker representation and worker consultation to take place.  While it is true that the 
Act provides a level of flexibility in terms of how consultation can or may occur, it is the 
experience of the author that in the industrial and commercial sector of the Victorian 
construction industry, that process is overwhelmingly taken up by duly elected OHS 
representatives, site or project managers and OHS committees.  These OHS representatives 
are predominantly members of the main trade unions within the industry.  The OHS Act 
requires that if employees are represented by duly elected OHS representatives, then the 
consultation process must involve that particular OHS representative (Section 36 [2]).    
 
The Act also provides a detailed format for consultation requirements, especially in terms of 
consultation with elected OHS representatives, and the obligations and requirements for 
employers to consult with employees on any proposed changes to the workplace that may 
affect the health or safety of employees (Section 35).  This includes consultation over risk 
assessments and safe work method statements which are commonly used throughout the 
Victorian construction industry and recognised within the Victorian legislative framework. 
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2.3.3 Consultation and the process of risk management 
and risk assessment 
Risk is acknowledged as an inherent part of business and public life (Tchankova 2002).  In 
terms of an organisational concept, Tchankova (2002) described risk as covering all aspects 
of an organisations activity which, ideally, should be incorporated at all levels of 
management.  She believed that risk management should be considered as a major part of an 
organisation’s activities and should be aimed and structured to primarily assist and reach the 
overall aims of the organisation.  In regards to this approach, Tchankova claimed that risk 
identification is the first stage in the process of risk management, which in turn forms the 
basis of the next steps in the process of risk analysis and risk control.  Taking all this into 
consideration, if a key indicator of OHS success is in fact meaningful and effective 
consultation, then it stands to reason that the process of risk identification and risk assessment 
should also provide for effective and meaningful consultation in carrying out such 
assessment.   
 
According to Quinlan and Bohle (1991) ‘… risk assessment is a process for estimating the 
probability that a specified undesirable outcome will result from specific duration of exposure 
to a specified hazard…’ (p.376).  Importantly, they argued that the most contentious issue or 
aspect of the risk assessment is the decision of what constitutes an acceptable risk.  In what 
Viner (2002) described as the ‘imprecise science’ of risk assessment, the question of exactly 
what understanding of the accident/ill health phenomenon are workplace risk assessments 
actually being based upon, needs to be better understood (Borys 2001). 
 
Analysing the risk means having a full understanding of the range of consequences which are 
possible, both in the long and short term, and a thorough analysis and/or review of the 
effectiveness or otherwise of the control measures that are in place (Cross 2001).  Too often 
the risk factor becomes a measure of personal experience and opinion, as opposed to any 
scientific and or objective exercise in controlling the hazard or risk at the source.  
Furthermore, if the assumptions that a risk assessment is based upon are later proven false, or 
are in fact no longer true, the risk assessment potentially becomes worthless (Keltz 2001). 
 
Quinlan and Bohle (1991) argued that because of such an imprecise approach and the degree 
of uncertainty about what is or is not acceptable, the final decision of what is deemed to be 
acceptable should emanate from a social and political process involving governments, 
employers, unions, health professionals and the wider community.  In a workplace 
environment, this equates to employers and workers and their representatives sitting down 
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and engaging in consultation over the issues in an open and transparent manner, in an effort to 
come up with the most effective hazard and risk control measures. 
 
The hierarchy of control is generally recognized and acknowledged under the Victorian OHS 
legislative framework as the most effective and efficient means of controlling hazards at their 
source.  Under OHS performance-based regulatory models, to effectively apply the hierarchy, 
controls that address the hazard source through elimination and substitution must be at least 
sought and explored in the first instance (Culvenor 1997).  But controlling workplace hazards 
also entails a determination of the risk of those hazards.    
 
It has been argued that the meanings of risk in the occupational health and safety environment 
are socially constructed and maintained, and within this social construct, the meaning of risk 
often reflects a social relationship embedded in the contract of employment (Holmes & 
Gifford 1996).  Indeed, the very context of risk in the workplace is often very different for 
employers and employees – with individual experiences and understanding of risk, together 
with the economic context of the industry all influencing the numerous views and levels of 
understanding that we have of risk and the management of it (Holmes & Gifford 1996).   
 
The decision making process in occupational health and safety is a complex and value-laden 
endeavour – be it on a personal, institutional or societal basis (Walters & Frick 2000; Burke, 
Tran, Roemer & Henry 1993).  It is precisely the nature of this process that highlights the 
importance of worker participation, via consultation, based upon what is known as normative 
power (Walters & Frick 2000; Quinlan & Bohle 1991).  The concept of normative power is 
considered crucial to the participation of employees and to the overall result in controlling the 
hazard and risk to an acceptable level.  According to Walters and Frick (2000) ‘…normative 
power is the very basis on which participation is enacted…’ (p.52), where participation is 
intended to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and skill in an effort towards solving 
problems and improving control measures.   
 
OHS standard setting and safety in general is not just a technical and or scientific process, but 
involves important normative judgements about what are acceptable levels of risk (Quinlan & 
Bohle 1991).  Workers and their representatives have as much right to determine whether the 
risk is acceptable or otherwise as anyone else, because as Quinlan and Bohle (1991) pointed 
out, OHS is subjugated to profit, which can, and does, unduly influence OHS research and 
terminology.  They believed that irrespective of all the rhetoric, it is perhaps naive to expect 
that employers typically place equal emphasis on OHS and cost profit implications.  In 
essence, the involvement of workers and their elected OHS representatives becomes vital if a 
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balanced approached is to be achieved in the formulation of risk assessments and any 
subsequent agreed control measures. 
 
A balanced approach between the social, technical and scientific implications of risk is also 
required because essentially, the process of risk assessment is a value-laden judgment that 
takes place in a vacuum of power, politics and a raft of views and motives that continue to be 
the subject to all types of prejudices and change (Waring 1996).  Unfortunately as Waring 
(1996) highlights, value judgments follow the idea that some levels of risk are acceptable and 
others are not.  Viner (2002) argued that rather than debating the values of a particular risk, it 
would be far more effective if the debate was centred on the effectiveness and reliability of 
the control measures.  This is where the requirements for meaningful and effective 
consultation take on significant meaning, together with the knowledge and skills that are 
brought to the consultation process by the participants, because it is the knowledge and skill 
of the participants that has been identified as key components necessary for meaningful and 
effective consultation (Cameron et al. 2006; Shearn 2004). 
 
 
2.4 Knowledge and skill 
Knowledge is regarded as a key intangible asset and is recognised as a main source of an 
organisation’s competitive advantage (Mooradian 2005; Martini & Pellegrini 2005; Epstein 
1998; Pascarella 1997).  According to Svieby (2001) ‘…knowledge is dynamic, personal and 
distinctly different from data…and information…’ (p.345). 
 
In her paper looking at what the key factors were in both knowledge and knowledge 
management in what was described as ‘knowledge-creating companies’, Smith (2001) 
claimed that organisations required the creation of worker-centred environments that 
encouraged the open sharing and use of all forms of knowledge.  Indeed, the ability of an 
organisation to attain, apply and transfer knowledge from one unit to another within the 
organisation, are seen as key contributors to organisational performance and its survival and 
growth in the long term (Salojärvi et al. 2005; Sveiby & Simons 2002; Smith 2001).      
 
The collaborative environment and a collective sense of identity have both been identified as 
important factors in influencing the effectiveness of knowledge transfer at the workplace 
(Sveiby & Simons 2002; Smith 2001).  The collaborative climate has very similar properties 
to the proactive and generative stages of Hudson’s evolutionary safety culture model.  For 
example, Sveiby and Simons (2002) described the organisational culture in a collaborative 
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climate as having open communication, encouraging and requiring information exchange with 
all members of the organisation and encouraging and requiring a sharing of knowledge on a 
continual and up-to-date basis.  These ideals are consistent with and, arguably form the basis 
of, the proactive and generative stages in the Hudson model, which will be discussed in more 
detail later on in this chapter.   
 
Svieby and Simons (2002) also found that as people grow in expertise and experience, they 
find the collaborative climate even more favourable, leading to a greater flow of information 
within the organisation.  They believed that if people feel secure in their jobs and no longer 
fear competition from either external or internal forces, they are more inclined to share their 
knowledge and skill which enhances the organisations’ overall position in the marketplace.  
They suggested that it is mainly those people who feel powerless, vulnerable and insecure 
who are most likely to react in a negative manner and create barriers against the sharing of 
information – thereby creating a poor collaborative climate and thus restricting the 
knowledge-sharing process.   
 
Gherardi and Nicolini (2000) saw organisational knowledge as a collective endeavour, made 
up of heterogeneous materials and entities.  Such knowledge, as specifically applied to health 
and safety, formed organisational expertise that was situated in a system of ongoing practices, 
which they claimed had both explicit and tacit dimensions.  According to their constructionist 
research which looked at how safety related knowledge was constituted, institutionalised, 
continually redefined and renegotiated within organisations, it is now incorrect to assume that 
knowledge and learning are primarily an individual and mental process.  They believed that 
the concept of knowledge and learning is primarily a social and cultural phenomenon.  The 
knowledge that individuals possess is something that is not just achieved or collated alone, 
but is something that occurs or is learnt in a social environment.  Often, such knowledge 
manifests itself as practical knowledge, and they believed that it was time that the prejudice 
that has asserted that practical knowledge is an inferior form of knowledge, was discarded and 
instead, should be seen as the development, both individually and collectively, as a knowing 
and understanding of the ability to act with competence. 
 
However, Kelly (2007) believed that such competence, be it individual or organisational, can 
only be looked at in the context of what she described as the overall power and authority 
structures within a workplace.  In her literature-based review on the relationship between 
knowledge and power within an organisational cultural perspective, it was opined that there 
needed to be a successful development of what she called a knowledge-sharing culture, which 
would then engender a development of trust within an organisation.  She believed that 
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knowledge should no longer be regarded as a power resource, but more as a communal 
resource to be freely shared amongst the organisation in order to facilitate the joint and 
mutually beneficial achievement of organisational and professional goals, underpinned by an 
environment of organisational trust. 
 
 
2.4.1  The importance of trust 
Within the literature, there appears to be general agreement that that the level of trust in an 
organisation is one of the most important factors affecting the willingness to share knowledge 
within the organisation (Kelly 2006; Salojärvi et al. 2005; Mooradian 2005; Firth-Cozens 
2004; Svieby 2001;).  Cruise-O’Brien (1995) described this trust as ‘…an assessment of 
subjective probability about the actions of other people, without being able to control or 
assess the outcome…’ (p.118).  She went on to explain that trust is more a form of 
confidence, based less on intensity and consistency of feeling and more on evidence, bringing 
with it an enduring long-term relationship more so than co-operation and participation, which 
she believed were separate re-negotiable acts more in the form of temporary collaboration for 
specific purposes.   
 
Of course, there have been numerous other definitions of trust and what constitutes a trusting 
relationship, with the majority of them formed around a complex set of circumstances and 
events.  For example, Zeffane and Connell (2003) described trust as a ‘… multi-component 
construct with multiple dimensions that vary in nature and importance according to the 
context, relationship, tasks, situations and people concerned’ (p.4).  A large majority of the 
literature considered trust to be an imperative phenomenon and a vital component in any type 
of organisational change and development.  But trust is more commonly associated with and 
between people.  One of the most consistent underlying themes in the definition of trust found 
in the literature, appeared to be established upon interpersonal relationships and the concept 
of accepting vulnerability or a willingness to be vulnerable, based upon the positive 
expectations or intentions of the behaviour of others (Clarke & Payne 2006; Burns, Mearns & 
McGeorge 2006; Rousseau, Sitkins, Burt & Camerer 1998).   
 
This concept was demonstrated by Clarke and Payne (2006) in their research on the nature of 
trust at work.  They claimed that trust in the context of the workplace, is a notion which has 
evolved around the idea of leadership and leaders having the authority to make decisions that 
have a significant impact upon the followers, who were fundamentally the vulnerable party.  
When applied to this particular research and to the Victorian construction industry in general, 
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the persons who are often deemed responsible for making OHS decisions (i.e. the leaders) 
may not necessarily be the most appropriate persons to do this.  Indeed, merely because a 
person is deemed or appointed as a supervisor or leader in an organisation, may not 
necessarily translate into having the level of knowledge and/or technical skill required to 
make the appropriate OHS decisions.  This is where the concept of consultation and utilising 
the knowledge, skill, expertise and experience available at the workplace, via the workforce, 
can become an invaluable tool in terms of OHS standards in the industry and in the effective 
operation of the organisation itself.   
 
Cox, Jones and Collinson (2006) stated that ‘… trust is an important element of an effective 
organization and that it plays a central role in the coordination of social actors’ expectations 
and interactions ….’, and that ‘… without a certain degree of trust it is almost impossible to 
establish or maintain successful organizational relations over extended periods of time…’ 
(p.1123).  They believed that the foundations of trust must also be based upon the concept of 
encouraged ownership and continuing participation in the process; without which the success 
and level of trust within organisations and between the stakeholders will vary greatly.  In this 
regard, it is the level of ‘trustworthiness’ that is potentially the key factor that will either make 
or break the relationship between one person and another (Clarke & Payne 2006). 
 
Trust, especially knowledge-based trust, develops over time, with the histories of the players 
generally forming an expectation of predictability and trustworthiness between them in terms 
of safety management (Cox et al. 2006).  In such circumstances, Cox et al. (2006) believed it 
was mainly open and honest communications between the key stakeholders that provided the 
fundamental basis of the trust.  They argued that in order to maintain this trust, there needed 
to be continuous communication and an open and honest supply of information between the 
parties.  They claimed that past research has shown that those managers who are willing to 
share information with their employees, give those employees the signal that they can be 
trusted, stating that ‘… managers and supervisors who engage in trustworthy behaviour will 
increase the likelihood that employees will reciprocate and develop a trusting relationship…’ 
(p.1126).   
 
In a time of what Zeffane and Connell (2003) described as flexible capitalism, which they 
believed has evolved in an environment of superficiality created by restructuring and 
contingent labour, and where there is a focus on expediency over trust and loyalty, there is a 
risk that workers and organisations will be indifferent towards one another.  In such 
circumstances, the levels of trustworthiness between the parties may be difficult to establish 
and maintain.  This was later acknowledged by Conchie and Donald (2006), who claimed that 
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because the nature of the employment relationship has now changed from one which once 
emphasised permanency, to one where contractor and temporary workers are being used with 
greater frequency, the levels and the application of trust at the workplace has been adversely 
affected.  In these circumstances, it is believed that the development of trust is much harder to 
materialise, which as previously mentioned, affects the willingness to share knowledge, be it 
tacit or explicit, within the organisation (Gill & Meyer 2008; Jasimuddin et al. 2005; 
Mooradian 2005; Smith 2001;). 
 
 
2.4.2  Tacit and explicit knowledge 
In her review of the role that knowledge plays in the information revolution, Smith (2001) 
readily acknowledged that individuals all have varying degrees and levels of both explicit and 
tacit knowledge, and different perspectives on how to think about and solve the myriad of 
problems that face an organisation on a daily basis.  She described tacit knowledge as almost 
being automatic and requiring little thought, yet it determined how organisations made 
decisions and influenced the collective behaviour of their members.  According to Smith 
(2001) ‘…(cognitive) tacit knowledge incorporates implicit mental models and perceptions 
that are so ingrained they are taken for granted…’ (p.314). 
 
It is believed that tacit knowledge is fundamentally impossible to articulate (Martin, Hatzakis, 
Lycett & Macredie 2005).  In their extensive review of the literature on the use of both tacit 
and explicit knowledge, Jasimuddin et al. (2005) claimed that the very nature of tacit 
knowledge means that it is often ambiguous in nature and because of this, it is very difficult 
to copy, thereby working in favour of an organisation.  Yet at the same time, it means it 
cannot be stored and is often difficult to communicate to others both within and outside the 
organisation. 
 
This may explain why Smith (2001) had earlier suggested that tacit knowledge is best taught 
by experienced persons directly to the less experience, via a ‘showing of the ropes’ whilst on 
the job.  Such a process would appear to reinforce the thinking of Jasimuddin et al. (2005), 
who suggested that tacit knowledge is constructed more from the individual’s own experience 
in the world, which in turn then becomes the basis of explicit knowledge if passed on in such 
a manner.   
 
In contrast, explicit knowledge is generally thought to be a more technical process and 
arguably requires an academic knowledge or understanding gained via a structured and 
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formal educational approach (Smith 2001).  Explicit knowledge is, on the whole, carefully 
structured, codified and stored in a hierarchy of databases and is generally accessed via fast, 
reliable information retrieval systems (Smith (2001).  While it is important to acknowledge 
the differences in both forms of knowledge, there is general consensus and agreement that the 
use of both forms of knowledge needs to be balanced and used effectively; the extent to 
which will ultimately determine the success or failure of the organisation (Jasimudden et al. 
2005; Mooradian 2005; Svieby & Simons 2002).   
 
In this regard, Smith (2001) argued that tacit knowledge is best used to foster creativity and 
innovation, while explicit knowledge should be used to make the work environment 
predictable and guide the way that the work is carried out and organised.  She posits that 
those organisations that are best able to recognise and use their employees’ tacit and explicit 
knowledge to solve problems and achieve goals, have a major competitive advantage.  
According to Smith knowledge, be it tacit and/or explicit, is too often underutilised and unless 
organisations begin to acknowledge and recognise the improvisations and inventive ways 
people get things done and make better use of this intangible asset, the knowledge will 
continue to be lost to the detriment of the organisation.   
 
It is the capturing of tacit knowledge that Mooradian (2005) considered to be the real 
challenge if organisations wish to spread overall knowledge and promote greater innovation 
throughout their organisation.  In exploring the philosophical roots of the concept of tacit 
knowledge, he described it as  ‘… a hidden reserve of water underground, no different from 
the surface pools, just difficult to get to because of its location and obstacles surrounding it…’ 
(p.107). However, access to tacit knowledge may say more about the management of the 
knowledge by the organisation, rather than its initial discovery.   
 
 
2.4.3  Knowledge management 
Knowledge management has been described by Robinson, Anumba, Carrillo and Al-Ghassani 
(2006) as the process of ‘…creating, acquiring, capturing, sharing and using knowledge, 
wherever it resides, to enhance (the) learning performance in organisations’ (p.798).  
According to Smith (2001), it is the issue of knowledge management that guides an 
organisation’s development and exploitation of both tangible assets and intangible knowledge 
resources.  Like Robinson et al. (2006), Smith (2001) also believed part of the challenge in 
the management of knowledge was how to best capture, evaluate, cleanse, store, provide and 
effectively use the knowledge that is already available within the organisation. 
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The management of knowledge has been described by Salojärvi et al. (2005) as the art of 
creating value by leveraging intangible assets.  In their research examining the relationship 
between sustainable sales growth and knowledge management activities in 108 small and 
medium sized enterprises in Finland, Salojärvi et al. (2005) concluded that the maturity of 
organisations, in terms of their knowledge management and awareness, was positively 
correlated with organisational growth.  While they were careful to explain that their results 
could not be generalised due to the research concentrating on only one country, and while 
they could not identify a direct causal relationship between the management of knowledge 
and organisational growth, they nonetheless indicated that it appeared that knowledge 
management awareness and activities and faster growth often appeared in the same 
organisation.   
 
Such a finding was later supported by the research of Robinson et al. (2006), when they 
investigated the relationship between knowledge management and business performance in 
construction organisations in the UK.  Their research found that knowledge management was 
inextricably linked to corporate sustainability.  In their opinion, bringing knowledge or 
intangible assets to the forefront of an organisation’s business strategy can have a significant 
impact on the organisations’ profitability. 
 
Martin et al. (2005) believed knowledge management was a diverse and spanning entity.  
They saw knowledge management and knowledge transfer as more effective in a community 
of practice (CoP) environment, as opposed to the more traditional team environment.  Their 
ethnographic research showed that the CoP environment was more creative in sharing 
experiences, which then led to new approaches in problem solving and innovation.  This 
finding reinforced the earlier arguments of O’Donnell et al. (2003) about the value of CoPs 
and their role in both the management and transfer of knowledge within that community. 
 
The positive link between knowledge and CoPs was primarily because, according to Martin et 
al. (2005), CoPs are largely driven by values, knowledge and know-how.  In contrast, they 
believed teams, which are commonly used as knowledge transfer mechanisms within many 
organisations, are primarily driven by deliverables and defined tasks.  In their opinion, the 
problems that many teams face stem from a lack of cohesion and knowledge sharing between 
them  If, as Rechenthin (2004) claimed, that the purpose of an organisations’ strategy is to 
develop a competitive position of optimum advantage, then how organisations manage their 
knowledge assets arguably becomes imperative to this position (Robinson, Carrillo, Anumba 
& Al-Ghassani 2005).  In terms of OHS knowledge, if managed correctly, such knowledge 
should contribute to an organisations’ overall safety programme and in the construction 
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industry, as Rechenthin (2004) observed, ‘…an organisation with a successful safety program 
can promote safety performance as a sustainable competitive advantage…’ (p.297). 
 
In case studies of large UK construction organisations and how they managed what was 
described as the organisations’ knowledge assets, Robinson et al. (2006, 2005) identified that 
learning and knowledge sharing were the key drivers if an organisation was to sustain any 
type of long-term competitive advantage.  They pointed out that knowledge management is a 
way of transforming knowledge as an asset, which is best used to facilitate continuous 
improvement.  But in order to facilitate and take advantage of this knowledge, the culture of 
the organisation needs to be conducive for such a process to occur. 
 
 
2.5 Culture or climate? 
Within the literature, there appears to be general agreement about the overall confusion that 
surrounds the terms safety culture and safety climate.  In their review of the literature on both 
safety culture and safety climate, Mearns and Flin (1999) argued that while the terms climate 
and culture have often been used interchangeably, they should really be thought of as distinct 
concepts and as such, be treated accordingly.  They suggested that safety climate best 
described employee’s perceptions, attitudes and beliefs about risk and safety, whereas safety 
culture was a more complex phenomenon which reflected fundamental values, norms, 
assumptions and expectations which to some extent resides in societal culture in which an 
organisation is located.  This in turn, influences how the safety climate within an organisation 
develops.   
 
Glendon and Stanton (2000) believed that over the years the two terms have been used 
interchangeably, with climate being regarded as a more superficial concept than culture, 
which they felt was used to describe different aspects of an organisation’s current state.  On 
the other hand, Guldenmund (2000) argued that there were lots of different dimensions 
underling culture and climate and felt that climate had more to do with perceptions, whereas 
culture was more closely aligned with attitudes.  In later research, Gadd and Collins (2002) 
argued that safety climate was a distinct yet closely related concept evolving from safety 
culture, discerned from the employee’s attitudes and perceptions. 
 
The views of safety climate as primarily being part of the employee’s perception is largely 
contributed to the earlier work of Zohar (1980), cited by many in the cultural and climate 
literary sphere.   Zohar’s study is considered by many as somewhat of a landmark piece of 
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work in regards to the measurement of employee perceptions of management attitudes 
towards the relative importance of safety in the workplace. 
 
There are those that claim that culture is not primarily inside people’s heads, but rather is 
found somewhere between the heads of a group of people, where symbols and meanings are 
publicly expressed and the culture becomes central in governing the understanding of such 
issues as behaviour, social events, institutions and processes (Alvesson 2001).  This partly 
explains why Olsen (2001) believed that culture is a key factor in understanding why certain 
safety practices develop in organisations.  Seen in this way, cultural understanding 
concentrates not on individual idiosyncrasies, but is more attuned to the shared orientations 
within a group or an organisation (Alvesson 2001).  Such an approach was also shared by 
Clarke (2003) when she described safety culture as essentially being a social phenomenon 
because its definition depended upon individual perceptions being shared within a group 
context.  However in her review of the literature, Clarke (2003) was equally at pains to point 
out that there is no one universally accepted definition of a positive safety culture.  In her 
opinion, a common understanding of safety culture is that it simply refers to a shared 
understanding that safety is a priority, and that safety management practices reflect the safety 
culture of the senior management of an organisation. 
 
More recently, Lawrie, Parker and Hudson (2006) described organisational culture as the 
‘…complex framework of national, organisational and professional attitudes and values 
within which groups and individuals function’ (p.551).   While it could be argued that this 
may well be an appropriate definition, it is important to consider and have regard to other 
issues that can influence the type of culture that exists or is created within organisations.  This 
is mainly due to the fact that as Alvesson (2001) explained ‘…any understanding of culture 
should also recognise how power operates in dominant meanings and the asymmetries of 
social relations work behind established cultural order.  Cultural meanings do not develop 
freely or spontaneously, but bear the imprints of ideologies and actions of powerful agents…’ 
(p.57). 
 
The research of Hofstede (1983) explored the effect that ethnocentricities had on 
organisational culture, as well as looking at other influences such as the ideologies of both 
organisations and the country from within which the organisation operated.  This research 
took place in 50 countries and included collecting over 116,000 questionnaires; a substantial 
piece of research in anyone’s language.  Hofstede’s definition of culture was also one of a 
collective mental programming, restricted to one particular nation, region, or group.  But he 
stressed that culture was far too complex a phenomenon to be described in a common or 
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general language because of the risk of being too subjective and superficial.  He linked the 
cultural approaches of organisations not only to their national culture of origin, but also to a 
four dimensional model in an attempt to identify what he called the different dimensions of 
management and culture.  In summary, the four dimensions of the model concentrated on: 
 
1. Individualism versus Collectivism; this concept evolved around the relationship 
between an individual and their fellow individuals.  Hofstede believed that an 
individualist society was primarily loosely integrated.  He also believed that the 
degree of individualism was statistically related to a county’s wealth. 
2. Large or small Power Distances; this second dimension was used to try and explain 
how a society deals with the issue of inequality between its people.  While 
acknowledging that society has varying degrees of inequality, Hofstede believed that 
some were more inequitable than others.   
3. Strong or weak Uncertainty Avoidance; the third dimension concentrated on how a 
society dealt with uncertainty and the future.   Hofstede claimed that people in the 
weak uncertainty dimension tended to accept each day as it comes and tended to take 
more risks.   
4. The final dimension was based upon a Masculine versus a Feminine society.  It 
was Hofstede’s belief that feminine societies tended not to show off, put relationships 
before money, held the quality of life and the environment higher than that of the 
masculine society and in general, tended to help others, in particular the weaker 
members of the society.   
 
As an example, Hofstede (1983) nominated the USA as a country where he believed many of 
the above traits were clearly evident.  He believed that it was primarily an individual society, 
where corporation culture and society culture was very much centred on an individual 
approach with little regard for other persons or parties.   He argued that if such an approach or 
philosophy was forced onto a more collectivised society, it would mean that work 
organisations would be created that would not offer protection or security to their employees.  
Such an environment would appear not to bode well for any type of effective and inclusive 
consultative approach if previously identified prerequisites for meaningful and effective 
consultation are anything to go by. 
 
The later work of Downey, Cannon and Mullen (1998) had a similar inference to that of 
Hofstede, believing that collective cultures were more likely to establish good trusting 
relationships because the chances that collectivists would engage in opportunistic behaviour 
were much lower.  Similarly, Downey et al. (1998) believed that in general, feminine 
61 
 
societies tended to exhibit a more nurturing, less aggressive and a more cooperative approach, 
and generally frowned upon the opportunistic behaviour that is often associated with 
masculine societies.  Indeed, Hofstede (1983) believed that in the masculine society, it was 
often the opportunistic individual who tended to be seen as the successful achiever.   
 
The extent to which cultural norms and values facilitated or inhibited the formation and 
building of trust was evident in the work of Downey et al. (1998).  They provided an outline 
of what trust meant in an organisational context, exploring the influences that they believed 
affected the cultural norms of an organisation.  Their definition of cultural norms and culture 
was similar to that of Reason (1997), believing that the norms and values of the collective and 
feminine cultures supported behavioural conformity and assisted in the establishment of a 
high level of trust.   
 
Various definitions of safety culture were considered by Mearns, Flin, Whitaker, Gordon and 
O’Connor (2001).  They concluded that essentially, regardless of whatever definitions were 
used to describe safety culture, what was required was a framework that was able to 
accurately measure the attitudes of staff in response to the health and safety management 
systems of their organisation.  They believed that such a framework was an essential tool if 
safety culture was to have any meaning and effect on an organisation.  Olsen (2001) also felt 
that culture had to be measured, but measured from what he called the ‘… native’s point of 
view…’ (p.32).   
 
In his work on organisational culture and maturity, Hudson (2001b) claimed that ‘…the 
culture defines the setting within which the climate operates…’ (p.16).  He later went on to 
explain that the climate reflects an individual’s perception of their own organisation, 
determined by their own expectations derived from within their own culture. This approach 
was also adopted by Mearns et al. (2001), when they described the safety climate as an 
interpretive approach of how the individual perceives the state of safety within their own 
organisation.  Given the general confusion and disagreement within the literature about the 
differences, similarities and indeed definitions of the terms safety culture and safety climate, 
Guldenmund (2001) concluded that while the distinctions between the two terms remain 
unclear, there was still much work to be done to gain a consistent and agreed position 
between the two. 
 
It has been suggested that organisations are distinguishable from each other based upon the 
notion of their organisational culture (Lawrie et al. 2006; Westrum 2004; Hudson 2001a, 
2001b; Reason 1997), and it is this organisational culture which is deemed to be critical to the 
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success or failure of an organisation (Glendon & Stanton 2000).  Hudson (2001a) believed 
that the very notion of any particular organisational culture was simply too difficult to neatly 
define and categorize, preferring a more general description of ‘…who and what we are, what 
we find important, and how we go about doing things round here…’ (p.30).   
 
This approach is arguably consistent with Svieby and Simons’ (2002) description of culture as 
‘…the deeper level of basic values, beliefs and assumptions that are shared by an 
organisation’s members’ (p.421).  This view is further supported by Gadd and Collins (2002), 
who argued that culture is a concept that describes the shared corporate values within an 
organisation.  Such values then help shape and influence the attitudes and behaviours of its 
members.  But it is not just the values of an organisation that helps shape their culture.   
 
Hofested (1983), Pidgeon (1998) and Hildebrandt-Eriksen and Baarts (2001) have all 
questioned the influence that ideological, social and political environments have on an 
organisations’ structure.  They all believed that such factors were pivotal in the establishment 
of the eventual quality of the safety culture within the broader organisational culture.  This 
was later highlighted by Härenstam et al. (2006) when they suggested that when organisations 
are described from a cultural perspective, aspects such as ideologies, attitudes, norms, 
metaphors, rhetoric and motivations must all be taken account of when researching and 
examining the structures and cultures of different organisations. 
 
 
2.5.1  Safety Culture 
In his book on managing risks and accidents within organisations, Reason (1997) argued that 
the ideal safety culture was the engine that continually propelled the system and hence the 
organisation towards the goal of maximum health and safety – regardless of the organisations’ 
leadership style, personality or their current commercial concerns.  Reason is generally 
acknowledged and credited for providing one of the best descriptions of what characteristics 
or components go into making up an organisations’ safety culture.  These characteristics or 
components are: 
 An informed culture: one in which those who manage and operate the system have 
current knowledge about the human, technical, organisational and environmental 
factors that determine the safety of the system as a whole; 
 A reporting culture: a culture whereby people are willing to report errors and near 
misses; 
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 A just culture: a culture of ‘no blame’ where an atmosphere of trust is created 
whereby people are encouraged and even rewarded for providing essential safety 
related information – but where there are also very clear lines between acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour; 
 A flexible culture: this can take a number of forms but is generally characterised as 
shifting from the conventional hierarchical mode to a flatter professional structure; 
 A learning culture: the willingness and the competence to draw the right conclusions 
from its safety information system, and the will to implement major reforms when the 
need is indicated.  
 
All of the above characteristics are generally considered and acknowledged as key elements 
that contribute to successful organisational culture and hence, a successful safety culture 
(Hudson 2001a&b; Gadd & Collins 2002; Lawrie, Parker & Hudson 2006; Westrum 2004; 
Madsen 2001; Reason 1997).  Hudson (2003a&b) further posits that there is strong evidence 
to suggest that the most safety minded organisations are also the most profitable, with a 
positive safety culture playing a leading part in this equation.   
 
The culture of an organisation would also appear to have an important role to play in assisting 
organisations to look into the future and assess the consequences of different complex events.  
According to Hildebrandt-Eriksen and Baarts (2001), if these future events are left 
uncontrolled, they could easily lead to accidents.  They further argued that this process is not 
simply a matter of assessing what hazards and risks are the most dangerous or damaging, but 
involves a process that is able to identify which explanatory model will work most effectively 
at the workplace and amongst the workforce.  This, they believed would then enable whatever 
remedial action is required to take place to be actively and positively pursued and 
implemented. 
 
In their research on trust in high reliability organisations, Cox et al. (2006) argued that the 
management of safety culture was a crucial factor in the shaping of good safety performance 
within organisations.  They believed that organisations that are generally considered as having 
a good or positive safety culture were generally characterised as having a positive 
organisational culture founded upon open and honest communications, based upon mutual 
trust and commitment by all stakeholders.  However they also warned that safety culture can 
often be characterized by complacency, which could easily lead to ‘organisational blindness’ 
to certain forms of error and risk.  Indeed, they argued that you simply cannot take safety 
culture for granted, and claimed that ‘…safety culture is dynamic, contingent and unstable, 
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requiring continuous support and monitoring and not a homogenous, reified and static thing 
that can be mechanically installed within organizations…’ (p. 1125). 
 
In light of this, Cox et al. (2006) also claimed that a good safety culture was only achievable 
if senior management demonstrated real commitment towards safety, and genuinely showed 
concern and care over the workforce in their attitudes and actions towards hazards and risks, 
then continually monitored, analysed and acted upon the feedback mechanisms that were in 
place at the workplace.  They argued that past research continues to show ‘… the underlying 
importance of trust as facilitators of, and/or barriers to, employee engagement in safety 
improvement initiatives and systems concomitant with improvements in safety culture…’ 
(p.1124). 
 
Safety culture is generally recognised and accepted as a sub-facet of organisational culture 
(Lawrie et al. 2006a; Gadd and Collins 2002; Hudson 2001a, 2001b; Cooper 2000; Glendon 
& Stanton 2000; Guldermund 2000).  However Hudson (2001a, 2001b) stressed that it was 
important to recognise that it is only after an organisation has reached and subsequently 
passed a certain point along what he described as the safety evolutionary line within the 
organisational culture, that an organisation can be said to have a true safety culture. 
 
But the safety culture of an organisation should also be reflective of what Hildebrandt-Eriksen 
and Baarts (2001) described as the organisations’ societal obligations concerning exposure to 
health-damaging and fatal events.  While admitting culture is difficult to understand and 
define, they suggested that further cultural analysis should not be about the mere description 
of workplace characteristics, but should focus more on the understanding of the complex 
processes and social interaction that determines the occurrence of workplace accidents.  They 
further believed the interaction between technique, organisational and financial structures, 
together with ideological conditions, all impact and influence how culture contributes to how 
vulnerable or secure workers feel in various working situations.  
 
The levels or degrees of vulnerability or security that workers feel in their status of 
employment has also been found to influence and impact upon the degree and quality of 
participation that workers are both allowed, and indeed encouraged, to have at the workplace 
(Walters 2006; Quinlan & Mayhew 2000).  Accordingly, Hvid (2001) believed that 
participation and culture, whilst being two separate entities, are too closely aligned to allow 
consideration of one without the other.  That is to say, organisational culture and subsequent 
safety culture creates either the possibilities or the obstacles for increased participation.  In 
Hvid’s (2001) opinion, a high degree of participation has a profound influence on 
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organisational culture.  An earlier paper by Hale (2000) suggested that the challenge for 
organisations was to therefore identify and find the tools that allow it to effectively assess 
whether it has a culture.  The more recent work of Lawrie et al. (2006) indicates that while 
developing a positive safety culture can and often does improves safety performance, there is 
little guidance on how organisations may achieve such an outcome. 
 
The concept of culture was seen by Alvesson (2001) as implying a focus on shared ideas and 
meanings which ultimately helps shape the collective cognitive and affective orientations of 
an organisation.  However, he also pointed out that culture is anchored in tradition and change 
does not come about easily.  When it does occur, the change is frequently slow and requires a 
great deal of effort.  Hudson (2003, 2001a) held similar beliefs in terms of progressing along 
his evolutionary safety culture model, via the different stages of organisational and cultural 
maturity.  He claimed that progression along his model cannot be hurried, but must go 
forward progressively, and even at times tentatively, to ensure that all the steps in attaining 
the right levels of cultural and organisational maturity are obtained, understood and applied 
consistently across the entire organisation.  The Hudson model is seen as a tool that can assist 
in determining if there is an appropriate safety culture in place via the implementation of a 
systematic safety management system.  However as Hudson (2001a) noted earlier, the mere 
possession of a safety management system is no guarantee of sustained safety performance, 
no matter how thorough and coherent the system may be. 
 
 
2.6 Safety management and Hudson’s model 
Occupational health and safety management systems now feature prominently in the thinking 
and strategies of many organisations throughout Australia (Else & Beaumont 2001).  Hudson 
(2003b) described safety management systems as ‘… the systematic application of 
management processes to the problems of hazards an organisation faces…’ (p.4).  He earlier 
argued that an organisation requires a safety culture ‘…that supports the management system 
and allows it to flourish…’ (2001a, p.29).   
 
According to Hudson (2003a), the notions of organisational culture and the understanding of 
safety management will differ according to the levels of cultural maturity that an organisation 
may or may not possess.  He believed that different organisational cultures exhibited different 
ways of making sense of the world and what works for one, may literally be 
incomprehensible to another.  His model is based upon a scale of five levels of organisational 
and cultural maturity as set out in Figure 4.  
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In an organisational sense, the model revolves around attitudes to the importance of safety, 
the roles and efficiency of the individual and the importance attached to systems and their 
associated processes.  While there are no simple step-by-step instructions as to how 
organisations may ultimately reach or progress along the different levels or tiers of the model, 
Hudson (2003a) believed that organisations are distinguishable throughout the model along 
the following lines: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:    The Hudson evolutionary safety culture model         
Source: Hudson (2003a) 
 
Pathological: Organisations deemed to be in the Pathological category generally believe 
safety is a problem caused wholly by workers rather than by any systems or organisational 
problems.  The main concerns of the organisation are the business itself and they have a 
strong desire not to get caught by the regulator.  Organisations within this Pathological culture 
are characterised by a strictly run ‘results only’ attitude or approach.  While Hudson believed 
this is not altogether wrong, the problem is how the results are achieved and what reasons 
may be offered for failures to meet the expected outcomes.  Hudson believed this approach 
leads to a high level of individualism, with failure to perform demonstrating that certain 
individuals may simply ‘not be up to it’.  There is a strong characteristic of blame within this 
cultural sub-set, especially blame on the individual.  Pathological cultures do not like to admit 
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they have problems and the advice of lawyers generally carries more weight within the 
culture or organisation than that of operational experts. 
 
Reactive: Organisations deemed to be at the Reactive culture level begin to take safety 
seriously, but only after accidents occur.  Safety is important to them, proven by the 
organisation doing a lot every time they have an accident and looking for solutions to 
accidents and incidents after they occur.  Failures are generally seen as the responsibility of 
individuals who do not do as they are told.  The reactive organisation does however see itself 
as superior to the pathological organisation because in their view, they take safety seriously 
(Hudson 2003a). 
 
Calculative: This stage is seen by Hudson as a major step up the cultural ladder and along the 
safety evolutionary line.  An organisation deemed to be at the Calculative level, requires its 
workforce to acquire a much larger set of skills and an overall safer attitude than the previous 
two stages.  Safety is driven by management systems, with the collection of much data.  
Safety is still driven primarily by management and is imposed upon, rather than looked for 
by, the workforce.  The organisation generally prides itself on the management systems they 
have in place to manage all hazards at the workplace.  While workers and management follow 
procedures, they may not necessarily believe those procedures are critically important to their 
jobs or operations.  Standards that are set and followed are too often only minimum 
requirements.  Calculative cultures do however represent a major shift in the internal attitudes 
to safety and its management.  It is at this stage that Hudson suggested that that an 
organisation can begin to claim possession of a safety culture.  However, he also 
acknowledged that at the Calculative level, organisations can prove difficult to shift to the 
more advanced stages of the model, simply because they begin to feel comfortable and 
satisfied with their achievements up to this point. 
 
Proactive: With improved performance, organisations deemed to be Proactive begin to see 
the unexpected as a challenge.  Problems are actively sought out and solved.  Workforce 
involvement starts to move the initiative away from a purely top down approach and workers 
and management begin to acquire the belief that safety is genuinely important.  As the 
organisation becomes more competent, it is possible to shift the balance from detailed 
procedures to guidelines supplemented by the knowledge and skills of frontline personnel.  
The issue of competence becomes an issue of what people are truly capable of, rather than a 
sterile list of courses and tests passed.  There is a general change of attitude from immediate 
short term gain to what Hudson calls a life-cycle based approach founded on experience.  At 
the proactive level, management are generally still operating in a top down fashion, but are 
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now becoming more receptive to shop floor suggestions.  It becomes easier to free up 
resources for safety initiatives, even though some of the concerns over safety may not have 
yet materialised.  What separates the Proactive organisation from the Generative 
organisations is the chronic unease so familiar within Generative cultures. 
 
Generative: Historically, this level has generally described and been reserved for 
organisations such as high reliability organisations (HRO’s).  HRO’s are generally reserved 
for nuclear power plants, hydrocarbon plants and chemical manufacturing and the aviation 
industry.  There is a chronic unease within this cultural subset, based upon uncertainty about 
what could possibly go wrong.  Problems are not just simply identified, understood and 
solved; rather there is an organisational mind-set that sees a never-ending stream of problems 
continually facing the organisation.  Generative organisations have the ability to consider new 
realities as well as existing ones and the success of the organisation is due to its continual 
change.  There is also the realisation that those closest to the problems are best equipped to 
find and implement the solutions.  In this way, there is active participation at all levels.  
Ironically, this represents a beginning of a return to an almost individualist culture that so 
pervaded the Pathological culture.  However, as Hudson pointed out, in the Generative culture 
the individual is not blamed, but rather their knowledge and skills are actively sought and 
used to help the organisation escape the traps of rigid systems-based thinking.  Safety is 
perceived to be an inherent part of the business.  Generative organisations are characterised 
by chronic unease as a counter to complacency, and safety is fully integrated into everything 
the organisation does. 
 
It was Hudson’s (2003a&b) opinion that an advanced safety culture entails four main 
dimensions.  While slightly different to Reason’s (1997) model, they nonetheless have very 
similar components that certainly resonate with Reason’s cultural expectations.  According to 
Hudson, advanced safety cultures are characterised by being: 
 Informed at all levels – this informedness follows from seeking and providing 
information; 
 Trust is exhibited by all within the organisation, both upwards and downwards.  Trust 
is developed by being just and informed, this includes bad news being told and 
accepted as information that can be acted upon as opposed to reasons to punish ; 
 The organisation is extremely adaptable to change, this comes from being flexible 
and learning what works well and what doesn’t; 
69 
 
 The organisation constantly worries – an advanced safety culture within an 
organisation does not allow success to engender complacency, being worried is seen 
as healthy and logical even when the organisation is performing superlatively. 
 
Taking all of the above components into consideration, Hudson (2003b) believed that 
organisations that are informed and know what is going on both within and around them, have 
already provided the prerequisites for the development of a true safety culture within the 
organisation.  It is at the point of acquiring a safety culture that the culture becomes a vital 
ingredient in the organisation’s performance.   
 
Hudson (2003a) saw the process of moving up his ladder of cultural maturity reliant upon the 
generation of trust and the development of what he and Reason (1997) called informedness.  
This informedness constitutes the cultural approach of trust – in essence meaning that a no-
blame culture commences to be implemented and that information, regardless whether it be 
good or bad news, is not only welcomed but actively encouraged (Reason 1997).  Both 
Hudson (2003a) and Reason (1997) also believed that the boundaries for what is deemed to be 
clear and the publicly-agreed boundaries of what constitutes acceptable behaviour provide the 
beginnings of a just-culture.   
 
According to Hudson (2003b), the more advanced the safety culture of an organisation is, the 
more an organisation seeks out the information and, increasingly, seeks the opportunities to 
ensure incidents do not turn into accidents.  In turn, this should also assist an organisation in 
seeking a higher level on the Hudson organisational and cultural maturity model (Hudson 
2003b).  The evolution of a safety culture, via the Hudson model, is a process whereby 
informedness and trust leads to a better communication and consultation process throughout 
the organisation, which in turn results in a safer and better quality organisation (Hudson 
2003a).   
 
 
2.6.1  Maturity models in an organisational context 
While the explanation and elucidation of Hudson’s model of organisational and cultural 
maturity may be adequate in terms of this research, a more detailed exploration of the term 
‘maturity model’ may well enlighten and benefit the overall understanding of this important 
organisational construct. 
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In the organisational context, the term ‘maturity model’ reflects various forms and 
characteristics of organisational and cultural maturity.  The different models and processes 
used to measure such maturity appears to be connected via common themes that bind them in 
an organisational tapestry used to address the key functions of knowledge management, 
organisational performance and sustainability (Kenny 2006; Robinson et al. 2006; Martin et 
al. 2005; Vassie & Fuller 2003; Fuller & Vassie 2002; Skilton & Dooley 2002). 
 
In what they called a relationship management maturity model (RMMM), Martin et al. (2005) 
adopted a five tier framework, along which organisations could progress and not only 
improve their organisations’ knowledge-sharing and subsequent corporate sustainability, but 
also measure the maturity of their business.  They defined their maturity model as a 
‘…phased approach to improving business processes over a substantial period of time… ’ 
(p.345).  Although it may be problematic to draw direct comparisons with the Hudson model, 
it was interesting to note that the RMMM phased approach has some similar ties.  It was also 
noticeable, that as advancement took place along the RMMM, the involvement of employees 
also increased, suggesting a greater use of the knowledge and skill of those employees.   
 
The later work of Kenny (2006) demonstrated that as organisation’s become more reliant 
upon the attainment of new knowledge and skill, new organisational structures will be 
required that are more flexible, responsive and less hierarchical.  This has strong similarities 
and characteristics to both the Hudson model and the overall structure of high reliability 
organisations (Hudson 2001; Weick et al. 1999).  The maturity model for strategy formation 
and development designed by Kenny was based upon three stages.  It aimed for a progressive 
improvement along a continuum of enhancement and upgrading of issues that included the 
organisations’ strategic goals, learning culture, role of employees and key performance 
measures.  He believed that a more responsive and strategic process was required where the 
elements of trust, participation and support enabled individuals to learn from their experiences 
and the experiences of others, for the benefit of themselves and the organisation.  If this was 
achieved, Kenny believed it would help develop what he described as ‘… an organisational 
learning culture…’ (p.353).   
 
The knowledge management maturity roadmap that was developed by Robinson et al. (2006) 
provided us with yet another model and description of organisational maturity.  They believed 
that the difficulty for many organisations in the specific area of knowledge management was 
the unstructured method under which many organisations appeared to operate.  They 
considered that this was most evident in the construction industry.  As knowledge 
management and performance becomes increasingly important in this industry, Robinson et 
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al. saw a need for a more structured approach to be undertaken by participating organisations 
in the industry, to assist in both the measurement and the implementation of the process.  In 
light of this, they designed a five-tiered model, based on the sustainability and the maturity of 
the organisation.  Each level has certain requirements and elements that must be met before 
progressing to the next level.  This infers a logical step-by-step progression along the model, 
avoiding and preventing a leap-frogging or by-passing effect of any level.  While this 
maturity roadmap provides a structured approach specifically designed for the construction 
industry in terms of knowledge management and subsequent improved performance, 
Robinson et al. believed that the model could just as easily be applied to other industries.  
 
In earlier discussions about the relationship between knowledge management, maturity, 
innovation and productivity improvements, while not providing a model per se, Skilton and 
Dooley (2002) provided some compelling arguments that appear to have strong overtones for 
this research.  They emphasized the importance of the retention of what they saw as critical 
knowledge at the structuring level in any environment where labour is transient - a term 
which arguably describes the construction industry workforce.  They believed that one of the 
most effective ways of achieving this was via a strong community of practice. In their view, 
the environment of a community of practice was better able to retain, transfer and utilize 
much of the mature knowledge far more effectively, than what they believed was occurring 
throughout many organisations which fundamentally relied upon a transitory workforce. 
 
All of the above examples provide different and assorted explanations, definitions and models 
of maturity in the organisational context.  However there appears to be some key features that 
they all share and have varying degrees of commonality with the Hudson model, which is 
utilized within this project.  For example, a structured framework, be it a five-tiered model 
favoured by Hudson (2003a&b, 2001), Martin et al. (2005) and Robinson et al. (2006), or a 
three-tiered model favoured by Kenny (2006) and Westrum (1996), from which the Hudson 
model evolved, was a common approach in all of the models.  A methodical and structured 
approach, with a logical progression from one level to the next, without being able to leap-
frog and/or by-pass particular levels, also appears to be accepted as the most efficient and 
beneficial arrangement throughout the various maturity models found in the literature.   
Within the literature on maturity models, the models themselves and the definitions of 
organisational maturity appear to be characterized by the importance of knowledge 
management and knowledge sharing in an effort to sustain and improve organisational 
performance.  The issue of knowledge management within the models also appears to be 
important in the creation of an organisational culture that promotes and facilitates a positive 
and fruitful partnership between the stakeholders (Gollam & Patmore 2003; Sargeant 2001).   
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Being able to fully incorporate the model into normal organisational operations, with the 
ability of the model to be applied outside the realms of its original environment and onto 
other industries, also appears to be a theme that maturity models should have as one of their 
defining factors.  Broken down into its sum of parts, the safety evolutionary culture model of 
Hudson (2001a) contains and reflects the characteristics that epitomize all the key elements 
and functions of many of the maturity models found in the literature that have, as their raison 
d’être, improved organisational performance both in terms of occupational health and safety 
and the overall sustainability of the organisation. 
 
 
2.7 What the literature has revealed  
The literature presented in both this Chapter and earlier in Chapter 1, revealed a number of 
themes that appear to be interrelated, thereby affecting and influencing how meaningful and 
effective workplace consultation can be achieved in the construction industry.  Listed in the 
order in which they affect and influence this research project, these themes are: 
1. The commercial and industrial sector of the Victorian construction industry can be an 
extremely hazardous and dangerous workplace, with more than its fair share of 
fatalities, injuries and illnesses; 
2. Worker participation via the consultation process, is seen as pivotal to the success of 
both safety management systems and overall levels of workplace health and safety; 
3. Legislative requirements alone may not be sufficient to ensure that effective and 
meaningful consultation takes place; 
4. Moral and/or ethical principles or issues of trust, honesty, commitment and respect 
are generally considered and acknowledged as necessary if effective and meaningful 
consultation is to occur; 
5. OHS representatives and the involvement of trade unions are considered crucial to the 
success of consultation and the employee-participation process; 
6. Managerial prerogative is a major impediment to the effectiveness of consultation and 
employee participation at the workplace; 
7. Organisational and cultural maturity, together with the safety culture and the issues of 
power and control and how they are dealt with within organisations, are seen to be 
central to the success of both the consultation process and the overall levels of OHS; 
8. The management, transfer and ultimate use of the knowledge and skill of the 
workforce, are regarded as key intangible assets in terms of successful levels of OHS 
and meaningful and effective consultation.  They are also acknowledged as an 
important source of an organisation’s competitive advantage;  
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9. A systematic approach, such as that espoused by various organisational and cultural 
maturity models and the majority of safety management systems, are considered 
fundamental in the attainment and improvement of levels of OHS; 
10. A key factor in the success of an organisation’s safety management system appears to 
be reliant upon the levels of cultural and organisational maturity; 
11. Hudson’s model of organisational and cultural maturity revolves around the attitudes 
of the organisation about the importance of safety, the roles and efficacy of the 
individual and the importance attached to the systems and associated processes of the 
organisation. 
 
Taking all of these themes into consideration, this research will add to the knowledge base in 
a number of important ways.  What has failed to materialise within the literature thus far, is a 
clear understanding of how the moral and/or ethical principles or issues of trust, honesty, 
commitment and respect are applied by senior site management representatives and OHS 
representatives of construction companies, within the matrix of cultural and organisational 
maturity, during consultation over occupational health and safety.  This is important if we are 
to gain a better understanding of how the process of consultation between management and 
workers truly operates, and how consultation may further enhance levels of occupational 
health and safety within the commercial and industrial sector of the Victorian construction 
industry.   
 
The role of consultation and how it is conducted within the construct of organisational and 
cultural maturity is also a topic that has not yet been fully or comprehensively researched, 
especially in the Victorian construction industry.  This research project has attempted to do 
just that.  In addition, this research also looked at whether the application of the moral and 
ethical principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect by the participants of each 
company at the different levels of organisational maturity, allowed for a more or less effective 
knowledge and skill transfer between employers and employees.   
 
This project has also attempted to estimate the level of input and influence that OHS 
representatives have in the occupational health and safety management system of their 
employers and other strategic and upstream occupational health and safety forums, as a means 
of quantifying such involvement. 
 
 
The next Chapter will increase the depth and detail of our understanding of how the principles 
or issues of trust, honesty, commitment and respect are considered in the literature, and 
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further investigate how they relate specifically to this project.  It will also outline and 
elucidate the philosophy that sets the intellectual and theoretical framework that was utilised 
throughout this research project. 
  
75 
 
Chapter 3 Intellectual and theoretical framework 
3.1 The intellectual framework 
For consultation to be meaningful and effective in terms of OHS success, it is generally 
acknowledged that moral or ethical principles or issues such as trust, honesty, commitment, 
and respect must be recognised and implemented by all participants during the consultation 
process (Walters 2006; Shearn 2005, 2004; Page 2002; Hart 2002; Blewett 2001).  While not 
generally mandatory under any type of constitutional rule (which for the purposes of this 
research specifically refers to the OHS Act 2004 [Vic]), they are arguably morally and 
ethically required under what Emmet (1966) referred to as ‘… a constitutive rule in 
morality…’ (p.59).  She believed that the recognition and application of such rules or 
principles were necessary if a practice was to be considered moral or ethical and which, when 
enacted upon, enabled a constitutional rule to be applied effectively.  It is how these 
constitutive rules or principles are applied within the framework of constitutional rules, and 
what kinds of moral and ethical judgements people make and proceed upon in applying 
constitutive principles, that forms the basis of what Emmet called ‘moral relativism’ (p.90).  It 
is this theory of moral relativism which provides the theory that underpins this research.  
 
According to Emmet (1966), constitutive principles are primarily concerned with moral and 
ethical considerations and are greatly influenced by people’s ethical and moral beliefs and 
their cultural ways of life.  Transposing this into an organisational and workplace context, the 
culture of the organisation becomes pivotal in determining how the issues required for 
meaningful and effective consultation are applied.  Such an approach appears consistent with, 
and arguably compliments, the cultural concept of occupational health and safety, which in 
turn supports the paradigms of social and cultural relations at the workplace (Hvid 2001).  As 
noted in Chapter 2, a useful model that espouses the social and cultural relations’ paradigms 
is Hudson’s evolutionary safety culture model (Hudson 2003a).   
 
The Hudson model is based upon an evolutionary process of organisational and cultural 
maturity, set out in a framework or scale of five organisational maturity levels.  Commencing 
from the bottom or lowest end of the scale and working towards the top, the levels of the 
model are pathological, reactive, calculative, proactive and generative (see Chapter 2.6 of this 
paper for a detailed explanation of each level).  The model is seen as part of a process of an 
organisation’s evolution towards a full safety culture (Hudson 2001b).  According to Hudson 
(2003a), the notions of organisational culture and the subsequent understanding of both safety 
culture and safety management, will differ according to the levels of cultural maturity that an 
76 
 
organisation achieves.  In terms of occupational health and safety, Hudson believed that the 
higher an organisation progresses along the model, the more it will seek out information and 
opportunities to ensure incidents do not turn into accidents.  
 
The culture of the organisation has been identified as a critical component in determining an 
organisation’s success or failure (Glendon & Stanton 2000).  However it is the sub-culture 
that evolves from organisational culture, namely the safety culture of the organisation (Lawrie 
et al. 2006; Gadd & Collins 2002; Hudson 2003a, 2001a; Reason 1997) which is considered 
to be largely responsible for the levels of safety and the degree of workforce involvement that 
occurs at the workplace (Lawrie et al. 2006; Hudson 2003a; Hvid 2001; Reason 1997).   
 
Informedness and trust, key issues that are acknowledged as necessary for a true safety 
culture to exist (Hudson 2003a; Reason 1997), have also been identified as characteristics 
necessary if meaningful and effective consultation is to occur (Lawrie, Parker & Hudson 
2006, Walters 2006; Blewett 2001).  Taking these ideas to the next level, Hudson (2001a) 
believed that the more meaningful and effective the communication and hence the 
consultation process is, the safer and more effective the organisation will become.  
 
Effective organisations are characterised by their positive management and transfer of the 
knowledge and skills of their workforce (Mooradian 2005; Martini & Pellegrini 2005; Sveiby 
2001; Epstein 1998; Pascarella 1997).  Knowledge and skill is now considered to be a social 
and cultural phenomenon, with organisational culture having been identified as playing a vital 
role in the successful utilization of this highly regarded intangible asset (Salojärvi et al. 2005; 
Zeffane & Connell 2005; Sveiby & Simons 2002; Smith 2001; Gherardi & Nicolini 2000).  
The effective management and transfer of knowledge and skill is synonymous with 
meaningful and effective consultation (Sveiby & Simons 2002; Smith 2001).  Meaningful and 
effective consultation is positively associated with a high degree of workforce involvement, 
which not only has a profound influence on organisational culture (Hvid 2001), but is also 
acknowledged and recognised as being vital to OHS success. 
 
A crucial, but nonetheless undercurrent theme of this research, revolves around this concept 
of positive workforce involvement in the improvement, maintenance and successful 
implementation of occupational health and safety standards within the Victorian construction 
industry.  In part, this project explored the interactions and synergies that emerged from such 
workforce involvement, via the process of consultation, whilst utilizing the theory of moral 
relativism, in an attempt to determine what effect, if any, this had on the application of the 
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principles or issues of trust, honesty, commitment and respect, that have been identified in the 
literature as being necessary for meaningful and effective consultation to occur.   
 
In an attempt to evaluate the significance this had upon the quality and effectiveness of 
consultation within Hudson’s model of organisational maturity, this project also considered 
the impact and influence that organisational culture and safety culture had upon the five 
Victorian construction companies who participated in the project.  The project also considered 
how the construction companies managed and shared the knowledge and skills contained 
within their workforce, best represented by the most senior and appropriate management 
representative and the duly elected OHS representative on the construction sites.  These two 
players are considered to be two of the critical vectors in the sharing and transferring of 
knowledge and skill of OHS at the workplace, so that enhanced levels of occupational health 
and safety may be achieved in the construction industry (WorkSafe Victoria 2006; 
WorkCover Corporation S.A. 2001; Blewett 2001). 
 
 
3.2 The theoretical framework  
While the process of consultation is a legislative requirement under Victorian OHS law, the 
decision of whether or not to apply principles or issues such as trust, honesty, commitment 
and respect during consultation essentially becomes an ethical or moral dilemma.  In 
describing this dilemma, Emmet (1966) stated that: ‘… people’s ethical beliefs and practices 
are seen in the context of their culture and the ways of life and the structural forms in which 
these are organized, and this contextual way of looking at them is commonly taken to imply 
moral relativism’ (p.90). 
 
In the context of this research, Emmet’s (1966) theory of moral relativism asks how the moral 
and/or ethical requirements of both organisations and individuals affects the application and 
implementation of principles or issues which are generally accepted as being required for 
effective and meaningful consultation to occur.  How these principles or issues were applied 
at the different levels of organisational maturity, represented in this project via the Hudson 
evolutionary safety culture model (Hudson 2003), was a central theme of this research.  
Further to this, the type of culture, both organisational and safety, which existed within each 
organisation, also needed to be carefully considered.  This assisted not only in gaining a better 
understanding of the different cultures of the organisations that participated in the project, but 
also the role that moral relativism played in the overall management and transfer of the 
78 
 
knowledge and skill contained within the workforce, and the effect and influence that this had 
on the consultation processes that occurred at the different levels of the Hudson model. 
 
Moral relativism can be many things to many people.  Eddington, Searle and Temple-Smith 
(2004) described it as: ‘… a comfortable panacea for inaction, a thicket in which most 
partisan and divisive practices can be disguised and pursued, or even an oil on troubled waters 
if it is based on genuine respect for differing value systems…’ (p.7).  Regardless of the 
application or definition one wishes to apply to moral relativism, they believed that whenever 
humans make decisions, there is a ranking of values attached to those decisions.  In light of 
this, they further argued that there was evidence to show that there is indeed a more concerted 
effort on the part of many organizations to be more socially responsible in their business 
dealings, and through this, in providing a safer and healthier workplace, which they believed 
reflected a more civil society.  However, they also argued that the forces behind this approach 
were not just based on ethical principles, but also included a mixture of economic and 
organizational self interest. 
 
By distinguishing between what she called constitutional rules of procedure, described as 
procedures and powers within an institution, and the constitutive rules, which define their 
practices, Emmet (1966) was able to shed light on the ethical and moral dilemmas faced by 
individuals when undertaking a process such as consultation.  The requirements for 
consultation are set out in OHS legislation, which we can liken to Emmet’s constitutional 
rules.  However, issues such as trust, honesty, commitment and respect which are generally 
accepted and acknowledged as being necessary for effective and meaningful consultation, are 
better described as constitutive rules or principles (Emmet 1966).  These rules or principles 
while not mandated or stipulated in any law or constitutional legislation, are arguably 
ethically and/or morally required if consultation is to have any type of lasting effect and 
significance in terms of increased levels of occupational health and safety. 
 
Emmet (1966) drew an analogy between the distinction that can be made between the rules 
which define a practice and the rules which may be arrived at by generalizations from 
experience - describing these latter undertakings as maxims for optimizing particular acts 
within the practice.  However simplistic it may appear, Emmet (1966) believed that similar to 
a game, there are rules of how to play the game and maxims that dictate how to play it well.   
 
Figure 5 demonstrates how Emmet’s theory was applied to this particular research project. 
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Figure 5: Emmet’s theory of moral relativism as applied to this project 
       Source: Based on Emmet (1966) 
Constitutional Rule 
 
(OHS Act with legal requirement 
to engage in and undertake 
consultation). 
 
 
Constitutive Principles 
 
(Moral and/or ethical principles 
such as trust, honesty, 
commitment and respect) 
For a Constitutional rule to be truly 
effective, it requires the application of 
Constitutive principles… 
 
Constitutional Rule with the application of 
Constitutive Principles… 
Meaningful and effective 
consultation between employers 
and OHS representatives in the 
Victorian construction industry? 
Potentially a more fluid, trusting and 
honest approach to OHS issues…? 
 
… Leading to greater worker input 
into strategic, critical and upstream 
OHS matters? 
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To be successful, Emmet (1966) believed that ‘… each culture must be able to provide the 
patterns of motor habits, social relations, knowledge and beliefs, such that it will be possible 
for men to survive.’ (p.96).  It is therefore the thinking, identification and reaction-forming 
processes that occur within the group, which allows some type of assessment of the particular 
culture to be undertaken (Emmet 1966).   
 
Symbolic interaction, which forms the basis of the theoretical perspective of this research, 
appears to be ideally suited to identify such processes, because it looks at the way the 
participants or actors interact and relate to each other, as they construct meaning and interpret 
the actions, symbols and practices of their environment.  Symbolic interaction is cognisant of 
the actors’ or participants’ views and interpretation of events, symbols, language, 
communication, interrelationships, community and other cultural and symbolic objects and 
tools that effects their lives and foregrounds their interpretations of the events (Crotty 1998).  
The researcher’s role is to allow the participant or actor to describe their world from their 
perspective (Crotty 1998).   
 
Indeed, it is the common needs, common tasks and common psychological processes which, 
according to Emmet (1966), provide the framework for the wide variety of human behaviours 
that develop within the different cultures.   Accordingly, she believed that those who live and 
work together tend to follow a path set by the customs and expectations of the group and do 
not just blindly follow or obey external coercive pressure.  In terms of this research, there are 
legislative requirements set out under OHS legislation for consultation to occur.  However, it 
is the motivations and actions of the individuals and through them, the organisations they are 
employed by, which to varying degrees help establish and reaffirm the habits and attitudes of 
the organisation, that effect the application of the principles or issues required for meaningful 
and effective consultation, which this project sought to investigate and explain.   
 
It must be remembered that a society or a group are made up of individual members.  These 
individuals have minds and wills of their own, and so cannot always be expected to function 
in a completely harmonious manner, without some degree of conflict or adversarial 
participation (Wall 1978).  To overcome such conflict or disharmony, Wall (1978) believed 
that positive mannerisms such as warmth, concern and acceptance, should be positively 
displayed and reciprocated, in order for people to respond in a more constructive and 
affirmative manner.  Such mannerisms are considered to be within the realms of moral and 
ethical behaviour (Emmet 1966). 
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It is believed that the moral and ethical elements within a culture are fundamentally affected 
by other elements within that culture, and when considered as a whole construct, are what 
makes up any particular culture (Emmet 1966).  What kind of moral and ethical judgments 
people make and upon what type of constitutive principles they proceed, are questions that 
Emmet (1966) believed philosophers and anthropologists will continue to ask.  By 
implementing a research methodology that has developed from cultural anthropology known 
as ethnography (Crotty 1998) and guided by Emmet’s (1966) theory of moral relativism, this 
research project has attempted to answer these questions.  Clearly, these questions will be 
answered in the investigation, within the confines of the consultation process that occurs 
within the different levels of organisational maturity, reflected and played out in the 
commercial and industrial sector of the Victorian construction industry. 
 
Emmet (1966) described morality as a ‘…function of enabling people to live together with 
sufficient mutual trust to be able to form reasonable expectations…’ (p.106).  She went on to 
state that morality ‘…encourages qualities which enlarge possibilities of trust, making 
possible cooperative enterprises …’ (p106).  In terms of this research, such cooperative 
enterprises, built on trust, could well be describing the proactive and generative levels found 
within the Hudson model.  While morality is a matter of judgment often guided by rules, they 
are not simply applied automatically (Emmet 1966).  Indeed, whilst she believed that making 
moral judgments is very problematic, if they are faced responsibly, and in terms of this 
research maturely, such judgments may be seen as solving a moral problem, the answers to 
which are not always arrived at by simply looking them up in a book of constitutional rules 
(Emmet 1966).   
 
By participating in a social practice or institution, Emmet (1966) argued that one accepts the 
normative and descriptive characters of the institution.  More recently, Burnside (2007) 
claimed that ‘…living in a complex society requires all members of society to adhere to a 
commonly agreed set of norms and ideals.’ (p.46).  However, it could be argued that the 
acceptance of such norms and ideals is also dependent upon value judgments being made on 
the very norms and characteristics of the institution or society in question (Emmet 1966).  In 
this regard, the making of such value-laden decisions would appear to rely heavily on moral 
judgments, principles and rational and ethical behaviour.  The relationship and 
interdependence between issues such as trust, honesty, commitment and respect are 
underscored by such value-laden decisions and moral and ethical judgments, with the element 
of trust taking a central role (Flin & Burns 2004). 
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It is generally accepted that if there is to be effective and meaningful consultation, then a high 
level of trust between the participants involved in the consultation is required (Sargeant 2001; 
Walters & Frick 2000; Fuller 1999).  In the organisational construct, trust in a relationship 
subsequently builds upon the notion of a partnership approach, which harbours such key 
concepts as: mutual recognition and respect; equal opportunities and fair treatment for all; a 
joint commitment to success by all parties; honesty in the provision of sharing all information 
in the process of joint problem solving; and, the recognition of the legitimate roles and 
interests of all parties (Gollan & Patmore 2003).  Such concepts are at the very heart of the 
constitutive principles utilised in this project.   
 
 
3.2.1  Constitutive principles used in the project 
According to Emmet (1966) sociologists have described the mores
8
 of a society as part of the 
whole culture of that society and they are unable to be adopted in a piecemeal-like fashion 
and cherry-picked to suit other cultures, without losing their original meaning and application.  
But she also believed that merely because one may occupy a certain position in a social 
network within a particular society, it does not necessarily mean that this will determine a 
particular moral outlook.  She argued that ‘…whatever else morals may be concerned with, 
they are concerned with ways in which people live together in some form of ordered 
society…’ (p.95). 
 
For the purposes of this research, the ordered society was taken to be the commercial and 
industrial sector of the Victorian construction industry.  Whilst consultation is legislatively 
required under the OHS Act 2004 (Victoria), the process of consultation in terms of its 
effectiveness and meaningfulness is essentially a moral and ethical obligation, as are the roles 
that participants are allowed or indeed empowered to play within the forum. 
 
The moral foundations of employee rights as proposed by Rowan (2000), reiterated that in 
terms of an employee’s right to health and safety at or in the workplace, employers had an 
absolute duty to let their employees know of any hazards and risks which may be present at 
the workplace.  In real terms, the most practicable and appropriate fashion for this to occur 
would appear to be through a forum of open and honest consultation.  Rowan made the point 
that the type of mediation involving employee rights, including the right to be consulted over 
OHS, needed to be accompanied by a workable framework if it was to have any real affect 
                                               
8 Emmet (1966, p.13) stated that “...the rules of the mores may be a combination of manners and morals, are likely sometimes to be ambiguous, sometimes 
inconsistent, and it may be possible sometimes to break them without an umpire calling one to order.  Nevertheless, they enable an aggregate of people to live 
as a social group...”. 
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and influence.  In Rowan’s opinion, employees must be treated as persons first and foremost 
and not merely as chattels or statistical means.  In simple terms, employers must treat their 
employees in a morally and ethically acceptable manner and show them due respect. 
 
Emmet (1966) noted that professional morals and ethics between colleagues have traditionally 
been intended as a means of maintaining mutual trust and cooperation within a profession.  
This approach was later confirmed by Salaman (1979) when he observed that where 
organisational roles are essentially complex, containing discretionary elements and requiring 
skill and judgment, the issues or elements of commitment and trustworthiness were of 
paramount importance.  Operating a constructive and meaningful consultation process 
requires a high level of trust and honesty between participants (Fuller 1999).  Trust and 
honesty in information exchange and information acknowledgement, and trust in the 
implementation of agreed decisions, was described by Alexander and Lewer (1994) as 
cooperative decision making.   
 
The concept of trust was considered by Conchie and Donald (2006) to be: ‘… a more 
complex phenomenon than is often portrayed in the safety literature.  The challenge is to 
unravel that complexity…’  (p.1158).  The definition of trust provided by Clarke (2003) was 
based on expectations or beliefs regarding the likelihood that another’s future actions will be 
favourable or at least not detrimental to one’s interests, but was heavily reliant upon both the 
culture of the organisation and the commitment of management to achieve this.  Mathews 
(1994) had earlier argued that trust is not a natural phenomenon but more a social construct, 
produced from norms that govern people’s behaviour.  Arguably, it is the behaviour of the 
parties that bears heavily on the level of trust that is generated between them, which may 
ultimately determine the effectiveness or otherwise of the consultation process.  
 
The research of Firth-Cozens (2004) found that trust had a positive influence on both job 
satisfaction and organisational effectiveness and that organisational trust, that is trust 
displayed between management and workers, was a crucial ingredient in the quality of an 
organisations’ end-product.  She believed that the level of trust which exists in an 
organisation is affected by the culture and the demands that society places upon itself.  The 
factors that she considered were necessary to promote trust within organisations included high 
staff participation in decision making, more openness and honesty in communication, a less 
bureaucratic organisation, job security, fairness of rewards and punishment, opportunities to 
participate and an ethical organisational environment.   
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Trust and cooperation are recognized as key components by many authors not only in the 
development of meaningful and effective consultation but also in the use, transfer and 
application of the knowledge and skills contained within an organisation (Gill & Meyer 2008; 
Kelly 2006; Salojärvi et al. 2005; Firth-Cozens 2004; Svieby 2001; Alexander & Lewer 
1994).   
 
In Hudson’s evolutionary safety culture model (2003a), as organisations move up the models’ 
ladder, there should be a corresponding increase in the level of trust which in turn, should 
then increase the information flow within the organisation.  This information flow is primarily 
from the positive use and transfer of the knowledge and skill of employees, which Hudson 
believed should positively affect the organisation in terms of both levels of safety and in their 
ability to survive and prosper.  This theory that increasing trust in organisations subsequently 
leads to an increase in the information flow within the organization, was also evident in the 
research of Costa (2003) and Firth-Cozens (2004), whose work on organisational trust and 
effectiveness reflected both the philosophy and the overall concept of Hudson’s premise.  But 
the development and application of trust is not simply limited to the idea of increased 
information, but appears fundamental to the constitutive principles used in this project.  
According to some, trust is directly implicated in, and affects the openness and honesty of, 
communication and consultation within organisations, which, it is claimed, can also lead to 
higher levels of commitment (Gill & Meyer 2008; White & Eiser 2006; Firth-Cozens 2004).   
 
While there is generally no one universally accepted definition of trust, Costa (2003) believed 
it to be generally regarded as a concept of people’s expectations towards one another and a 
willingness to become vulnerable to others.  Trust is generally described as a state in which 
one person, known as the trustor, relies on another person, known as the trustee, usually in a 
risky situation and relies upon positive expectations of the behaviours or intentions of the 
trustee (Conchie & Burns 2009).   
 
Some of the qualities that Conchie and Burns (2009) described as generally being necessary 
for trust to exist included knowledge, honesty, openness, care and concern.  They used a three 
dimensional model which they believed best reflected how these qualities or beliefs were to 
be applied.  The importance of a trustee’s integrity, honesty, knowledge and concern were all 
seen as vital if trust was to exist between different parties.  If we take this argument to be true, 
then trust should not be considered in isolation to the other constitutive principles used in this 
project.  Indeed, numerous authors have identified that for trust to be truly acknowledged and 
applied at the workplace, it is strongly influenced by and heavily reliant upon other factors 
such as benevolence, integrity, honesty, openness, fairness and respect (Conchie & Burns 
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2009; Cox, Jones & Collinson 2006; Walls, Pidgeon, Weyman & Horlick-Jones 2004; Mayer, 
Davis &Schoorman 1995).   
 
For the purposes of this research project, it was considered that all the factors identified above 
which complimented and supported the principle of trust, were best encapsulated in and by 
the principles of honesty, commitment and respect.  It is acknowledged that by concentrating 
on only these four constitutive moral or ethical principles (Emmet 1966), this may impact on 
and/or restrict the project from conducting an even far greater and deeper analysis than that 
which was undertaken in the project.  However, it was considered that the four nominated 
constitutive principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect allowed for a far greater 
appreciation and understanding of the roles that they played during consultation and how they 
were applied during this process, throughout the different levels of organisational maturity, as 
applied in the Victorian construction industry, than has ever been undertaken before.   
 
If, as has been suggested by Costa (2003), that trust is indeed the lubricant of a social system, 
then in the context of this project, trust may well be the mortar which holds together the 
complimentary but necessary blocks of honesty, commitment and respect.  However, if trust 
is broken or is absent, some consider any gains from collaboration and cooperation in 
increasing organisational effectiveness may be sacrificed and may take a long time for it to 
become re-established (White & Eiser 2006; Firth-Cozens 2004).  But such displays of 
distrust or mistrust may not be as detrimental as they first might appear. 
 
 
3.2.2  Creative distrust 
Safety has traditionally been associated with a high level of trust and negatively influenced by 
levels of distrust.  However, recent papers have challenged such assumptions, concluding that 
a degree of distrust or mistrust is often required to ensure that a high level of safety is 
obtained and maintained at the workplace.  While Conchie and Donald (2006) believed that 
trust enabled open, frequent and effective safety and risk communication to occur, they also 
believed that trust is often and mistakenly treated as a unified construct and a single entity.  
Indeed, there are grounds to state that the concept of mistrust may have at least as strong an 
effect on safety as that of trust.  According to Conchie and Donald, there is little empirical 
evidence that shows any positive link between trust and safety, suggesting that ‘… distrust 
might have a stronger effect on safety performance…’ (p.1153).   
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It is considered by some authors that complete and unquestionable trust in another’s opinion 
or methods could inadvertently expose the individual to the risk of an accident or incident, 
whilst trusting an organisation too much may unintentionally prevent workers from engaging 
in effective decision making and reduce personal responsibility, thereby creating an 
overreliance on others (Conchie, Donald & Taylor 2006).  In this regard, Conchie and Donald 
(2008) argued that a level of creative distrust or what they described as functional distrust was 
in fact necessary, if an organisation was to conduct a positive review on the standard of safety 
systems and safety management within the organisation. 
 
By making the distinction between what they called distrust with sinister intentions, compared 
with a level of distrust which takes a functional form and develops from a realization that 
people can and often do make mistakes, Conchie and Donald (2008) theorized that this 
functional distrust ensured a healthy degree of scepticism.  They believed that this was 
necessary for quality risk assessments, as well as high quality monitoring of safety procedures 
and actions, which they deemed necessary for higher levels of safety.  They saw distrust as a 
positive source of information; essential in environments where safety was critical (e.g. high 
risk industries) and where blind faith or too much trust could easily lead to disaster.   
 
The earlier work of Conchie, Donald and Taylor (2006) referred to the term ‘creative 
mistrust’ (p.1099) to promote a concept that they believed was necessary for a workforce to 
challenge unsafe behaviour and decisions and the problems associated with group thinking.  
Conchie and Donald (2008) considered that the presence of distrust may actually improve the 
effectiveness of an organisation’s safety system, while too much trust may actually damage it.   
 
The idea of creative mistrust was also used by Cox et al. (2006) as being necessary to 
maintain levels of OHS and risk control systems.  They argued that the development of a 
subculture of creative mistrust within an organisations’ safety culture would ‘… lead to a 
more questioning attitude and help evade potential accidents or near miss incidents resulting 
from an individual’s blind trust in technologies, systems and processes…’ (p.1125).  They 
further believed that ‘… the development of creative mistrust via a questioning attitude could 
evade situations in which group-think could potentially lead to neglect and the 
misinterpretation of the activities and intentions of other actors…’ (p.1125).   
 
Perhaps there is an argument for organisations to display levels of both trust and distrust, not 
only to increase levels of OHS, but also in terms of developing and promoting a positive 
safety culture (Conchie & Donald 2008).  This latter development would then be consistent 
with the belief that existing models of safety culture should be revised to include the different 
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types of trust, distrust and creative mistrust to help create more sophisticated safety culture 
models and also inform and direct future research in the concept of safety culture (Burns, 
Mearns & McGeorge 2006; Conchie, Donald & Taylor 2006). 
 
During a study that examined how the concept of trust affected the safety culture of a UK gas 
plant, Burns, Mearns and McGeorge (2006) claimed that ‘… in modern organizations, 
relationships based on trust and distrust emerge as the most prevalent form as relationships 
mature and interdependencies are expanded…’ (p.1148).  Such interdependencies would 
appear to not only be influenced by the levels of trust and distrust displayed in the 
organisations themselves, and indeed in the society in which they operate, but would also 
appear to be affected by the ethical behavior of the organisation in terms of their levels of 
organisational commitment (Firth-Cozens 2004; Hudson 2003; Brookes 2002). 
 
 
3.2.3  Commitment 
When investigating the role of managers engaged in high commitment strategies, Parkes, 
Scully, West and Dawson (2007) indicated that high commitment was vital if theory was to 
be replicated successfully from strategy to policy implementation.  They saw organisational 
commitment in terms of high employee involvement, in turn linking it to the notion of 
positive and active participation in the decision-making process of an organisation; thereby 
increasing job satisfaction and giving employees a greater sense of fulfilment and control over 
their working conditions. 
 
The work of Jeffcott, Pidgeon, Weyman and Walls (2006) identified that commitment was a 
vital component in the effort of companies to implement a safe organisational culture within 
their operating structure.  However they also emphasised the importance of what they called 
visual management commitment to employees, describing it as ‘… commitment that is well 
balanced against both operational and commercial issues…’ (p.1107). 
 
The relationship between organisational ethics and employee satisfaction was scrutinised by 
Koh and Boo (2004), who recognized that commitment was positively associated with greater 
job satisfaction, increased productivity and the increased profitability of the organisation.  
They also identified that there was a positive association between such organisational 
commitment, performance and the ethical behaviour and standards of the organisation.  In 
their opinion, employee dissonance and conflict generally only resulted if employees 
perceived little management commitment to ethical behaviour and standards.  According to 
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Salaman (1979), organisations are essentially structures of control and it is how this control is 
exercised, by whom and for what purposes, that tend to characterize the constant and 
continuing conflict that occurs within organisations.  He pointed out that while organisations 
are fundamentally reliant upon the cooperation of the subordinate levels for all jobs to be 
completed successfully, and because organisations are fundamentally and inherently 
inegalitarian in structure, involving superordination and subordination, this relationship serves 
as the basis for most of the conflict that is experienced within organisations. 
 
In such an environment, Gill (2009) believed that trade unions become invaluable.  She 
believed workers trust their unions because they see them as independent and working for 
their interests, as opposed to appointed managers who are essentially appointed by 
management to look after the interests of management.  It is perhaps inevitable that in every 
organisation, there will always be some dissension, some dissatisfaction, some conflict and 
some effort to try and achieve a degree of freedom from hierarchical control and 
organisational domination.  Salaman (1979) described this struggle in terms of a silent, 
muted, often defensive tussle which is more often than not expressed in terms of the efforts to 
regain, defend or achieve some type of control or autonomy.  He believed that such conflict 
reflected internal inequalities and organisation contradictions, inequalities and contradictions 
often encountered in the moral and ethical dilemmas faced by both individuals and 
organisations at the workplace. 
 
 
3.3 Recent applications of moral relativism 
There have been a number of studies conducted over the past few years that have had as their 
central theme the reasoning, conflicts and relationships that occur as a result of moral and 
ethical dilemmas and decision making within organisations (Peterson 2004, 2003; Pedigo & 
Marshall 2004; Dempster, Carter, Freakley & Parry 2004).  While these studies or projects 
used the terms ‘moral relativism’ and ‘ethical relativism’ interchangeably, they demonstrated 
how the individual and the organisation are influenced and affected by both the culture of the 
organisation and the individual’s own ethical and moral beliefs and the conflict that can often 
arise because of this. 
 
Many consider that moral and/or ethical relativism relies on the culture of the organisation to 
determine what is right or wrong (Pedigo &Marshall 2004; Dempster et al. 2004; Peterson 
2003; Emmet 1966).  It is the culture of the organisation that will not only drive the success or 
otherwise of the business (Glendon & Stanton 2000), but will also determine the generation of 
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trust and the flow of open and honest communication (Hudson 2003; Reason 1997).  In the 
endeavour for an organisation to succeed and prosper, Pedigo and Marshall (2004) 
demonstrated that moral relativism is important in building and maintaining trusting 
relationships, supporting the role that moral relativism has in the creation of trust and in the 
subsequent building of positive relationships that can give consultation depth and meaning.   
 
The distinction between universal or absolute moral rules, also known as moral absolutism, 
and that of moral or ethical relativism was a theme highlighted by Peterson (2004, 2003), 
Pedigo and Marshall (2004) and Dempster et al. (2004).  In Peterson’s (2003) opinion, 
individuals who take a relativist approach were more likely to formulate ethical intentions 
based on outcomes of potential acts and find it easier to align their own ethical standards with 
an organisations’ own goals, as opposed to absolutists or moral universalists who tended to be 
more troubled and have more difficulty in adapting.   
 
This was slightly different to the earlier approach taken by Emmet (1966), in which she 
claimed that moral relativism was better understood if broken into what she called ‘hard and 
soft relativism’ (p.91).  In her opinion, hard relativism is based on moral principles that are 
causally dependent on something else, whereas soft relativism is based on the concept that 
while there are distinctive moral factors, these are interrelated within a culture with other 
factors, including but not limited to familial, economic and power issues and which will vary 
accordingly.  It was Emmet’s soft form of moral relativism that appeared to best fit this 
research project in terms of occupational health and safety. 
 
 
3.4 Moral relativism and occupational health and safety 
The philosophy behind the concept of moral relativism may well have a corrosive malaise on 
the duty of care provisions, as set out under the Robens’ OHS legislation framework, because 
as Eddington (2006) pointed out, there is the underlying and ever-present tension between 
ethics and profits - which underscores concerns and constraints in relation to OHS.  In his 
opinion, the ethical dimensions of OHS have both an individual and a group dimension.  On 
an individual level, Eddington believed that a safe and decent work place provided an 
individual with a defence against society and was both a cause and an outcome of a civil 
society, while the group element ‘… springs from the gregarious nature of humankind and 
resides in social mores…’ (p.2). 
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According to Eddington (2006), OHS is primarily based upon ethical principles reflected in 
the duty of care provisions, as opposed to any duty to science or economics and is therefore 
reliant upon both individual and organisational ethics to ensure its success.  However, he also 
argued that while OHS has a scientific and social dimension, and while it is correctly 
presented and indeed acted upon as a science, it is still primarily driven by economic and 
ethical considerations.  In an earlier paper, Eddington, Searle and Temple-Smith (2004) 
claimed that the act of ethical behaviour in humans had always been problematic and it was 
no different when it came to ethical business behaviour.  At the time, they believed that the 
time and the current business environment were right for the promotion and implementation 
of such moral and ethical behaviour, especially in terms of OHS.   
 
In light of this, Eddington et al. (2004) claimed that while many boardrooms still treated OHS 
as a restraint on their ability and capacity to maximize shareholders value, there were some 
more enlightened boardrooms that were now willing to go beyond such a shallow and hollow 
bottom line, seeing OHS as an opportunity to positively differentiate themselves from their 
competitors.  They believed that the steady progression of the OHS agenda into a positive 
force had engendered this boardroom shift into a broader boardroom responsibility.  While 
they claimed that the process was articulated and heavily dependent upon the legislative 
framework and associated standards, they were left in no doubt that the boardroom OHS 
agenda was fundamentally being driven by the moral and ethical values of an organisation.   
 
When attempting to research ethical and moral values and concepts, the constructed and 
contextual nature of these issues has suggested a qualitative constructionist approach be 
undertaken (Crotty 1998).  The next chapter will both further justify then explicate this 
epistemological stance and methodology. 
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Chapter 4 The research framework 
When first developing and subsequently answering or completing a research project, Crotty 
(1998) suggested that there were four elements that needed to be addressed.  He argued that 
these elements provided the framework and the scaffolding upon which learning is based and 
which fundamentally constitutes and embodies a legitimate and robust piece of research.  The 
Crotty framework is modelled along the following four questions: 
i. What methods are proposed to be used during the research? 
ii. What methodology presides over the choice and use of the methods chosen?  
iii. What theoretical perspective lies behind the chosen methodology? 
iv. What epistemology informs the question? 
(Crotty 1998, p.2). 
 
Taking these questions one at time, the following sections will explain the reasoning behind 
the approach that was undertaken for this research project. 
 
 
4.1 Epistemology 
Commencing with Crotty’s last question, the epistemology chosen for this project was 
constructionism, an approach which assumes that: 
‘…all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon 
human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings 
and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context...’ 
(Crotty 1998, p.42). 
 
For this particular project, which fundamentally represents a piece of applied research, the 
philosophical underpinnings of consultation as outlined by Emmet (1966) and almost four 
decades later, Wilson and Haines (2005), evolved around this very notion of the interaction 
between human beings and their world essentially being transmitted via a social context.  In 
terms of this particular research project, the social context became the workplace, which in 
essence were building sites located within the confines of the commercial and industrial 
sector of the Victorian construction industry.  Human practices essentially formulated 
themselves into and became work practices, and the interaction between human beings that 
were developed and transmitted within the social context, arguably evolved around the 
efficiency or otherwise of the knowledge and skill transfer between employers and 
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employees, via the process of consultation, which was analysed through the lens of 
organisational and cultural maturity.   
 
Crotty (1998) explained that in the constructionist epistemology ‘…meanings are constructed 
by human beings as they engage with the world they are interpreting’ (p.43).  Any truth or 
meaning that is discovered or constructed by the participants therefore comes from their 
actual engagement within the realities of the world in which the participants are active 
players.  Essentially this becomes a process not so much of discovering meaning, but rather 
constructing meaning, ultimately leading to possible different meanings being constructed 
about the same phenomenon by different people (Crotty 1998).  
 
This research project set out to explore how the moral and ethical principles or issues of trust, 
honesty, commitment and respect, which are commonly acknowledged as being necessary for 
effective and meaningful consultation, were interpreted and applied by different people and 
hence different organisations, at different levels of Hudson’s model of organisational and 
cultural maturity, regarding occupational health and safety within the Victorian construction 
industry.  In doing so, it also set out to determine how the different participants, being senior 
management representatives and OHS representatives of five different construction 
companies, on five different sites, managed and transferred their knowledge and skill during 
consultation, in the context of this potential ethical and moral dilemma, when applying the 
principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect. 
 
 
4.2 Theoretical perspective 
The theoretical perspective that lies behind the choice of the methodology for this project is 
that of interpretivism.   This is the theoretical perspective that Crotty (1998) believes provides 
the appropriate context for the process, logic and criteria to be followed and used throughout 
a research proposal.   Interpretivism was chosen for this research project because of its focus 
on the effect that culture and historical interpretations, of what Crotty called the social life 
world, has on the outcomes and interpretations of the data.  Taken in this context, the 
interpretation of culture is derived from the very symbols of the culture, which is best seen as 
the source of, as opposed to the result of, human thought and human behaviour (Crotty 1998).   
 
Within this interpretative theoretical perspective, such symbols and interpretations are best 
viewed within a symbolic interaction approach (Crotty 1998).  Symbolic interaction takes the 
actors’ viewpoint and interpretation of the events, symbols, language, communication, 
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interrelationships, community and other cultural and symbolic objects and tools that affect the 
lives and the interpretation of the events that surround participants in their everyday life 
(Crotty 1998).  The researcher’s role in using symbolic interactionism is to place themselves 
in the role of the participant or actor, in order to see their world from their perspective (Crotty 
1998).  In this sense, symbolic interactionism makes the assumption that it is the way 
participants symbolically interact with each other that helps construct their own meanings and 
interpretations of the actions, symbols and practices of their environment.   
 
Crotty (1998) described the three basic interactionist assumptions as: 
1. Humans act towards things based upon the meanings that these things have for them; 
2. The meanings of these things arise out of the social interaction they have with their 
fellow human beings; and 
3. Such meanings are handled and modified according to the interpretations used by the 
person or persons dealing with the thing/s they encounter (p.72). 
 
It was believed by Hofstede (1983) that the many cultural symbols which have and give 
meaning to people’s lives are continually manipulated by others over those persons who are 
managed or organized.  In the context of this project, such an interpretation could arguably fit 
comfortably within many workplace situations.  The interactionist and cultural approach of de 
Laine (1997) also appears to have a strong relationship with the workplace and arguably an 
even stronger rapport with the fundamental philosophy of consultation.  She claimed that 
‘…from the interactionist perspective, culture is the result of people’s creative ability to 
interact together and collectively arrive at a shared definition of a situation…’ (p.74). 
 
In the context of this research project, the relevance of the symbolic interaction approach 
appears to be well justified as we attempted to gain an understanding and appreciation of what 
the participants or actors deemed to be symbolic and important.  This was especially so in 
terms of how they believed the principles or issues of trust, honesty, commitment and respect 
were applied during consultation over OHS in their workplace, and whether or not the 
consultation could be interpreted as being meaningful and effective.  Of equal importance and 
crucial to both the implementation and the outcomes of the project, was what methodology 
we were going to adopt to tease out and extract such information.  Once again, we turned to 
Crotty for inspiration and guidance. 
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4.3 Methodology 
In what he called a ‘scaffold of learning’ held within the research matrix, Crotty (1998) 
described a research methodology that developed from cultural anthropology, known as 
ethnography, which seemed perfectly suited to this project.  When using ethnography, Crotty 
claimed that the culture should not be questioned or criticised, but rather, it should be 
observed as closely as possible, from the perspective of those within the culture.  
Methodologically, using the symbolic interactionist perspective, he proposed that it is the 
actor’s view of actions, objects and the society in which the study is to be carried out in, 
which forms the key elements of the research.  Crotty further believed that as a social science 
research method, ethnography is heavily dependent upon close up and personal experience, 
participation and observation, all bound together in a narrative description that is ideal for 
exploratory research, which neatly encapsulated and described this research project.   
 
The ethnographic approach commonly employs three types of data collection, which in turn 
produces three types of data.  These are: 
1. interviews - which fundamentally produce quotations from people about their 
experiences, opinions, feelings and knowledge;  
2. observations - which produce descriptions of peoples activities, behaviours and actions; 
and  
3. documents - including organisational records, correspondence and written reports and the 
subsequent exerts and quotations taken from these (Genzuk 2003; Patton 1990).   
 
In consideration of the above points, Genzuk (2003) claimed that ethnography was able to 
provide us with new constructs, paradigms and variables which are then able to be researched 
and tested further, either in the field or through what he described as the more traditional 
quantitative social science methods.  de Laine (1997) had earlier described ethnography as 
being based on assumptions about society and human behaviour and how it can be best 
understood, while focusing on assumptions about naturalism, understanding and discovery.  
Genzuk (2003) later concurred with this approach, and provided the following definition and 
description of these three assumptions as: 
 
1. Naturalism: This aims to capture the character of naturally occurring human 
behaviour, in a setting that exists independently of the research process.  In doing so, 
it seeks to increase the chances of being able to generalise what is discovered in the 
research setting to other similar ‘un-researched’ environments.  Naturalism also 
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implies that the social events and processes that occur within a particular environment 
must be explained within the particular context; 
2. Understanding: In seeking to explain human behaviour, one must gain an 
understanding of the cultural perspectives upon which the behaviour is based.  
However a danger is that when a setting is familiar to the researcher, there may well 
be a misunderstanding from the researcher based on their familiarity with the subject 
and/or the environment
9
.  Indeed Genzuk strongly argued that a researcher cannot 
ever assume that they already know the perspectives of others, because groups and 
individuals alike develop distinctive worldviews; 
3. Discovery: this concept is based upon the argument that research should not just be 
about a particular hypothesis, but rather what is occurring throughout the process 
being investigated or researched.  In other words, we do not want to be blinded by 
any particular assumptions built into any particular hypotheses, but rather discover 
the true nature of the phenomenon that is under investigation.   
 
In summary, Genzuk (2003) described ethnography as a process of studying people’s 
behaviour in everyday contexts.  He believed that while data are generally gathered from a 
wide range of sources, observation and or relatively informal conversations are perhaps two 
of the main sources of information
10
.  In carrying out such a process, Genzuk believed that the 
ethnographic methodology was best focused on a single setting or a group of relatively small 
scale
11
, with the analysis of the data involving interpretation of the meanings and functions of 
human actions, taking the form of the verbal descriptions and explanations provided. 
 
The primary aim of this project was to examine how, at the different levels of organisational 
and cultural maturity, the actors interacted with each other; exploring their behaviours, 
actions and the symbols and tools that were used in the application of trust, honesty, 
commitment and respect during consultation over OHS.  In order to do this successfully, we 
needed to win the trust and confidence of all participants – both individually and 
organisationally.  In consideration of this and to be consistent with ethnographic principles, 
the approach we undertook to achieve this was vital.  One such approach that has been used 
successfully in past research is what is known as ‘insider research’. 
 
 
                                               
9 Crotty (1998) also wrote of similar issues and dangers within the ethnographic sphere of research methodology.  
10 Yin (1989) also saw systematic interviewing as another source of data collection within the case study 
framework. 
11 Also see Rooke and Clarke (2005). 
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4.3.1  The insider approach 
Insider research, also called practitioner research (Costley & Armsby 2007; Workman 2007) 
has been described as an innovative and qualitative methodology, involving in-depth semi 
structured interviews and direct observations, often conducted longitudinally via a case study 
approach (Ekanem 2007).  The terms inside research and practitioner research were used 
interchangeably by both Costley and Armsby (2007) and Workman (2007), to describe what 
they called practice-based research.  This is where the researcher is carrying out a systematic 
enquiry, while also holding down a position within the community or organisation under 
investigation and which Costley and Armsby (2007) described as ‘…a meshing of practical 
and intellectual capabilities that rely on the context of the community of practice in which 
practitioner-researchers are engaged…’ (p.132).   
 
Regardless of the descriptions or terms that are applied to portray the process of insider 
research, over the past decade or so this phenomenon has been pivotal in both the 
understanding and the changing of many organisations (Coghan 2007).  According to Ekanem 
(2007), the methodology of insider research shares a strong bond with ethnography because it 
is ‘…an aspect of ethnography for listening and asking questions in the context of 
sociological and anthropological studies…’ (p.107).  The strength of insider research in the 
context of this project, would appear to lay in the knowledge that is gained from the 
participants who are themselves engaging in the experimental learning cycles of experiencing, 
reflecting, conceptualizing and experimenting in real life situations (Coghlan 2007; Coghlan 
& Holian 2007; Costley & Armsby 2007). 
 
Much has been written about the advantages of insider research (Galea 2009; Workman 2007; 
Ekanem 2007; Rooney 2005; van Heugten 2004; Bonner & Tolhurst 2002).  Some of these 
advantages include: being able to draw upon the practical experience and the inside 
knowledge of the researcher; the inside researcher being more aware of a range of variables 
that may impact upon the chosen research problem within the organisation; the researcher 
having ready access to organisational information and personnel; the researcher already 
having an intimate knowledge or understanding of the culture of the organization; and, the 
inside researcher having the ability to immerse oneself with the participants while not unduly 
altering the flow of the social interaction.   
 
A further advantage of insider research highlighted by many authors is that the researcher is 
not seen as a complete stranger to the participants, thus enabling participants to feel more 
comfortable with the researcher, thereby talking more freely and openly because of this 
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familiarity.  This should then lead to the establishment of an intimacy between researcher and 
participants that further facilitates detailed accounts from the participants about their own 
world (Costley & Armsby 2007; Coghlan 2007; Coghlan & Holian 2007). 
 
It has been argued that insider research can lead to a greater degree of validity due to the 
added richness, honesty, fidelity and authenticity of the data, while the researcher’s prior 
knowledge fosters their ability to determine, more easily, when and why changes to routine 
practices or procedures occur (Rooney 2005; Bonner & Tolhurst 2002).  It has also been 
suggested that insider research enables a greater understanding of the decision-making 
process and the behaviour and motivation of participants within organizations and 
communities, because it allows access to the very meanings that are central to such human 
actions and behaviours (Ekanem 2007). 
 
According to Bonner and Tolhurst (2002), insider research allows the process, rather than 
simply the outcome, to be explored.  In effect, this describes what this particular research 
project was trying to achieve.  That is not so much the outcomes of consultation itself, but 
how the principles or issues of trust, honesty, commitment and respect were applied during 
consultation by participants, who were employed by construction companies, who were 
deemed to have researched various levels of organisational maturity.  The research was also 
trying to determine whether or not the various levels of organisational and cultural maturity, 
had any effect on the application of these principles. 
 
However, there are disadvantages to insider research that have been identified by many 
authors which had to be carefully considered for this project.  Some of these disadvantages 
included: the potential of the inside researcher having a particular bias towards interpreting 
the data; the inside researcher making assumptions about the data for the rationale, rather than 
seeking clarification for the potential rationale that may be underpinning such actions or 
behaviour; the inside researcher relying too heavily on participants with whom the researcher 
feels comfortable with, which potentially could lead to biased data collection or a biased 
interpretation process; the researcher focusing too heavily on the dramatic rather that the 
everyday routine events; and, the inside researcher experiencing a conflict of roles between 
researcher and their traditional role, whereby the new role as a researcher may be a role that 
participants are unable or unwilling to accept. (Workman 2007; Ekanem 2007; Costley & 
Armsby 2007; Coghlan 2007; van Heugten 2004). 
 
This last point was referred to by Hannabuss (2000) as the risk of not being able to change the 
mindset of participants about the researcher.  Potentially this could mean that participants 
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might only disclose to the researcher what they would disclose to them in their ‘old role’ as a 
non-researcher.  Furthermore, assertions of confidentiality and anonymity made by the 
researcher may be disbelieved by participants, thereby clouding or restricting the information 
flow because the credibility gap between what was the old role (of the person in their non-
researching position) and what is now the new role (as a researcher), is simply just too great 
for participants to either contemplate or accept (Hannabuss 2000).   
 
Another concern of insider research that had to be considered for this project was the risk of 
what is sometimes known as ‘going native’ whilst engaged in data collection (Workman 
2007; van Heugten 2004; Bonner & Tolhurst 2002).  ‘Going native’ was described by 
Ekanem (2007) as the process of the researcher becoming a member of the organisation or 
community that is under research, then becoming embroiled in the everyday lives of the 
subjects or participants under investigation.  Put simply, it is an over-identification and over-
involvement with the subjects by the researcher (van Heugten 2004).  It is also believed that 
‘going native’ can lead to internalizing the subject’s culture, thus the researcher becomes 
unable to take on a more dispassionate view of events, potentially leading researchers to 
unintentionally discard the research elements of the field work itself (Ekanem 2007; Bonner 
& Tolhurst 2002).   
 
In some cases, Ekanem (2007) believed insider research may be limited in its application 
because of the extent to which the research can be generalized to a wider population.  
However, he also believed that this may be somewhat overcome if the aim of the research is 
not necessarily to seek broad representation, but to gain an insight into the actual behaviour of 
the particular researched phenomenon.  Indeed, by adopting this type of approach, Ekanem 
felt that it actually reinforced the strong emphasis that insider research has on exploring the 
nature of a particular phenomenon, as opposed to the precise testing of a specific hypothesis.   
 
Consistent with the ethnographic approach of Genzuk (2003), when undertaking insider 
research, Ekanem (2007) also recommended that the investigation should ideally consist of a 
relatively small number of cases studied in detail, with the data analysis primarily involving 
explicit interpretation of the meanings and functions of human actions while heavily 
concentrating on verbal descriptions and explanations.  These verbal descriptions and 
explanations are considered to be most effectively obtained from a combination of both semi-
structured interviews and direct observations (Costley & Armsby 2007; Bonner and Tolhurst 
2002; Hannabuss 2000) - both of which were carried out under the auspices of this project. 
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In the attempt to ensure that the most appropriate and intellectually competent research 
perspective was undertaken for this project, it was considered pertinent that the ‘outsider 
research’ perspective also be given consideration alongside that of the ‘insider research’ point 
of view.   
 
 
4.3.2  The outsider approach 
Bonner and Tolhurst (2002) claimed that researchers must always be wary and endeavour to 
build a relationship of trust with the participants of their research project.  They believed that 
the gaining of this trust was easier from an outsider’s point of view, because the outside 
researcher is not seen as participating in the day-to-day activities and is therefore more likely 
to be seen as impartial.  Indeed, they identified that the outsider’s role in research is an 
effective method of building such a rapport with participants, thereby increasing opportunities 
for in-depth discussions and accurate observations of everyday actions. 
 
As opposed to the inside researcher, who has a direct involvement or connection with the 
research setting and the particular organisation, Rooney (2005) claimed that the outside 
researcher may often be perceived to be more of an independent observer, rigorously 
gathering data and objectively reporting on it.  Bonner and Tolhurst (2002) suggested that 
because an outside researcher is not a regular staff member, they are generally not viewed as 
an internal threat to the organisation.  Moreover, they claimed that being an outsider often led 
participants divulging intricate concerns and details of the organisation to the outsider more 
readily than they might do to an inside researcher.   
 
Because the outsider is also removed from the immediate situation and activities, Bonner and 
Tolhurst (2002) further believed that they may well have an instinctive ability to grasp subtle 
differences in certain events with greater objectiveness.  They also argued that as an outsider, 
the researcher was able to better observe and seek clarification of understated, and what may 
sometimes appear to be mere routine behaviours or actions of the participants.   
 
 
4.3.3  A hybrid approach for this research project 
In determining the most effective approach to take for this project, it was firstly 
acknowledged that the choice of any research method must be reflected in the research 
question and the actual phenomenon that is under investigation (Ekanem 2007, Crotty 1998). 
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Given the advantages and disadvantages claimed by a variety of authors of both insider and 
outsider research, the method applied for this project is perhaps best described as a hybrid 
approach.  That is, taking the best of both insider and outsider research and offsetting the 
weaknesses of one against the strengths of the other.  A similar approach was adopted by 
Humphrey (2007) in her research about the rise of self-organised groups for women, black 
people, disabled people and lesbian and gay men within the British trade union movement.   
 
Humphrey (2007) recognised the unique position she found herself in as both an insider and 
outsider researcher because of her role as a researcher while being sponsored by a university, 
her role as a union activist and an ex-employee of a British trade union.  Her own personal 
struggle with ‘coming out’ as a lesbian at the time of commencing her project also put her in a 
unique position as a researcher in this area.  She felt that all these factors gave her a unique 
insight into the heart of her researched subjects. 
 
It was felt that the current research project presented a somewhat different, yet nonetheless 
unique situation, in the construction industry.  The researcher and author has an intimate 
relationship with the construction industry, gained from over twenty years experience of 
working in the industry.  During this time, his roles have included work as a builder’s 
labourer, an elected OHS representative and a trade union OHS advisor and later, as the 
Manager of the OHS Unit of the main construction industry trade union.  It was considered 
that this placed him in a unique position to apply the knowledge, skill and experience gained 
in these positions and roles in the industry, while being able to recognise and identify with the 
industry and its culture, together with the many personal and professional contacts built over 
this substantial period of time.  In this way, the researcher was part of the industry, a person 
who intimately recognized and understood how the industry works, appreciative of how the 
participants who operate within the industry manage their own day-to-day work challenges 
and how they manage and relate to their organisations and the myriad of issues that they 
encounter.  However, the researcher, not being employed by any of the organisations under 
investigation, was also able to remain separate from them, thereby mitigating the potential 
risk of ‘going native’ and losing the focus and objectives of the research. 
 
Taken in this context, it is argued that this research is heavily aligned to a practitioner 
research approach as suggested by Costley and Armsby (2007), whereby ‘…work takes place 
within a particular community of practice, with its own cultures, modes of discourse, 
positionality, status hierarchy often reflected to payment…the research is practitioner-led; 
small scale and often collaborative, with a real and useful or beneficial outcome for a 
particular community’ (p.133). 
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Such an approach draws upon existing epistemologies and the sometimes hybrid 
methodologies of practitioner research, which Costley and Armsby (2007) believed was best 
able to take account of the complexities of the particular industry and the phenomenon that 
was under investigation.  Humphrey (2007) claimed that the acknowledgement of the hybrid 
insider/outsider approach was also crucial to research reflexivity when undertaking research 
in what she described as ‘complex territories’ (p.22), which some would arguably say 
accurately describes the construction industry. 
 
It has been suggested by Rooney (2005) that research conducted by insiders can never quite 
capture the total experience of an entire community, but nor can it be entirely captured by 
outsiders.  In this regard, Humphrey (2007) believed that if the insider/outsider researcher 
actively and robustly pursues the process, not only can the researcher better appreciate the 
uniqueness of their situation, but the approach itself can nurture the art of crossing over 
between life worlds, whilst adding validity to the process.   
 
In their earlier work, Bradbury and Reason (2001) wrote that theory and lived experiences 
should be used to complement each other, rather than one being seen as a substitute for the 
other.  They believed that in research terms, a project should be viewed or valued in terms of 
what it can provide to those who may be affected by it and how the research may be useful to 
a particular community or members of that community.  They also argued that while the 
notion of validity is sometimes raised and questioned, there is an argument for dismissing 
validity altogether because of the very nature of postmodernism research, and the view that 
validity itself is inextricably bound to the ideals of positivism.  According to Bradbury and 
Reason (2001) ‘…each theory of the way the world is, gives rise to particular ways of seeing 
the world…’ (p.448).   
 
Given that research is inevitably coloured, consciously and unconsciously, by the 
subjectivities of society and our social, historical and cultural backgrounds, validity is perhaps 
best regarded as something that we should work towards, rather than something that is ever 
able to be fully achieved (Rooney 2005).  It is perhaps these last few arguments that arguably 
best captures the philosophy and reasoning of the hybrid insider/outsider approach that was 
undertaken for this particular research project.   
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4.4 Methods 
The final element in Crotty’s research matrix focuses on the methods that are implemented to 
collect the data.  According to Slife and Williams (1995), it is important to recognise that the 
data that is to be collected cannot be considered as knowledge, until that data has been 
interpreted, with the interpretation being dependent upon the very ideas that do not always 
appear within the data.  
 
Initially, a suitable number of Victorian construction companies, whose primary source of 
engagement within the industry was construction work undertaken within the commercial and 
industrial sector of the industry
12
, were purposefully selected as potential participants for the 
research.  From this initial pool, twenty companies were purposefully selected to be the basis 
of an expert panel selection process (see Section 4.4.1. p.104), whereby each company was to 
be allocated to one of each of the five levels or tiers that make up the framework of Hudson’s 
model using the observable measures found in Table 3 (page 106).   
 
Each company was unidentifiable to the panel members except for an individual number 
which was allocated to each company.  The researcher provided each panel member with a 
dossier of information based upon the eight observable measures, specifically relating to each 
of the 20 companies (see Appendix D).  The number 20 was arbitrarily chosen, but a pilot of 
the allocation of companies using the observable measures indicated that 20 was a number 
that was neither too onerous in terms of the time it took to allocate or classify the companies 
into the different levels of Hudson’s model (this being between two and three hours) and it 
appeared to provide a sufficient number of companies to choose from for the purposes of this 
research project.  It was assumed that each level of the model would have at least one 
company or organisation allocated to it, after which one company was randomly selected 
without replacement using a random numbers table (Downie & Heath 1970) to represent each 
level of the models’ framework. 
 
While the information provided in the dossier of how each company rated or performed 
against the eight observable measures was primarily a subjective classification by the 
researcher, it was felt that such a process did not unduly compromise or bias the fundamental 
principles of a qualitative research project.  Indeed, it was felt that overall, the entire company 
selection or allocation process allowed the principal researcher of the project to step away 
from the selection criteria as much as possible.  It enabled the selection process to proceed in 
                                               
12 The commercial and industrial sector of the industry is acknowledged as having greater potential for incurring 
major hazards and risks, and where consultation is seen as a vital element in the attempt to reduce and control such 
hazards and risks (WorkSafe Vic 2007, 2005).  
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a more independent and autonomous manner than may have otherwise been the case had the 
selection of the companies, into the various levels of the Hudson model, proceeded without 
anonymity and without a dossier of information and the provided observable measures.   
 
Given the time restraints placed upon any PhD research project, it is also arguable that 
without the dossier and observable measures, the expert panel members would not have had 
sufficient or indeed the quality of time, to enable the allocation of the 20 construction 
companies into the Hudson model framework.  The complexities of choosing members of the 
panel with the appropriate academic, industry and occupational health and safety expertise 
and background was also another factor that had to be considered given the time restraints of 
the project.  These factors, together with the difficulties and indeed the opportunities that the 
members of the panel would have had to adequately source and immerse themselves in the 
Victorian commercial and industrial construction industry to make such judgements, in a 
consistent and unbiased manner, weighed heavily in how the research method was designed 
and approached.  
 
While the number of case studies in this project may be considered by some to be small in 
number (i.e. five in total), it is nevertheless important to highlight that in the first instance, the 
number represents the levels of organisational maturity found within the Hudson model.  
Secondly, this number has been used in previous research conducted by Walters and Nichols 
(2006), in which they looked at worker representation and meaningful consultation over OHS 
issues at the workplace and the effect it had on improving health and safety performance.  
Their research was undertaken in the UK chemical industry, which at the time was considered 
by Walters and Nichols as an industry that was ‘… essentially one in which trade union 
organisation is still relatively well established and the unions continue to play a significant 
role in joint arrangements, including those for health and safety…’ (p.231).  This description 
appeared to neatly encapsulate the status and the industrial climate of the Victorian 
commercial and industrial construction industry at the time that this project was undertaken.   
 
Figure 6 gives a diagrammatic overview of the selection process that led to the five 
construction companies being selected for this particular research project. 
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Figure 6: Diagrammatic overview of sample selections for the research Case Study 
 
 
20 Victorian commercial and industrial 
construction companies (whose primary source 
of engagement within the construction industry 
is work carried out in the commercial and 
industrial sector of the industry), purposefully 
selected as potential participants in the research 
project. 
An expert panel assigned the task to allocate or categorise 
20 unidentified construction companies into the 
framework of Hudson’s model using a set of observable 
measures (based on Parker, Lawrie & Hudson 2006) and 
a dossier of information (provided by the principal 
researcher) on how the companies perform against the 
observable measures. 
Pathological 
group 
companies 
Reactive 
group 
companies 
Calculative 
group 
companies 
Proactive 
group 
companies 
Generative 
group 
companies 
One company from each category randomly selected to represent the five different tiers 
of the Hudson model. 
Pathological 
case study 
Reactive 
case study 
Calculative 
case study 
Proactive 
case study 
Generative 
case study 
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4.4.1  Panel of experts 
A panel of five experts was utilised in this project to initially allocate the 20 companies into 
the different levels of the Hudson model.  The panel members were selected due to their 
familiarity and knowledge of research methods and their familiarity, expertise and experience 
in both the construction industry (not necessarily the Victorian construction industry) and in 
the field of occupational health and safety.  Two of the panel members hold professorships in 
the field of occupational health and safety; the first is currently engaged in this position with a 
Victorian university, recognised for its’ strong construction and engineering streams, while 
the second alternates his academia role in OHS at another Victorian university, renowned for 
its’ strong OHS stream, with a global role as the health, safety and environmental leader of an 
international building and construction firm.  The third member of the panel is an independent 
engineer, who has an academia role in both engineering and OHS at a Victorian university, 
and is renowned for his creative solutions to many and varied OHS issues. He has also been 
involved in numerous parliamentary OHS inquiries to do with the building and construction 
industry.  The fourth member of the panel holds formal qualifications in OHS and is the most 
senior OHS manager with an international building, construction and engineering firm.  The 
final member of the panel is also an OHS manager with an international building and 
construction company.  He is based in Victoria, and holds formal qualifications in both OHS 
and industrial relations.  None of the companies that the panel members have been, or are 
currently employed by, were utilised in this project. 
 
A similar selection process for selecting and using an expert panel was implemented by Behm 
(2005) in his research linking construction industry fatalities and the concept of safe design.   
The use of an expert panel, together with a purposive sampling approach, allows for the 
selection of unique informative cases, the selection of a specialised population and the 
identification of the particular types of cases for in-depth investigation (Neuman 2003).  It 
was felt that all of these conditions were the requirements for this research.  The criterion 
used for the selection and allocation of companies into the particular levels of the 
organisational maturity model utilised in this research project were based upon the research of 
Parker, Lawrie and Hudson (2006).  The aim of their exploratory research into the 
petrochemical industry was to ‘…generate a theory based framework that could be used by 
organisations to understand their own safety culture…’ (p.555).  They used 11 elements to 
describe levels of what they called ‘…concrete organisational aspects…’ (p.557).  Their 
research then used a further seven elements that provided what they described as 
‘…descriptions of levels of safety culture for abstract organisational aspects…’  (p.559).  A 
later and complementary piece of research by Lawrie, Parker and Hudson (2006) then 
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assessed the coherence and validity of the descriptions used to describe the levels of safety 
culture that Parker et al. (2006) found within the petrochemical industry. 
 
For the purposes of this research project, it was decided to use eight elements or observable 
measures.  It was anticipated that these eight measures could best be identified by the selected 
panel of experts, based upon both the concrete and abstract organisational aspects of Parker et 
al. (2006) which appeared to best suit and have the most relevance to the Victorian 
commercial and industrial construction industry.  The number of elements or observable 
measures chosen (in this case eight) was arbitrarily selected, but it was felt that the number 
was neither too difficult nor to cumbersome to work with.  It was felt that the amount of 
information provided in the eight observable measures on each company was able to provide 
a satisfactory basis upon which to establish the selection of the companies into the Hudson 
maturity model framework.  It was also considered that the eight elements or observable 
measures were able to readily provide the relevant and important information that the panel 
members required in order to assist them in this task.   
 
Importantly, and for the purposes of this research project, the eight elements or observable 
measures, while based on the descriptions of safety culture used by Parker et al. (2006), were 
appropriately modified and attuned to more accurately reflect the environment and conditions 
of the commercial and industrial sector of the Victorian construction industry. 
 
The eight observable measures are set out in Table 3 on the next page.  
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Table 3:       Observable measures for classifications of Victorian construction companies into the Hudson model of organisational maturity. 
Adapted from Parker, Lawrie and Hudson (2006) 
 
 Pathological 
organisation 
Reactive organisation Calculative organisation Proactive organisation Generative organisation 
1.  Size and status of the 
OHS department 
If there is one, a one or 
two person operation, 
often integrated into 
another area of the 
organisation. 
Small with little influence.  
Seen more as a police 
force.    Production staff 
overrides or may ignore 
many OHS decisions.  
May use an outside 
consultancy service on an 
ad hoc basis if an incident 
occurs. 
OHS officer positions 
given to those who cannot 
be put in other more 
productive places.  Mainly 
performs statistical reports 
for compensation, may 
coordinate training 
courses.  OHS manager 
reports to another person 
in a higher position. 
Seen as important, given 
to high fliers.  OHS 
personnel recruited for 
their professional 
approach and knowledge.  
OHS manager reports 
directly to the top 
management of the 
company. 
The OHS department or 
personnel are powerful 
with much influence.  Has 
equal status with other 
departments.  OHS 
responsibilities may be 
distributed throughout the 
organisation..    
2.  OHS procedures: 
what are their purposes 
and are they reflective of 
site conditions? 
Has them out of necessity.  
Many of these documents 
are simply seen as a way 
to limit and avoid 
litigation or harm to the 
company assets.  Many 
procedures and the actual 
work processes are often 
very different. 
Such documents viewed 
as a way to prevent 
accidents / incidents from 
reoccurring.  Often written 
after an event, with little 
relevant or applicable 
detail to site conditions. 
Has many procedures, 
written to prevent 
accidents and incidents.  
These procedures often 
confused (sometimes 
merged with) and difficult 
to separate from training.  
Procedures generally 
compliant to the work 
environment but begin to 
break down when time 
and money begin to 
become issues. 
Used to spread and 
encourage best practices.  
A limited degree of non 
compliance is acceptable 
if it can be proven that 
alternative method is 
superior & safer.  Time 
and money begin to 
become secondary 
considerations. 
Trust in employees to 
recognise situations where 
compliance to procedures 
should be challenged.  
Non compliance goes 
through recognised 
channels.  All procedures 
constantly reviewed and 
refined.  Procedures take 
precedent over time and 
money restraints. 
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3.  Who checks safety on 
a day to day basis? 
There is no formal basis; 
individuals or individual 
subcontractors look after 
themselves.  Workers and 
their OHS reps tend to 
take on the role of looking 
out for one another.  
Heavily reliant upon the 
regulatory authority to 
check site and provide 
advice and approval.  
Cursory checks by middle 
management when they 
have time.  No formal 
system for inspection or 
following up on incidents 
/ accidents.  
Site activities regularly 
checked by site 
management, but not on a 
daily basis.  Inspections 
aimed more on regulatory 
and procedural 
compliance.  Emphasis of 
site inspections more on 
progress of project, rather 
than the safety of the 
project. 
 Supervisors encouraged 
to check on safety 
themselves.   Managers 
and supervisors openly 
engage in dialogue with 
workforce about safety.  
OHS reps openly 
encouraged and invited to 
participate in these walks 
and discussions. 
Daily safety walks / 
inspections by various 
OHS committee members.  
No problems with 
demanding a stoppage of 
works if and when 
required for OHS reasons.  
All workers encouraged to 
engage and suggest 
control solutions to OHS 
problems. 
4.  Is management 
interested in 
communicating OHS 
issues and information 
with the workforce? 
 
Management generally not 
interested apart from 
telling workers not to 
cause problems and to be 
careful.  Management 
decide what information 
can be displayed and what 
information is allowed to 
be given to the OHS reps. 
Flavour of the month OHS 
issues (generally from 
regulatory authority) 
passed down from 
management.  No formal 
meetings, so called safety 
posters hung on notice 
boards or walls of site 
sheds.  “Interest” 
generally fades after a few 
days. 
Management shares lots 
of OHS information via 
posters, stickers and 
official OHS notice 
boards filled with 
company OHS Bulletins.  
Generally a top down 
approach with little 
worker or OHS 
representative input.   
Company and external 
OHS information sought 
and displayed in 
prominent positions 
around site.  OHS 
representatives and 
workers asked for their 
thoughts and ideas.  Time 
given to OHS reps to 
report OHS issues to 
workforce; private 
computers and internet 
access provided for OHS 
reps to freely source OHS 
information. Feedback 
actively sought by 
management. 
Definite two way process 
in place.  Workforce and 
reps thoughts and 
opinions hold sway in 
sourcing and gaining OHS 
information from all 
sources.  Regular 
meetings to discuss and 
obtain feedback.  Process 
fully transparent and open 
to change for more 
effective processes to be 
implemented. 
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5.  How does the 
organisation react after 
an accident? 
The focus is normally on 
the worker/s.  Priority is to 
limit any legal damage 
and continue with 
production.  Prefer not to 
report accidents to 
regulatory authority. 
Site management are 
annoyed at disruption to 
productivity.  Warnings 
are made clear to those 
‘thought responsible’ not 
to put themselves in the 
position again.  Follow up 
is limited.  Reporting to 
regulatory authority often 
takes many days, often 
requiring ‘encouragement’ 
from workers and their 
representatives. 
Management more 
concerned how the 
accident reflects on the 
organisations’ statistics.  
Workers still seen as 
primary cause for 
breakdown of the system,; 
management run 
investigation.  Reporting 
requirements are often put 
off until last minute. 
Immediate priority is on 
any injured workers and 
their well being.  
Investigation focus on 
underlying causes, worker 
representatives fully 
involved with 
investigation and 
recommendations.  
Transparent and open 
reporting system to 
regulatory authority and 
workforce. 
Top management fully 
involved in accident 
investigation.  Any injured 
workers first priority.  Full 
and transparent approach 
and involvement with all 
players. Follow up 
programme on injured 
workers, the investigation 
(emphasising underlying 
causes) and any 
recommendations 
resulting from 
investigation.   
6.  OHS Audits and 
reviews. 
Unwilling compliance 
with regulatory inspection 
/ audits.  OHS audits 
unstructured and usually 
occur only after a serious 
accident / incident. 
Begrudging acceptance of 
being audited, especially 
after a serious accident / 
incident.  No set schedule 
for audits or reviews.  
Audits and reviews seen 
more as a punishment.   
  
A regular scheduled audit 
program is in place; 
concentrating on the 
major hazards and risks.  
Happy to audit 
contractors, less 
enthusiastic to audit 
themselves.  Audits 
structured around the 
safety management 
system. 
Extensive audit program, 
including cross auditing 
within the organisation.  
Organisational and 
managerial bias taken into 
account; outside help 
welcomed.  Audits seen as 
a positive tool. 
Fully functioning and 
structured audit system 
occurring.  Ongoing and 
continuous informal 
search for non obvious 
problems.  Positive 
workforce involvement  
and participation in audit 
system  actively 
encouraged and sought.   
7.  Site Safety Meetings: 
how are they conducted? 
 
Meetings seen as a waste 
of time.  If they occur, run 
by management with little 
worker involvement.   
OHS issues often 
trivialised. 
Reluctant attendance at 
OHS meetings.  Provide 
opportunities for blame.  
Short term solution 
focused.  Information / 
OHS solutions and 
Meetings concentrate 
primarily on 
organisations’ own 
policies and meeting 
deadlines of program. 
Employee and their OHS 
OHS issues discussed 
with a firm view to 
providing solutions to the 
issues raised. Also used to 
identify problems before 
they occur.  Positive 
Meeting can be called by 
any OHS committee 
member, and chaired by 
employee/s.  Takes place 
in a relaxed and informal 
manner.  Time is not a 
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meeting agenda’s set by 
management with little or 
no worker input.  
reps interaction tolerated 
mainly due to statutory 
requirements; worker 
input into OHS solutions 
limited.   Meetings run on 
a strict timeframe with 
limited input from 
workforce and OHS  reps.   
involvement from workers 
and management.  
Meeting seen as a positive 
tool, genuine feedback 
given to all workers and 
management over issues 
discussed and solved.  
Meetings eagerly awaited. 
problem, meeting 
participants trusted to sort 
things out with best 
possible outcomes.  
Information is free 
flowing and open. 
8.  Training in OHS? Training seen as a 
necessary evil.  Only 
completed if required by 
legislation.   
Training only provided 
after an accident /incident.  
Usually seen as a workers 
responsibility.   Time and 
money seen as main 
consideration for training.   
Training not encouraged 
to be undertaken in 
working hours. 
Standard OHS training 
given when and where 
required.   Some on the 
job OHS training 
conducted.  OHS training 
only for elected OHS reps.  
OHS training 
acknowledged and 
encouraged.  Working 
hours training not seen as 
a problem.  All OHS reps 
and OHS committee 
members provided and 
encouraged to continue to 
update and upgrade their 
knowledge and skills.  
General workforce also 
encouraged. 
On going OHS 
development and training 
seen as a natural 
progression for all 
workforce and 
management. Training 
seen as an integral tool for 
both the OHS 
management system and 
the general OHS on site 
conditions.  
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A full and complete summary of the expert panels’ analysis against the observable measures of 
each company can be seen in Appendix A.  A simple mathematical rating out of five (one being 
the score representing the Pathological level, two the Reactive level, three the Calculative level, 
four the Proactive level and five representing the Generative level) of how each company was 
deemed to have performed against each observable measure, was then used to further assist in the 
appropriate allocation of Hudson’s model for each organisation (see Appendix B).  This exercise 
allowed for a final and definitive categorization for each company; given that some of the expert 
panel members gave answers to some of the measures bordering between two levels (e.g. part-
Pathological and part-Reactive), or found that their overall rating bordered between two levels of 
maturity for a particular company (e.g. Calculative and Proactive or Proactive and Generative).  
Table 4 summarizes how the expert panel members rated the 20 companies using the observable 
measures. 
 
Table 4:  Overall numerical results of expert panel analysis of observable measures 
Level of maturity  Number of 
Companies 
Pathological 3 
Reactive 4 
Calculative 8 
Proactive 5 
Generative 0 
 
As can be seen from the results in Table 4 above, by combining all expert panel members answers 
and using the mathematical rating formula, there was no company that was overwhelmingly rated 
as a Generative organisation.  However for the purposes of this research, it was decided to select 
the company that had the most Generative ratings from the eight observable measures.  In 
Appendix B ‘Summary of numerical results from expert panel analysis of observable measures’, 
Company 15 can be seen to have the most ratings in the Generative category; more than double 
that of any other company. 
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Therefore, given the requirements for this research and taking into consideration all of the above, 
Company 15 was chosen as the company that best represented a Generative type company for the 
purposes of this project. 
 
A further statistical analysis (see Appendix C) of the expert panel’s allocation of companies into 
the Hudson model framework was conducted to compare the panel’s selections against that of the 
author (who gave all panel members the dossier of information on all of the 20 companies).  
Using the Spearman rank correlation test for paired observations (Kanji 1999), the result showed 
that at the 95% level, the null hypothesis of no correlation was to be rejected; concluding that the 
expert panel selections and those of the author of this paper were in general agreement about the 
rankings or allocation of the companies according to the criterion based upon Hudson’s model of 
organisational and cultural maturity. 
 
As qualitative research tends to rely on the use of non-probability sampling (Minichiello, Aroni, 
Timewell & Alexander 1996), theoretical sampling was chosen as the preferred choice for this 
research.  According to Minichiello et al. (1996), theoretical sampling involves the observation of 
groups while being able to extend, modify, develop and verify a theory.  The selection of 
informants is then based on relevant issues, categories and themes which emerge in the course of 
the research.  They also believed purposefully selecting persons, places or situations allowed 
them to be categorised into what they described as Category 1 types, which they defined as 
having been identified as relevant categories in the literature.  This then allows the researcher to 
possibly and fortuitously discover and categorise the analytical importance of events, incidents or 
situations that may emerge from the data.  They termed such data as Category II types, to be 
represented by added categories in the sample framework.   
 
It was felt that the implementation of a purposefully selected sampling strategy both harmonized 
and synchronized this research.  This is in part due to the often unpredictable nature of the 
construction industry, which potentially could put the data collection process in a somewhat 
precarious position.  Using the description provided by Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), a 
purposefully selected sampling strategy ideally suited this research due to  ‘… the selection of 
individual / groups based on specific questions / purposes of the research in lieu of random 
sample and on the basis of information available about these individuals / groups’ (p.76). 
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4.4.2  The Case study 
Härenstam et al. (2006) believed that case studies were the best methods for understanding the 
mechanisms of power and responsibilities within organisations.  Rather than seeing case study 
results being descriptive and only applying within a certain context (Yin 1989), Härenstam et al. 
(2006) argued that: 
 ‘…case studies can generate profound insights into the mechanisms of power and 
responsibility in contemporary working life, and support the overall knowledge of the 
organisational impact on working conditions by providing a broad view of the 
mechanisms spanning the micro, meso and macro levels.’ (p.49). 
 
Even though Suff and Williams (2004) were of the opinion that while the extent to which general 
inferences can be drawn from case study research may be limited, they still believed it was 
nevertheless important to understand the significance that can still be drawn from significant or 
critical cases.  These approaches are consistent with that of Sechrest, Stewart, Stickle and Sidani 
(1996), who had earlier expressed that it was at least implicit that in most case studies, 
generalization was intended.  Härenstam et al. (2006) later claimed that the findings of case 
studies were also able to generate models that were able have a much wider resonance.  de Laine 
(1997) believed that case studies were also useful in advancing the understanding of ethnographic 
techniques, being able to describe in detail how observation strategies were implemented, how 
field notes were recorded and what techniques and procedures were used when analysing the data 
and presenting the findings.   
 
According to Yin (1989) the case study is the perfect method when ‘how’ or ‘when’ questions are 
being posed, when the researcher has little or no control over events and when the research is 
focused on a contemporary phenomenon within a real life context.  Yin also believed that the case 
study allowed the research to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events.  
It is also because the case study has a unique ability to deal with a multitude of evidence that Yin 
found it as an attractive method for investigation and research.  He defined a case study as ‘… an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used’ (p.23). 
 
Sechrest et al. (1996) described the case study as also being able to focus not just on the case, but 
also on a process.  In terms of this particular piece of research, it is the process of consultation 
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regarding OHS, in the Victorian construction industry, which is under investigation.  It is the 
ability of the case study to provide a description rich in context and detail, bringing to life what 
may otherwise be an abstract idea, concept or presentation which Sechrest et al. (1996) saw as 
one of the major strengths of using a case study approach.   
 
 
4.5  Data collection 
For this research project, data collection was completed by a variety of methods and sources 
consistent with the suggested approaches of Genzuk (2003), Sechrest et al. (1996), Minichiello et 
al. (1996), Patton (1990) and Yin (1989).  The project utilised semi-structured interviews and 
conversations, non-participant observation and the collection of site and organisational OHS 
documentation.  These tasks were all completed taking careful account of the three key principles 
of naturalism, understanding and discovery (Genzuk 2003)
13
.   
 
 
4.5.1  Semi-structured interviews 
The semi-structured interviews, together with informal day-to-day conversations, were conducted 
and recorded with the most senior management representative and the employee OHS 
representative on their construction site.  The aim of these methods of data collection was to 
gauge similarities, differences, conflicts as well as personal feelings of how the principles or 
issues of trust, honesty, commitment and respect were applied by the participants during the 
consultation process over OHS.  The effectiveness of the consultation, in terms of (i) the types of 
issues that were discussed, (ii) the types of solutions suggested and who suggested the initial 
solutions and (iii) the types of issues that were capable of being influenced via the consultation 
process, were also considered (Davis & Lansbury 1996).  It was hoped that the semi-structured 
interview approach would be less intimidating to all participants, and elicit what Ekanem (2007) 
described as ‘free-flowing narratives’ (p.110) to occur, so as not to hinder any deviation into lines 
of enquiry into other areas that may present themselves through the interview, and which may 
themselves be relevant to the topic under investigation.  When undertaking this type of research, 
Ekanem felt that any interviews should be semi-structured rather than completely unstructured, as 
is sometimes the case in many ethnographic or grounded theory methodologies.  He 
                                               
13 See pages 93 and 94 of this paper for Genzuk’s (2003) explanation of the terms naturalism, 
understanding and discovery. 
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recommended that any interview plan should remain unstructured enough to enable exploration, 
while at the same time, be structured enough to establish initial boundaries for the research.   
 
In the context of this research, the semi-structured interview method as a choice of data 
collection, is perhaps best encapsulated by Minichiello et al. (1996) when they stated ‘…if we 
believe (as most researchers using qualitative methods do) that social reality exists as meaningful 
interaction between individuals then it can only be known through understanding others’ points of 
view, interpretations and meanings.  If meaningful human interaction depends on language, then 
the words people use and the interpretations they make are of central interest to the researcher...’ 
(p.73) 
 
According to Minichiello et al. (1996) validity is enhanced by processes that preserve authentic 
data.  In light of this, all interviews were tape recorded - with the written permission of the 
interviewees.  This also assisted in what Parker et al. (2006) described as capturing the essence of 
the information that the interviewee wished to convey, and further ensured that all the material 
was available to be fully analysed when the researcher was able to give the data his full and 
undivided attention and concentration.  This also enabled a greater analytical depth to be given to 
any anecdotal information or ambiguous responses that may have been recorded.   
 
Ekanem (2007) believed that the importance of the interview process was that it not only afforded 
the researcher the opportunity to discoverer new clues and ideas while revealing new dimensions 
of the phenomenon under investigation, it also simultaneously enables an uncovering and 
capturing of accurate and inclusive accounts from the participant’s own experience.  He claimed 
that this then allows for the identification of significant circumstances that tend to develop under 
the participant’s own personal framework and their own moral beliefs and values; which are 
major considerations for this research.   
 
In relation to this particular research project, Gunningham’s (2008) belief that moral and ethical 
issues or principles such as trust, honesty, commitment and respect cannot be adequately 
addressed by surveys, questionnaires or other such quantitative data, would appear to sit 
comfortably and indeed reinforce the approach undertaken for the project.  Gunningham believed 
that it was only by engaging in face-to-face interviews with participants, that such issues can 
begin to be properly understood and provide any type of in-depth understanding or appreciative 
acknowledgement of such concepts.  In keeping with these beliefs, it must be said that the semi-
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structured interviews conducted in this project often found themselves in a more free-flowing 
conversational type arrangement, often yielding unexpected insights and frank and forthright 
disclosures by the participants during such discourse. 
 
Each particular site or construction project utilised in this research, was nominated by the 
construction company themselves.  It was the view of the researcher that this allowed each 
organisation at least some level of ownership, independence and autonomy during the research 
project.  It also enabled each company to choose a particular project or site which they believed 
best represented their corporate philosophy or belief regarding consultation, and empowered the 
company to choose the manager that they thought was best suited to the requirements of the 
project.   
 
The employee OHS representative was taken to be the person who best represented the voice and 
views of the majority of the construction workers on the site.  At the time of writing, the OHS 
representative under the Victorian OHS legislative requirements is duly elected by their peers (i.e. 
fellow workers), indicating a shared level of trust and confidence.  In this way, they are deemed 
to best represent their peers and thus become the conduit of employee OHS knowledge, skills and 
concerns to the management representatives.  In terms of this research, the researcher saw no 
reason, legal or otherwise, to contradict or challenge such an assumption. 
 
In terms of the industrial demographics of the participants and their gender, age groupings and 
experience, these all appeared to fit within the industry profile of the Victorian construction 
industry (Skills Victoria 2009).  This profile showed that over 86% of employees were male and 
that the average age of employees was between 35 and 44 years, with those over the age of 50 
expected to increase dramatically over the next few years.  Comparing this profile to the 
participants of this research project, seven participants were aged between 35 and 44 years of age, 
two were aged 50 years and over and one was aged in the 46 to 50 year age bracket.  The length 
of experience in the role of a site or project manager varied between three years to 18 years, while 
the OHS representative’s level of experience in their role varied between four years and up to 18 
years.  All of the participants were male.   
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4.5.2  Non-participative observation 
Non-participative observation was conducted on all of the five construction sites utilised in this 
research project.  This primarily involved the researcher taking a non-obtrusive and non-
participative ‘observing’ role during site safety walks, site OHS committee meetings and during 
the site safety tool-box meetings.  The sensitising concepts (see Appendix E) were used as a 
catalyst to interpret, in a qualitative manner, how the process of consultation between the actors 
(site or project managers and OHS representatives) occurred during such forums.   
 
The entire observation process took approximately six months to complete.  In part, it was felt 
that this period of time was also able to overcome any evaluation apprehension (later discussed in 
section 4.7 of this paper) which can sometimes occur during research observation periods.  It was 
hoped that over these six months, the participants would come to see the researcher as ‘just 
another person’ on the site, rather than as ‘a researcher’.  It was also considered that the 
combination of a hybrid approach of insider and outsider research, as discussed earlier in Section 
4.3.3 of this paper, alleviated and counteracted much of any potential evaluation apprehension. 
 
The observation periods were used to observe not just how the process of consultation was 
conducted on each particular construction site, but also, as Auberbach and Silverstein (2003) 
noted, to ‘…not only identify the lived experiences of the individuals being studied, but also to 
understand the relevant contexts (social, racial, economic, etc.) of the experiences...’ (p.25).  This 
also assisted in supporting the participants’ own subjective experiences of consultation regarding 
OHS while utilizing this as a key source of knowledge in the process, which appeared to 
complement the textual and story data that was also obtained during the project (Auberbach & 
Silverstein 2003).  Direct observation also represents an excellent source of qualitative data, 
allowing the researcher to view participant’s practice (Bonner & Tolhurst 2002).  Direct 
observations allow the researcher the opportunity to gather data based on the participant’s 
relevant behaviour, thus creating another source of significant and pertinent source of evidence 
especially applicable to ethnographic case study projects (Ekanem 2007; Yin 1994). 
 
Bonner and Tolhurst (2002) believed that the role of the observer ranges from complete 
membership of the group being studied (the insider approach) to a complete stranger (the 
outsider’s role).  They believed that observations are then made of persons in their natural 
environment or in the context of their environment or setting, hence the term field research.  The 
time and the timing of observations is crucial to their effectiveness and the ability of the observer 
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to capture data, while not encroaching upon the normal routine practices of the day-to-day 
functions of either participants or the organisation itself (Bonner & Tolhurst 2002).   
 
It is argued that direct observation also allows access to what participants do, as opposed to what 
they say they do, or what they have suggested they do, thereby allowing the researcher to identify 
the various forms of misinformation and evasion that inevitably occurs in the majority of social 
settings such as the workplace (Ekanem 2007).  When writing up field notes from observations, 
Bonner and Tolhurst (2002) suggested that to further enhance the validity of the research and the 
process itself and not to impose unnecessarily and distract participants, field notes should be 
written up ‘after hours’ or at the very least, away from the participants.  They also suggested that 
to further enhance validity and create a level of trust between the researcher and participants, the 
researcher or observer not be identified via emblems or any other material on their person that 
may connect or identify them with any one particular organisation or belief.  All these pre-
mentioned requirements were strictly adhered to and formed a crucial part of the direct site 
observations undertaken for this research project. 
 
 
4.5.3  Documentation 
The documentation that was collected and analysed for this project included, but was not limited 
to, company and site OHS policies and procedures - especially those relating to processes of 
consultation and its structure, timing and format.  Further to this, site safety minutes from OHS 
committee meetings that had been conducted on each site over the last six to twelve months, were 
also collected and analysed.  It was considered that this would give a good indication of the types 
of issues that had been discussed and if and how the issues were resolved, via the consultation 
forum of the OHS committee meetings. 
 
According to Eddington, Searle and Temple-Smith (2004), an organisations’ policies, mission 
statements and the like are the very foundations of how the organisation is to be held to account 
for both their performance and their ethical and moral standards.  Indeed, Eddington et al. (2004) 
highlighted the important role such documentation can have in an organisation, claiming that: 
‘…mission statement ideals can become enshrined in institutional rules and procedures which, 
through time, can become increasingly transparent and effective against misuse, and also serve in 
the ongoing leverage of better performance…’ (p.6). 
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4.6 Data Analysis 
According to Auberbach and Silverstein (2003), there is not ‘one right way’ (p.33) to interpret 
qualitative data.  However, they claimed that: ‘… you must be able to support your interpretation 
with data… so that other researchers can understand your way of analysing.  If your interpretation 
is supported by the data, then it is valid, even if there are other ways to interpret the same data…’ 
(p.32). 
 
A qualitative interpretive approach as used by Ekanem (2007) was undertaken in the analysis of 
the data collected in this research in order to gain an insight into how the constitutive principles 
of trust, honesty, commitment and respect were applied and interpreted by the participants within 
the different companies, that were deemed to be representative of the different levels Hudson’s 
organisational maturity model.  It was hoped that this would not only provide a better 
understanding of the quality, richness and depth of the consultation process that occurs over OHS 
between management representatives and employee OHS representatives, but also give a glimpse 
of the often complex and multifaceted role that each party plays and undertakes as part of their 
day-to-day interactions over OHS on a construction site.  Ekanem also suggested that in 
qualitative data analysis, there is no one universal process or right way to undertake such a task 
and considered that the analysis is best conducted or undertaken based upon the research 
question.  He believed that this should then lead to a more conceptual overview of the 
phenomenon under investigation, rather than any type of descriptive analysis on how participants 
may respond to particular questions or circumstances. 
 
In an attempt to extrapolate and gain an insight into the opinions and perceptions of the OHS 
representatives and the site or project managers of the five construction companies, the data 
analysis firstly consisted of a content analysis of the semi-structured interviews.  Following the 
basic conceptions of qualitative data analysis as proposed by Auberbach and Silverstein (2003), 
this content analysis of the semi-structured interviews began by listening to and then 
subsequently transcribing all of the recorded semi-structured interviews.  The transcripts were 
then carefully read and examined to identify the relevant text and repeating ideas which, 
according to Auberbach and Silverstein (2003), helps shed light on the research concerns.   
 
The next step in the process was to find groups of repeating ideas that had something in common 
or which appeared to have a common theme (Auberbach & Silverstein 2003).  This then led to 
what Auberbach and Silverstein described as organising the themes into larger and more abstract 
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‘theoretical constructs’ (p.39).  These constructs were then linked to the theory that underlined 
this research, which is based upon Emmet’s (1966) theory of moral relativism, and the moral and 
ethical principles that underlies the choices that both individuals and organisations make or 
choose when consultation occurs regarding OHS.  After completing the above process, the 
theoretical constructs were then organised into the theoretical narrative which, in effect, is this 
thesis. 
 
In conducting this research, consideration was also given to when OHS decisions were actually 
being made rather than formally being undertaken and what types of issues were capable of being 
influenced via the consultation process (Butler 2005; Davis & Lansbury 1996).  The project also 
took into account what Walters et al. (2005) and Reason (1997) described as the types of 
‘consequential actions or feedback’ that arose out of the consultation process, and what barriers 
were identified within and throughout the consultation that may have restricted or indeed 
impeded the consultation process.  The issues of power and control were two such themes that 
appeared to restrict and impede the quality of the consultation, thereby requiring consideration in 
both their application and in terms of the data analysis. 
 
Costley and Armsby (2007) believed that the principal way in which power operates is through 
discourses.  Therefore, in an endeavour to better understand the way in which people talk about 
things, they suggested that this discourse required the utmost consideration when analysing 
interview data.  They recommended that discourse analysis be implemented to investigate and 
identify dominant validated knowledge, believing that this was a very important factor when the 
focus of a project was on a specific organisational or communication process that requires 
development.  
 
A recommended process to explore the inner and outer discourses and encourage alternative 
interpretations has been described by a variety of terms including reflexivity, reflectivity, 
reflection and deconstruction (Costley & Armsby 2007; Humphrey 2007; van Heugten 2004; 
Bonner & Tolhurst 2002).  According to van Heugten (2004), all these terms reflect a process 
whereby there is ‘…an active engagement of the self in questioning perceptions and exposing 
their contextualized and power driven nature…’.  Irrespective of the terminology, van Heugten 
(2004) believed that the process of reflexivity, reflectivity, reflection or deconstruction is required 
because: ‘…the researcher’s subjectivity must be open to intensive scrutiny.  Values, beliefs and 
personal interests should not only be declared but challenged on an ongoing basis.  If the 
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researchers’ self is to function as a well-calibrated instrument, passion must be valued and 
harnessed...’ (p208). 
 
In light of this, Costley and Armsby (2007) believed that discourse analysis treats language as the 
construct of truth as the language occurs.  This suggests that in the context of this particular 
research project, the semi-structured interviews had a great influence and bearing in the 
development of meaning and understanding of how the principles or issues of trust, honesty, 
commitment and respect were applied during the phenomenon of consultation.  The non-
participant observation periods that were conducted on each site over the six monthly period also 
served as an analysis and examination of the actual events of what occurred during the 
consultation process.  Each of the construction projects or sites were visited and observed on at 
least six different occasions.  Each project observation period lasted between two and five hours, 
dependent upon the size of the project, the issues or work that was occurring at the times of the 
observation periods and the issues that were raised for consultation and discussion.  Effectively, 
this meant that in total, approximately between 80 to 120 hours was spent observing how the 
OHS representatives and the site or project managers engaged in consultation over OHS.   
 
During the observation phase, a number of key sensitizing concepts (see Appendix E) were used 
to assist in the identification and the decoding of the observations into how the OHS 
representatives and the site or project managers interacted with each other.  The sensitizing 
concepts were also used to assist in determining how the different constitutive principles were 
applied by both parties during the consultation forums on the construction sites.   
 
The third piece of the data analysis puzzle consisted of the review of both of company and site 
OHS documentation.  This documentation included company OHS management systems and site 
specific OHS management plans and procedures, OHS policies of the companies and records and 
minutes of both site safety walks and/or inspections and minutes of OHS committee meetings 
where these were established and formally conducted and recorded.  The analysis of this 
documentation concentrated primarily on how, when and by whom the OHS decisions were 
actually being made, the type of decisions that were being conducted and the levels of 
involvement and influence that the participants appeared to have in both the decision making 
process and the within the documentation itself (e.g. level of input into company OHS policies 
and management plans).  As already noted, Eddington et al. (2004) believe that such company 
documentation is often the very foundation of how organisations conduct their business. 
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4.7 Limitations and threats to the research 
Like any piece of research or investigation, there are inherent limitations and dangers which, if 
not given due consideration, recognition and or prior acknowledgement, may both well 
undermine and emasculate the research methods and also the overall research findings.  Case 
studies may not be readily accepted if they are perceived to be biased or come from a source that 
has a vested interest in the interpretation of the data (Sechrest 1996).  This is where the analysis 
and interpretation of the data is crucial for the validity of the results.  Genzuk (2003) provided a 
definition of these terms to overcome such problems by stating that ‘… analysis is the process of 
bringing order to the data, organising what is there into patterns, categories and basic descriptive 
units…’ (p.16).  He then went on to explain that ‘…interpretation involves attaching meaning and 
significance to the analysis, explaining descriptive patterns, and looking for relationships and 
linkages among descriptive dimensions.’ (p.16). 
 
According to Malterud (2001), the same criteria that are used for scientific rigour in quantitative 
research cannot be applied to qualitative studies.  Subsequently, different criteria need to be used 
and she suggested that the criterion of credibility, dependability, conformability and 
transferability be applied as a test for the validity and robustness of the research.  While admitting 
that some of these terms are consistent with and indeed correspond to the more traditional ones 
(e.g. credibility and internal validity; conformability with objectivity; transferability with external 
validity), she believed that they were still able to provide some degree of measurement for the 
quality of qualitative research.   
 
Sechrest et al. (1996) also identified evaluation apprehension, sometimes known as the 
‘Hawthorne effect’ (Ivancevich & Matteson 1993) as another threat to the validity of a research 
project.  This is where persons and even organisations may behave in a non-characteristic manner 
or produce non-characteristic behaviour because they are aware that they are being evaluated or 
observed.  Such an effect was carefully monitored via both documentation and prior or past 
behaviour and characteristics and was addressed at the particular time if the effect was deemed 
too prevalent.  The researcher, having worked in the commercial and industrial sector of the 
construction industry for over 20 years, was in a unique position to identify any potential changes 
in behavioural patterns which may have resulted from such evaluation apprehension. 
 
However being familiar with the industry and being in the industry for that amount of time also 
presented other challenges.  In particular, the challenge or threat of what Sechrest et al. (1996) 
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described as investigator bias.  They claimed that bias on the part of the researcher must be 
seriously considered as a threat to the construct validity of the research and must be carefully 
watched and constantly monitored throughout the research, especially in the observation, 
collection and interpretation of data.   
 
Malterud (2001) believed that this could be somewhat overcome if a declaration of belief
14
, made 
on behalf of the researcher, is placed at the start of the research.  But Malterud was careful to 
make the point that preconceptions are not the same as bias, unless the researcher fails to mention 
them.  She claimed that preconception or what she called reflexivity, which she described as 
‘…an attitude of attending systematically to the context of knowledge construction, especially to 
the effect of the researcher, at every step of the research process…’ (p.484) may in fact be a 
valuable source for relevant and specific research.  But she warned that this will only be the case 
provided the researcher does not ‘…confuse the knowledge intuitively present in advance, 
embedded in preconceptions, with knowledge emerging from inquiry of systematically obtained 
material’ (p.484). 
 
Similar beliefs were expressed by Auberbach and Silverstein (2003) when they indicated that 
subjectivity and values were in fact a necessary part of human interaction and therefore cannot be 
eliminated or totally controlled.  Instead, they believed that researchers should acknowledge and 
reflect upon such values and subjectivity and that rather than being a hindrance, a researcher’s 
own subjective experience can often be a source of knowledge about the phenomenon which is 
under investigation.  
 
The professional relationship that the author has with the trade union is duly acknowledged, while 
the potential threats of bias were closely monitored and scrutinised by the researchers’ three 
supervisors
15
.  It is also acknowledged that this research is potentially limited by the reliance on 
unionised OHS representatives.  However, as stated earlier
16
, the commercial and industrial sector 
of the Victorian construction industry does have a high level of trade union involvement (Cole 
2003). 
 
                                               
14
See page xii of this paper for the authors’ Declaration of belief statement. 
15 As above. 
16 See Section 1.8 of this paper. 
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It is also acknowledged that in attempting to categorize organisations into the Hudson model, 
using the observable measures specifically provided for in this research, there was a risk of 
empirical accuracy of how organisations may or may not conduct consultation or indeed, whether 
the organisations themselves were accurately categorised into the correct maturity levels.  
However, such risks had to be considered in the context of what the project was attempting to 
achieve, that is, a basic understanding of how particular moral and ethical principles are applied 
during OHS consultation, and the outcomes which could potentially flow from this research.  It is 
hoped that the entire project design, including the triangulation of the data collection process and 
the subsequent data analysis, provide some level of support and an appropriate buffer against 
such risks or limitations. 
 
 
4.7.1  Limitations or the research focus? 
The commercial and industrial sector of the construction industry is primarily dominated by a 
project management approach, whereby a principal contractor will subcontract out the majority, if 
not the entire scope of works and who will, at least in theory, exercise close control over the 
subcontractors and their employees (Loosemore & Andonakis 2007; Mathew, Quinlan & Bennett 
1996;).  Indeed, the great majority of workers employed on commercial and industrial 
construction sites are employed by subcontractors and not directly by the principal contractor 
(Lingard & Rowlinson 2005; Hopkins 1995).   
 
While the OHS Act 2004 (Vic) directly imposes the primary responsibility for the health and 
safety of all workers on the site on the principal contactor, this does not necessarily translate into 
the elimination of OHS problems within the subcontracting fraternity (Quinlan & Mayhew 2000).  
Indeed, it is generally acknowledged and accepted that there is a direct link between 
subcontracting and OHS problems, with subcontracting leading to an increase in the 
fragmentation and disorganization of the workplace and the marginalization of the workforce; 
which in turn often leads to a diminution of the working conditions - including levels of OHS 
(Loosemore & Andonakis 2007; Quinlan & Mayhew 2000; Hopkins 1995). 
 
A mechanism to improve levels of OHS in the construction industry is via the concept of what is 
commonly referred to as safe design (Breslin 2007; Behm 2005).  It is also referred to as 
upstream safety and is considered to be pivotal in the designing out and eliminating many of the 
hazards and risks that may occur during the actual building and construction process; which is 
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commonly referred to as downstream safety (Breslin 2007; Behm 2005).  The concept of safe 
design is also claimed to have a positive influence, in terms of levels of OHS, on those people 
involved in the life-cycle of the designed product or structure (Culvenor & Else 2005; NOHSC 
2004).  However at the time of writing this paper, at least in Victoria, there was no requirement 
(legal or otherwise), which mandated or required design professionals, during the design process, 
to consider the safety of workers during the downstream phase, or indeed the overall safety of a 
construction project (Behm 2005).  
 
Consistent with the principles and philosophies of upstream safety, Behm (2005) believed that the 
safety of a construction project is determined long before workers, procedures and equipment all 
come together on a construction site.  This suggests that it is at this embryonic stage of a 
construction project, which is the crucial point at which consultation can have the greatest 
influence on levels of OHS.  Behm suggested that consultation engagement at this stage should 
involve design professionals, principal contractors and subcontractors.  While he considers this is 
to be the ideal situation, the participation of workers and their representatives is generally neither 
sought nor encouraged in this type of safety design forum.   
 
Indeed, both Breslin (2007) and Behm (2005) failed to explicitly include workers and their 
representatives in their safety design consultation models or forums.  However, this may be more 
to do with the concept that safe design currently revolves around and only includes decision 
makers such as designers, engineers and those parties or persons in control or having the 
influence over the design of the product or systems of work (Culvenor & Else 2005; NOHSC 
2004), as opposed to any philosophical or ideological belief or opposition to the value or 
contribution that workers may or may not contribute in the safe design process. 
 
Taking all this into account, coupled with the current economic, political and industrial 
environment, it would appear, at least in the foreseeable short to medium term future, that any 
involvement of workers and their representatives in the concept of safe design, at least in the 
embryonic stage of a construction project, may perhaps be a rather altruistic ideal.  Within the 
realms of the construction industry and specifically on a commercial and industrial construction 
site, the consultation process takes on a myriad of different forms and characteristics.  There is 
consultation that occurs between the principal contractor and their supervisors; between principal 
contractor and their workers and their representatives; between principal contractor and 
subcontractors; between principal contractor and subcontractor supervisors and workers and their 
126 
 
representatives; between subcontractors and their supervisors; between subcontractor supervisors 
and subcontractor workers and their representatives; between management of both principal 
contractors and subcontractors and worker representatives and between any combination of all or 
any of the above.  There is also consultation between worker representatives and their 
constituents and members on the construction site.  There are also various forms of consultation 
that may occur between and in combination with legislative authorities such as WorkSafe 
Victoria and the principal contactor, subcontractors, workers and worker representatives, as well 
as consultation and discussions that occur between design professionals and principal contractors 
and subcontractors.   
 
The intention of this project was not to attempt to either discuss in detail or explore all the 
available options, forms or combinations of consultation that may occur prior, during or even 
after the completion of a construction project.  Rather, the focus of this particular research was to 
examine the various forms and approaches of consultation that occurred on Victorian commercial 
and industrial construction sites between senior site managers and employee OHS representatives 
over matters of OHS.  This was done utilising a model of organisational and cultural maturity, in 
an attempt to determine how the principles or issues that are generally acknowledged as being 
necessary for effective and meaningful consultation, were applied by the participants during the 
consultation.  An additional underlying theme was the positive contribution that workforce 
involvement can have in raising levels of OHS during the actual construction process, and how 
the process of consultation between management and workers, who are the critical vectors in the 
sharing and transferring of knowledge and skill of OHS in the workplace, could assist in the 
enhancement of levels of OHS in the industry. 
 
By doing this, it is hoped that this research may also be the motivation and platform for further 
research into the sometimes misunderstood and underutilised manifesto that is consultation, and 
the effect it has on levels of OHS in the construction industry.  As this research was based upon 
qualitative data, it is the thoughts of Malterud (2001) in her paper on the role and benefits that 
qualitative research has in the medical profession, which indeed seem timely and appear to 
provide further justification for the approach undertaken in this research design.  Malterud (2001) 
claimed that:‘ …Qualitative research methods involve the systematic collection, organisation and 
interpretation of textual material derived from talk or observation.  It is used in the exploration of 
meanings of social phenomena as experienced by individuals themselves, in their natural 
context…’.  (p.483). 
127 
 
4.8 Ethical considerations  
As with any human research project, there was a requirement to consider and identify any issues 
which could be regarded as ethically sensitive.  Having scrutinised and completed the University 
of Ballarat’s HREC Risk Assessment Checklist, it was concluded that this project was ‘low risk’.  
As such, there was a successful application for HREC Approval (Expedited) prior to any data 
collection. 
 
Consistent with the norms of social science research and the University of Ballarat’s ethics 
requirements, no company or any individual who participated in this project was identified, with 
each company and each individual participant who took part in the project giving their written 
consent to participate in the project.  A further issue which needed to be considered was the 
participant’s level or degrees of numeracy and literacy.  It is generally acknowledged that there 
are many workers in the construction industry that have difficulty when it comes to issues of 
numeracy and literacy
17
.  This had to be carefully considered when it came to analysing and 
evaluating the data. 
 
The proficiency in understanding verbal questions and inquiries put to participants by the 
researcher also had to be considered, especially those participants who may have been from a 
non-English speaking background and who may have had limited educational opportunities.  It is 
hoped that to some extent, these issues were sufficiently overcome by the face-to-face approach 
and close personal contact with all participants by the researcher during the entire project. 
 
 
We now turn our attention to both the data collection and the findings from the data analysis in 
Chapter Five. 
 
  
                                               
17 The CFMEU’s Victorian Construction Division Training Unit data base shows over 40% of its members need some 
type of assistance and support to access training and everyday on-site OHS information. 
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Chapter 5 Results 
This chapter will present and describe both the data collection and the findings of the subsequent 
data analysis, in order to provide a detailed narrative of how the constitutive principles of trust, 
honesty, commitment and respect, were applied during the consultation process over OHS by 
project or site managers and the occupational health and safety representatives of five different 
construction companies.  These purposefully selected companies were deemed to have reached 
different levels of organisational maturity based upon the Hudson (2003) model, in order to 
determine if any differences or variances in approaches to consultation emerged.  Figure 7 
provides an overview of how this chapter is structured. 
 
 Constitutive Principle        Organisational Maturity Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Diagrammatical overview of Chapter Five 
 
 
5.1 Trust 
How was trust demonstrated and 
applied by the site/project 
manager and OHS representative 
of the… 
 
5.2 Honesty 
How was honesty demonstrated 
and applied by the site/project 
manager and the OHS 
representative of the… 
 
5.3 Commitment 
How was commitment 
demonstrated and applied by the 
site/project manager and the OHS 
representative of the… 
 
5.4 Respect 
How was respect demonstrated 
and applied by the site/project 
manager and the OHS 
representative of the… 
Pathological Company  
Reactive Company 
Calculative Company 
Proactive Company 
Generative Company 
Pathological Company 
Reactive Company 
Calculative Company 
Proactive Company 
Generative Company 
Pathological Company 
Reactive Company 
Calculative Company 
Proactive Company 
Generative Company 
Pathological Company 
Reactive Company 
Calculative Company 
Proactive Company 
Generative Company 
129 
 
The data in its raw form comprised the following: 
 10 semi-structured interviews: five with the most senior site management representative 
and five with the corresponding site OHS representative on the five construction sites 
nominated by each one of the  five different construction companies who participated in 
this project; 
 Over 100 hours of non-participative site observations; and 
 The inspection and collection of both site and company OHS documentation - including 
company OHS management systems, site specific OHS policies and OHS procedures, 
records of issues or items identified on site safety walks and minutes from site or project 
safety committee meetings.   
 
During the data collection phase of the project, it became apparent that the main forums for 
consultation over OHS on the construction sites utilized in this research were primarily:  
1. via the weekly OHS inspections - referred to hereafter as the site safety walks;  
2. the weekly OHS committee meetings - which were generally held immediately after the 
site safety walks;   and  
3. the weekly site safety toolbox meetings - normally held the day after the site safety walk.   
The observation periods of the project concentrated on these three forums. 
 
While each of the four constitutive principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect are 
presented in this chapter as separate entities, the potential synergistic effects of each one and their 
effect on other moral or ethical principles that are not specifically utilized or specified in this 
project, are described where appropriate.  At the introduction of each section describing each of 
the four constitutive principles, there is a general overview of the application of each principle 
and where applicable, how each principle was reflected in company and site OHS documentation. 
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5.1  Trust 
5.1.1  Trust in General 
In general terms, the issue of trust was deemed to be a vital component or element by all 
managers and OHS representatives if there was to be any resemblance of what they considered to 
be meaningful and effective consultation.  However, the degree or level of trust which was 
thought to be required in order to achieve this was never fully nominated or explained by any of 
the participants. 
 
According to the OHS representative of the Pathological Company, the project manager at his site 
displayed trust in him by allowing him to stop the works and place workers in the site sheds if he 
considered that ‘…there is a serious breach in the OHS requirements…’ or there was any type of 
immediate threat to the workers health and safety: ‘… management said to me … just send ‘em to 
the sheds, pull ‘em up, put ‘em in the sheds for a while and we’ll come down and talk to them …’ 
18
.  However, it should also be noted that during the observation phases of the project, no such 
occurrence or event such as the OHS representative stopping the works or putting workers in the 
sheds if they were not compliant with OHS requirements were noted or recorded, nor could the 
OHS representative recall or remember the last time he ever carried out such an activity.   
 
The project manager of the Pathological Company believed that trust was a vital component if 
meaningful and effective consultation was to occur: ‘... trust, mutual trust… I mean it’s built on 
… needs to be built on the trust …’.  However he also believed that the site OHS representative 
lacked experience on large projects, which in his opinion, affected the OHS representative’s 
position and approach towards both himself and in the general area of site OHS: ‘…Yeah, he’s a 
little bit unsure; he’s not a particularly experienced OHS representative,  I mean one of the site 
managers is very experienced in the psychology of it all, and he’s had a word in his ear a couple 
of times, you know it might do you some good if you do such and such …’.   
 
For his part, the OHS representative of the Pathological Company did not appear to exhibit any 
anxiety or show any signs of being overwhelmed in the role.  If anything, it appeared that the 
OHS representative believed that management trusted him to make the appropriate and necessary 
                                               
18 At the time of writing, all duly and legally elected OHS representatives have the legal right and power to direct any 
work to cease, if, in the opinion of the OHS representative, that work involves an immediate threat to the health and 
safety of any person. 
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decisions over OHS if and when he believed it was required: ‘… they pretty much say to me that 
if there’s anything that needs to be done, you just do it, or get it done…’.   
 
The site manager of the Reactive Company claimed that: ‘… You need to have a certain degree of 
trust in what they’re [the OHS representatives] doing…’.  Overall, the site manager and the OHS 
representative of the Reactive Company appeared very much at ease and relaxed with one 
another.  The way they spoke and engaged with each other was almost the antithesis of the 
adversarial employer/employee relationship often found in a pluralist employment arrangement or 
environment (Alexander & Lewer 1994); which the author finds to be common in the commercial 
and industrial sector of the Victorian construction industry.  Indeed, the relationship between the 
site manager and the OHS representative of the Reactive Company, was perhaps more reflective 
of what would be more commonly found in a unitary type employment environment (Alexander 
& Lewer 1994).  The close working relationship between the site manager and the OHS 
representative of the Reactive Company appeared to allow the manifestation of the concept of 
trust to infuse itself into both a professional and a personal rapport; with both participants sharing 
the same lunch shed and often sharing their weekend and sporting anecdotal stories with each 
other, and indeed with other construction workers on the site.   
 
By relying on the two most senior site supervisors to accurately keep him informed about the 
status of occupational health and safety standards on his site, the Project Manager of the 
Calculative Company arguably displayed both trust and respect in his management team to keep 
him informed and up to date on all the issues affecting OHS standards on the site.  But the project 
manager also had regular and frequent one-on-one discussions with the OHS representative over 
all the site OHS issues.  This arguably demonstrated the trust and respect that both he and the 
OHS representative had towards one another and the commitment they had to resolve any OHS 
issue.  According to the project manager:‘…I do rely on my two foremen (sic) to keep me up to 
speed on any issues that they have, and going back to the one-on-one discussions I have with … 
[name of OHS representative], I guess that would be the forum if he’s concerned about 
something, to come and talk to me about it...’.   
 
The OHS representative of the Calculative Company claimed that while he had quite a trusting, 
respectful and open and professional relationship with one of the two most senior site supervisors, 
he had an almost completely opposite relationship with the other senior site supervisor.  However, 
while later admitting to noticing a slight improvement in the other supervisors’ attitude towards 
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OHS, he still harboured reservations towards him and displayed a lack of trust in the supervisor, 
openly stating that: ‘…while I have noticed a change in him, I still don’t f…..g trust him…’.   
 
The Proactive Company employed what the site manager and the OHS representative both 
referred to as a site safety facilitator.  The roles and responsibilities of the site safety facilitator 
were primarily focused on looking after all OHS matters on the project on behalf of the company, 
thereby appearing to redirect much of the OHS responsibility and tenure away from the site 
manager.  Included in the site safety facilitator’s role, was the responsibility to chair all the site 
OHS committee meetings and organise and lead the weekly site safety walks.  Observations of 
these two forums indicated that the OHS representative of the Proactive Company, whilst being 
an active participant and always voicing his opinion in these forums, often in very strong terms, 
had a role that is perhaps best described as supportive and secondary compared to that of the site 
safety facilitator.  The OHS representative described his own role as: ‘…I just say me piece when 
it comes around… if you’ve got a concern, you just say your piece…’.   
 
The site manager of the Proactive Company was quite vocal in his belief and trust in the OHS 
representative and indeed in the recognition of the knowledge and skills of all the workers on the 
site: ‘…we have a broad base of what we know, and if you have some people who do it all the 
time… it helps get you through…’.  While the approach of the site manager is perhaps admirable 
in his trust and respect to workers and their OHS representatives, it is interesting to note the 
slightly different interpretation of trust held by the OHS representative towards the wider 
management group, who largely fell under the control of the site manager.  A specific example of 
this was relayed by the OHS representative in relation to when site OHS issues were still 
outstanding, and it was still uncertain whether or not work should recommence in particular areas.  
According to the OHS representative: ‘… they [the management] just sneak up there…before we 
[the OHS representatives and site OHS committee] give ‘em the O.K.…’.  In another example, the 
OHS representative, when describing how the OHS committee operated in terms of raising OHS 
issues, stated that: ‘…when you’ve got management representation, there never appears to be 
anything wrong, I mean it’s only the [OHS] reps who’ll ever bring anything up, which is 
disappointing in a way I must say…’.   
 
The site manager of the Generative Company highlighted the importance of both trust and 
maturity, when describing what he considered was important if meaningful and effective 
consultation was to occur.  In his opinion, the ability to engage in an adult type discussion was 
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vital:‘… just having the ability to have an adult discussion on building sites with people you’ve 
obviously come to know in a fairly short period of time.  Obviously trust has a lot to do with it… 
just being able to talk the issues through, understand the issues, make sure they’re addressed 
properly, make sure we know who is going to address them, and how we’re going to do it and 
obviously follow it through… just being able to have an adult discussion to actually extract 
exactly what the problem is and to finalize the issues with the best possible outcome...’.   
 
The OHS representative of the Generative Company held similar views in terms of the 
importance that he felt the concept of trust had in the process of consultation if OHS issues were 
to be resolved on site:‘…if we start the job off on the right foot, where we’ve got trust, 
communication, we can continue that and for the longevity of the job, we’ll get the right outcome.  
Trust, it’s very important I believe…’.  The OHS representative also appeared to trust the site 
manager to fix any problem once the site manager became aware of it, stating that: ‘…we give 
‘em an opportunity to fix the problem and once that’s addressed, we re-evaluate whatever’s 
happened, if it’s fixed and we’re all happy, we move on…’.   
 
The level of trust displayed by the OHS representative from the Generative Company appeared to 
be reciprocated by the site manager.  This was reflected in the OHS representative having the 
autonomy to chair both the weekly site safety committee meetings and the weekly site safety 
toolbox meetings.  Interestingly, the site safety toolbox meetings were only attended by workers, 
with no management representatives in attendance.  No other company who participated in this 
project allowed their OHS representative to chair either of these forums, and all the other 
companies insisted that their site management attend all site safety toolbox meetings. 
 
The notion of empowering and trusting the OHS representative to chair both the weekly OHS 
committee meetings and the weekly site safety toolbox meetings, appeared to allow the OHS 
representative and the workers the opportunity to freely engage in vigorous and robust 
discussions and debates about the safety standards on the site, as well as raising any other OHS 
issues that they considered to be worthy of discussion.  This appeared to be done without any fear 
of intimidation or retribution from the companies engaged on the project.  It also allowed the 
OHS representative the opportunity to take all these issues or concerns directly back to the site 
manager for rectification and/or resolution. 
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The site manager of the Generative Company demonstrated his trust and respect in the OHS 
representative, by letting all sub-contractors know that the OHS representative had the full 
support and approval of the company to halt or cease any works immediately if, in the opinion of 
the OHS representative, it was necessary to do so.  During the observation phases of the project, 
the OHS representative implemented this right on three separate occasions.  The site manager, 
although not always agreeing with this action, and who on some occasions believed that there 
may have been an alternative course of action to take, nonetheless indicated his full support to the 
OHS representative by claiming that in these particular circumstances, the action of the OHS 
representative had been warranted.  The site manager also indicated that he and the company saw 
no reason to doubt the OHS representative’s sincerity and integrity in carrying out this function, if 
and when he deemed it appropriate.  The site manager reinforced the importance of his 
relationship with the OHS representative, by openly stating in one of the OHS committee 
meetings that ‘… if this bloke [the OHS representative] loses faith in me, I’ve got problems, which 
means the site has problems…’.   
 
 
5.1.2 Trust during safety walks and OHS committee 
meetings 
The OHS committee of the Pathological Company consisted of those persons who participated in 
the weekly site safety walks.  Primarily, this involved a senior manager (who was not the project 
manager), the OHS representative, and two and/or sometimes three other construction workers 
from different sub-contractors, dependent upon the numbers of workers and the types of sub-
contractors or tradespersons on the site at the time.  The sub-contractor / worker representatives 
did not appear to be certain, nor could anyone confirm, whether they represented their own sub-
contracting company or their peers and fellow construction workers who happened to belong to 
the same trades or work groups.  It was not made clear by either the project manager or the OHS 
representative whether the persons on the committee had been elected by their peers to represent 
them as workers, or whether they had been requested to go on the committee by their own 
management, the management of the Pathological Company, or by the OHS representative 
himself.  When this question was informally put to the committee, there was just a shrug of 
shoulders and an almost rhetorical answer of ‘… I dunno, we’re just all on the committee...’. 
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The chairperson of the Pathological Company site OHS committee was the most senior 
management representative on the committee.  It was not made clear by any members of the 
committee, and there appeared to be some confusion and uncertainty about whether this position 
had been determined by the committee members themselves, or whether it had been a 
management-appointed position.  The OHS committee meetings of the Pathological Company 
comprised standing around immediately after the safety walk had concluded, regardless of where 
it had concluded, and proceeded along the lines of very briefly discussing and then generally 
agreeing to all the issues or matters that had just been identified on the safety walk.  There was 
little if any debate or discussion over either the issues themselves, or indeed the proposed 
solutions.   
 
The project manager of the Pathological Company believed that the operation and agenda of the 
OHS committee meetings was primarily the responsibility of the OHS representative.  He further 
claimed that the meetings were subsequently conducted or chaired by the OHS representative.  
However, during the site observations it became apparent that it was the senior management 
representative on the safety walk that not only set the agenda, but also chaired and generally 
controlled the meetings and any subsequent discussions - albeit as brief as they may have been, 
that took place during the meetings.  The senior management representative also appeared to not 
only raise the majority of the OHS issues identified on the safety walk, but also suggested the 
majority of solutions to the issues, halted the works if and when he deemed it necessary to do so 
and generally directed and set the pace of the safety walk.  The OHS representative appeared to 
take on more of a supporting function or role, generally appearing content to follow the 
instructions and directions issued by the manager, as opposed to actively identifying issues and 
providing or suggesting solutions to them. 
 
Neither the site manager nor the OHS representative of the Reactive Company could recall 
whether the members on their site OHS committee were elected by their peers or fellow workers, 
or were selected to go on the committee by management representatives of either their own sub-
contractor or that of the Reactive Company.  It appeared that a number of workers of the different 
sub-contractors had either been asked or requested by either the OHS representative or the site 
manager, to attend the weekly OHS site safety walks at an earlier stage of the project.  These 
workers appeared to have accepted this role as part of their duties on the site, subsequently 
forming the site OHS committee.  The membership of the OHS committee consisted of the site 
manager, the OHS representative and three other workers who, in much the same vein as the OHS 
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committee of the Pathological Company, were not entirely sure whether they were representing 
their company or their fellow workers.   
 
The chairperson of the OHS committee was the site manager.  However the OHS representative 
appeared to play a major role and exerted a great deal of influence within the committee.  In a 
similar to the Pathological Company, after each safety walk, the members of the site OHS 
committee of the Reactive Company would stand around where the walk had ended, briefly 
discuss the issues that had been identified on the safety walk and generally agreed to the actions 
that were required to rectify them.  In the majority of cases, the solutions or actions were 
proposed by the site manager and/or the OHS representative.  The OHS committee then agreed to 
what issues would be discussed at the site safety tool box meeting, which was held on the 
following day.   
 
On one particular day, the site safety walk of the Reactive Company finished on a large flat 
section of the galvanised metal roof of the building.  The outside temperature on this day was 
very hot, with a large amount of radiant heat being generated from the roof-top.  The roof was 
also reflecting a large amount of sun glare, which resulted in those members on the safety walk 
who were not wearing sunglasses, experiencing a great deal of discomfort.  This made it a very 
uncomfortable environment to conduct an OHS committee meeting and generally discuss and 
focus on the OHS issues at hand.  The only persons who were wearing sunglasses at this 
particular point in time were the site manager and the OHS representative.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the subsequent discussion that took place at this ‘meeting’ was extremely brief.  
Indeed, one member of the safety committee stated that he was ‘off to get out of the heat and 
glare and would see everybody later…’.  With that, the site manager and the OHS representative 
decided to, in the words of the site manager: ‘wrap the meeting up if there’s no one else wanting 
to say anything of great urgency, and we’ll see you all in the morning!...’.   
 
According to the OHS representative of the Reactive Company, when it came to the OHS 
committee meetings:‘… we can pull in meetings any time we want, and we’re not strangled or 
restricted on what we can do, absolutely not, there’s no time limits…’.  While this comment 
arguably displayed an approach by both company and individuals that allowed for a free and 
unhindered approach in managing OHS, it is also important to note that the scheduling and or 
requesting of extra OHS committee meetings, if requested or deemed necessary, is only reflective 
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of what is currently legally allowable and entitled to be carried out under the auspices of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Victoria). 
 
The membership of the site OHS committee of the Calculative Company was consistent with the 
requirements of the OHS legislation in Victoria, especially when compared with both the 
Pathological and the Reactive Company site OHS committees.  The employee representatives on 
the Calculative Company site OHS committee had been democratically elected by their peers or 
fellow workers, while the employer representatives on the committee were appointed by their 
respective sub-contractors.  The membership of the OHS committee consisted of between six to 
eight employee representatives from different subcontractors / trades (dependent upon who was 
on site at the time) and two or sometimes three management representatives.   
 
The overall aura or mood of the members of the site OHS committee appeared to be trusting, 
respectful, honest and relaxed.  All the committee members generally displayed what appeared to 
be a high level of integrity and respect towards one another.  They always appeared to listen 
carefully to each other’s opinions and respectfully disagreed if and when they felt the need to.  
While the Calculative Company project manager only attended the weekly OHS committee 
meetings and site safety walks sporadically, he displayed a degree of trust in his management 
team by delegating these roles to his two most senior management representatives, both of whom 
rotated the role of chairperson of the committee between themselves.  The OHS representative 
appeared to take a leading role in both the safety walk and the discussions that took place in the 
safety committee meetings held immediately after the safety walk, but he did not chair the 
meetings.  It was never made clear by either the OHS representative or the project manager, 
whether the decision of who chaired the OHS committee was a decision made by the committee 
members themselves, or was a predetermined management decision. 
 
The OHS representative of the Calculative Company continually raised any OHS issue which he 
believed was worthy of attention, in an open and uninhibited manner.  He appeared to trust that 
the issues he raised both on the safety walks and in the OHS committee meetings would be 
treated as serious and genuine, and be dealt with in the same manner by the management team 
and in particular, by the project manager himself.  The OHS representative did not appear 
concerned that the project manager did not attend every safety walk or every OHS committee 
meeting.  He appeared happy and confident that the senior management representatives on the 
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safety committee would accurately reflect and represent his views and opinions back to the 
project manager.   
 
The OHS representative of the Proactive Company also took a leading role in both the weekly site 
safety walks and the OHS committee meetings,, which immediately followed the walks.  Similar 
to the Calculative Company and consistent with the Victorian OHS legislative requirements, the 
OHS committee of the Proactive Company consisted of duly elected employee representatives 
and management-nominated employer representatives, who all attended each site safety walk.  
The chairperson of the OHS committee was the site safety facilitator who was the most senior 
management representative on the committee.  The OHS representative of the Proactive 
Company frequently raised matters and issues to do with OHS in an unhindered and confident 
manner.  There appeared to be an open, honest and frank exchange of views and opinions 
expressed by all members of the committee, especially by the OHS representative, who was 
always very vocal and enthusiastic on both the safety walks and in the OHS committee meetings. 
 
Similar to the Calculative and the Proactive OHS committees, the Generative site OHS committee 
appeared to be established consistent with the appropriate legislative requirements.  However, the 
main point of difference with this OHS committee was that it was the only one out of the five 
committees in the case studies, which was chaired by the OHS representative and not by the most 
senior management representative on the committee.  The decision of who was to chair the 
committee was made in full consultation between all the members of the committee.  The OHS 
representative also lead and directed the weekly site safety walks.  The site manager appeared to 
play more of a supportive yet respectful role; supporting the OHS representative’s position, 
allowing him to fully utilize and apply his OHS knowledge and skills.  The site manager did 
however take a leading role in the OHS committee meetings and in instances where the OHS 
representative appeared to lose his way, or become somewhat distracted from the issues, the site 
manager would respectfully, calmly and unobtrusively redirect and steer the discussion back onto 
its original path. 
 
The site manager of the Generative Company appeared to trust the OHS representative to 
identify, represent and articulate all the OHS issues to the entire OHS committee and later to the 
entire site, in an impartial and non-emotive fashion.  The site manager appeared to rely on the 
OHS representatives’ knowledge and skill in both the consultation process and in the overall 
approach to help solve or rectify the problems or issues to everyone’s satisfaction. 
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5.1.3  Discrepancies of trust? 
Within the sphere of trust espoused by all of the management representatives, there appeared to 
be some discrepancies or inconsistencies in the application and display of this principle or 
concept.  One example of this was that in four out of the five case studies, there were no 
computers with internet access specifically provided or supplied to the OHS representatives for 
their immediate, unrestricted and unhindered use.  In an age where there is arguably such a heavy 
emphasis and even reliance upon electronic and computer equipment as a major source and form 
of communication and information, this could be interpreted as being somewhat surprising. 
 
While it could be argued that this may not be a significant factor on its own, the lack of private, 
unhindered and unrestricted use of a computer would appear to at least limit and restrict the 
ability of an OHS representative to gain independent and up-to-date OHS information when they 
required or deemed it necessary to do so.  Indeed, it appeared that those OHS representatives that 
did not have a computer for their exclusive or private use were almost beholden to their 
companies for a large percentage of their OHS information.  Without free and unhindered access 
to a computer and the internet, the OHS representative’s ability to ensure that any OHS 
information supplied to them by their company or other parties is accurate and up-to-date, or 
indeed their ability to source other OHS information, arguably becomes restrictive and 
problematic.  While all of the OHS representatives who did not have their own computer all 
claimed that they were allowed to use one of the site computers located in the respective site 
offices, none of them could remember, nor could they give examples, of the last time they had 
taken up this option.   
 
The OHS representative of the Reactive Company did comment that his company had promised 
to supply computers to all their OHS representatives by the end of 2008.  However, as at the end 
of July 2009, this had not yet occurred.   
 
The OHS representative of the Pathological Company was entrusted by his project manager to 
ensure that the OHS issues identified for action on the safety walks were rectified or completed: 
‘… I go round signing off… date its completion, all that sort of stuff…’  While this could indicate 
a level of trust by both parties towards one another, it is also interesting to note that while the 
OHS representative was entrusted to carry out such tasks on issues that have been described by 
Lunt et al. (2008) as day-to-day and /or reactionary trouble shooting issues, there was no 
indication or evidence from either party or from any site observations, that the OHS 
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representative was entrusted to participate or take part in any higher level OHS decision-making 
forums.   
 
While the day-to-day OHS items that made up the overwhelming majority of issues or items 
identified on all the site safety walks are important in their own right, such issues may not be able 
to sustain the enthusiasm of an individual performing this function or task over a prolonged 
period of time.  This was perhaps best demonstrated in the attitude and approach of the 
Pathological Company OHS representative on some of their safety walks, where he often 
appeared to be disinterested and bored during the safety walk.  By using the OHS representative 
to ensure that all the minor day-to-day issues were addressed and rectified, this appeared to allow 
the OHS representative little time and limited his ability to become involved in any higher level 
or critical high risk OHS matters concerning the project; not that such opportunities ever appeared 
to present themselves to the OHS representative. 
 
The site manager of the Reactive Company explained that the company had a policy that required 
the involvement of the company OHS manager in any high risk work and the subsequent OHS 
decision making process arising from this: ‘… We don’t make decisions here, anything that’s 
high risk, we have to go through them, our OHS managers…’.  The involvement of the most 
senior OHS personnel of the company, could be viewed in one of two ways: either it reflects that 
the company has some level of doubt in the ability of their own site personnel to adequately 
address some of the more complex OHS issues, or alternatively, it may allow another view or 
opinion to be considered prior to any final OHS decision being made.  Rather than interpreting 
this as a sign of mistrust, the OHS representative believed that this policy or practice of the 
Reactive Company allowed a review of any high-risk decision making process to occur: ‘… if I’m 
not happy with it, then I’ll get …(name of the OHS manager within the company) involved in it, 
and we go from there…’.   
 
The OHS representative of the Calculative Company arguably displayed what Conchie and 
Donald (2008) described as a level of distrust (p.1153), in relation to how he consulted with one 
of the supervisors over OHS issues on the site: ‘…I still talk to him, but I just don’t trust him.  
Yeah, so it just makes me keep me eye on him a bit more than … (name of the other supervisor)… 
I can trust …(name of one supervisor), there’s no bullshit with …(name of the supervisor)…’.  In 
terms of the level of trust displayed by the Calculative Company towards the OHS representative, 
it was noticeable that the OHS representative was not supplied with his own computer.  However, 
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this did not appear to prevent him or limit his ability to gain access to outside sources of OHS 
information.  Indeed, he appeared to be far more active and successful that either of the OHS 
representatives who worked for the Pathological and Reactive Companies, in obtaining third 
party OHS advice and information from outside sources, including his trade union and the state 
regulatory authority.  Unlike the Pathological and Reactive Companies, the site amenity complex 
of the Calculative Company displayed a vast amount of OHS information sourced from a wide 
variety of organisations. 
 
The trust exhibited by the Proactive Company site manager towards the OHS representative did 
not extend itself into the company providing the OHS representative with his own computer with 
internet access.  This again raises questions of the ability of the OHS representative to gain 
independent OHS advice at short notice, as well as how the OHS representative can objectively 
determine the validity, robustness and accuracy of any of the OHS information given to him by 
the company.  Being able to access a computer (in this case the site manager and the OHS 
representative both indicated that there was the availability for him to access a computer in the 
site office if he deemed it necessary) is one thing, however feeling confident and sufficiently self-
assured of being able to correctly use it when required and having sufficient privacy and 
confidentiality to do this, is perhaps another matter entirely.  However, like the OHS 
representative from the Calculative Company, the Proactive Company OHS representative had 
sourced vast amounts of OHS information from other sources such as his trade union and the 
regulatory authority, which he freely and explicitly displayed in and around the site complex. 
 
Conchie and Burns (2009) considered that: ‘… an individual’s response to risk communication is 
determined by how trustworthy they believe the information source to be…’ (p.14).  They 
believed that it was therefore vital that there is a mechanism in place to verify the honesty and 
accuracy of information given to one party, in this particular case the OHS representative, from 
another party or source, in this case the company.  Free and unhindered access to a computer with 
internet access, in the privacy of the OHS representative’s own office, would arguably provide 
the OHS representative with the ability to verify the accuracy and expediency of any OHS 
information provided to them, or accessed by them from any source. 
 
The OHS representative from the Generative Company was the only OHS representative out of 
all the OHS representatives in the case studies, to be provided with his own computer with 
internet access, located within the privacy of his own office.  This meant that he had full and 
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unhindered access to the internet, enabling him to obtain independent and up to date OHS advice 
and information when he required.  The printed OHS information displayed in and around the site 
amenity complex appeared to confirm this, with vast amounts of OHS information obtained from 
a wide variety of sources, all freely available and displayed around the site.  The OHS 
representative of the Generative Company was also the only OHS representative that was allowed 
to conduct the initial site inductions to all new workers who came onto the site.  All the site 
inductions carried out by the other companies were conducted primarily by management 
representatives, with the OHS representatives of each company playing only a very limited (if 
any) role in this particular OHS process. 
 
 
5.2  Honesty 
5.2.1  Honesty in General 
The overall concept of honesty appeared to be captured in, and was consistent with, the notion of 
openness; a term or ideal used by many of the participants during their semi-structured 
interviews.  For the purposes of this research, the terms or ideals of both honesty and openness 
were applied synonymously with each other.   
 
In his interview, the project manager of the Pathological Company expressed some doubt over the 
honesty and even the legitimacy of some of the OHS issues raised during the OHS consultation 
forums on his site, claiming that: ‘… sometimes they’re made into problems…’.  This attitude or 
approach was perhaps slightly inconsistent and out of step with that of other management 
representatives involved in the project.  For example, the site manager of the Reactive Company 
believed that when dealing with and solving OHS issues, regardless of what those issues were, 
the honesty and openness of all parties was vital to the successful resolution to the issues or 
problems.  He believed that ‘… you need people to be open, they need to be open and if they are, 
then things can be sorted out…’.  This openness was reflected in the relationship that the OHS 
representative and the site manager of the Reactive Company had with each other, both in their 
day-to-day discussions and on their weekly safety walks and OHS committee meetings.   
 
The level of honesty between the project manager and the OHS representative of the Calculative 
Company also appeared very high, reflected in the following comments about how they believed 
the consultation process over OHS issues was played out on their site.  The project manager 
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claimed that:  ‘…[name of OHS Representative] and I have a good, open relationship, he and I 
do try and catch up; it’s all based on time, but at least once a week I try and catch up, to sit down 
and have a chat…’.  In turn, the OHS representative stated that: ‘…it’s never like anybody tries to 
hide it (an OHS issue or problem), or brush it off, it’s always out in the open…’. 
 
The site manager of the Proactive Company believed that an honest and open approach was the 
key in keeping all parties informed during the consultation process and in reaching the most 
effective control methods or solutions to the problems: ‘…report back to the blokes so they all get 
the feeling, right O.K, so it’s happened, right, that’s the reason, right, they’re on top of it, 
there’ve fixed it…  I think we are very good at it because we’re open with it, we’re open with 
communications with everybody, we have a good working relationship generally with the occ 
(sic) health and safety representatives… and I know it’s a cliché, but we do have the open door 
policy’.  The OHS representative of the Proactive Company also believed in the concept of 
honesty and openness claiming:‘…I’ve learnt over the years, get it out, get it out in the open, fix it 
up, get it out in the open and fix it up.  Everything’s upfront, it all goes on our safety committee 
meetings and on all our notice boards, that’s how I do it anyway...’. 
 
The OHS representative and the site manager of the Generative Company appeared to have the 
most open and honest relationship out of all of the participants of the five companies who took 
part in this research.  The OHS representative felt that there was a very open and honest rapport 
between himself and the site manager when it came to consultation over OHS.  In his opinion, the 
site manager and the company had nothing to hide, claiming that was the way that both he and the 
site manager approached each other over OHS:  ‘…Yeah, it’s all open door, I mean there’s 
nothing to hide, it’s not as if we have a meeting and someone’s just lumped there, we discuss it, if 
we’ve got any problems, no problems, consultation yeah, they [the management] always ask, 
which is good…’. 
 
The site manager of the Generative Company also displayed what could be described as a 
refreshing level of honesty not always evident or indeed admitted to, in the sometimes macho and 
highly competitive nature or culture of the construction industry.  While the quote below from the 
site manager may not be strictly related or indeed attributed to the research project in terms of 
consultation over OHS issue with the OHS representative, it does however depict a senior 
manager who is not afraid or restricted in getting other ideas and/or opinions of how best to solve 
OHS issues or problems:‘…I’m still quite young in the industry, and I still do call on other site 
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managers that have had obviously a lot more experience than me, and sometimes I do ring them 
for my own benefit just to see if there are any other ways we could have done things.  I think it’s 
more to do with my own learning curve to be quite honest…’.   
 
 
5.2.2 Honesty during OHS committee meetings and tool 
box meetings 
The OHS committee meetings and the site safety toolbox meetings of the Pathological Company 
were always chaired and run by management representatives, as opposed to perhaps a more 
consultative process whereby the OHS representative might have been invited to co-chair the 
meetings, or at the very least, play a more prominent role in the forums.  However, it should also 
be noted that the OHS representative of the Pathological Company showed little if any inclination 
or wish to chair either of these meetings or take a more prominent role in the forums.  The 
reasons for this were never made clear by either the OHS representative or the project manager.   
 
At the OHS committee meetings of the Pathological Company, the only persons who ever 
appeared to have a copy of the previous meetings minutes were the senior management 
representatives who chaired the meeting.  Again, it was never made clear by either party or 
indeed the other participants on the committee, why this was so.  However, no one ever 
questioned or seemed to mind that there was only ever one copy of the minutes at the meetings. 
 
Like the Pathological Company, there was no evidence or suggestion of any formalized meeting 
agenda or structure in the Reactive Company OHS committee meetings.  Rather, the brief 
discussions that took place at the end of each safety walk, at the location of where the walk had 
ended, appeared to be based only on those items that were identified on the walk.  At the OHS 
committee meetings of the Reactive Company, the site manager and the OHS representative 
appeared to be the only persons with a copy of the previous week’s minutes.   
 
In the tool box meetings of the Reactive Company, the subcontractors deemed responsible for the 
particular actions or items identified on the safety walk were all given a copy of the safety walk 
inspection list.  Like the Pathological Company, the site safety toolbox meetings of the Reactive 
Company were attended by all personnel on site, including management representatives.  The site 
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manager of the Reactive Company believed that the site OHS toolbox meetings were an 
important part of the company consultation requirements under their OHS management system. 
In terms of how the actual OHS committee meetings were run and structured, there were 
sometimes subtle and sometimes not so subtle differences displayed by each company in how 
they conducted their meetings.  For example, at the beginning of their meetings, the senior 
management representative from the Pathological Company and the Calculative Company and in 
the case of the Reactive Company, the OHS representative, would each read aloud to all other 
members of their respective OHS committees, the minutes of the previous meeting.  The 
members of the OHS committee’s were then asked if they had any objections to the minutes that 
had just been read out as being recorded as a true and accurate description of what had occurred 
the week before.  During the observation sessions of the Pathological, Reactive and the 
Calculative Company OHS committee meetings, no committee members ever objected or 
questioned what had been read out, nor did anyone question or raise the issue that no one else 
(other than those just mentioned) ever had a copy of the previous week’s minutes.  However, it 
should be noted that the minutes and records of the safety walks and subsequent safety committee 
meetings were placed upon the respective site notice boards located in and around the site 
amenity and facility compounds of the sites, with all sub-contractor management also given a 
copy of the minutes.   
 
The site manager of the Proactive Company believed he was always open and honest and allowed 
all the information that was discussed at the site OHS committee meetings to be freely available 
and accessible to all workers and all management personnel on the site.  He stated that: ‘…the 
safety committee minutes go up on the pin-boards, the notice-boards up in the lunch rooms and 
the guys can all have a look at it, and see where it’s going, what the actions, and what’s 
happening and what actions have been taking place…’.   
 
The OHS representative of the Proactive Company was very vocal and active in expressing his 
thoughts and opinions in both the safety walks and the safety committee meetings over a vast 
array of OHS issues, appearing unconcerned about who he may or may not upset or offend in the 
process.  He claimed that his approach on these occasions was simply based around ‘…getting the 
job done in the safest possible way…’ and on more than one occasion he stated ‘… well, next time 
if it’s not right, I’ll just stop it outright and then we’ll see what happens…’.  The OHS 
representative was honest enough to openly state this in front of all committee members and the 
senior management representatives, which seemed to have a positive effect on management in 
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terms of changing particular work processes in question, and directly intervening to ensure that 
particular work procedures were conducted safely and consistently to what had been agreed.  This 
approach arguably gave the other employee OHS committee members the confidence to openly 
speak their minds.  It must also be acknowledged that the response of the company appeared both 
positive and respectful, as opposed to harbouring any negativity or bitterness at any particular 
OHS issue being raised.   
 
On more than one occasion, the OHS representative of the Proactive Company indicated that in 
some instances, issues that had been recorded in the minutes of the OHS committee meetings as 
being finalised or completed, were in fact incorrect and had yet to be rectified or attended to.  On 
such occasions, the OHS representative also questioned the accuracy of how the reporting or 
recording of the minutes was being conducted.  The site safety facilitator of the Proactive 
Company never appeared to disagree with him, committing to either getting the issue rectified 
himself, or having the minutes of the meeting/s altered to reflect the actual status of the events in 
question.   
 
The OHS representative of the Generative Company always appeared open and honest in his 
approach to OHS.  He presented all OHS issues discussed at the meetings in an open, honest and 
comprehensive manner in his role as chairperson of the site OHS committee.  While he was very 
candid in giving his views and opinions, he also appeared to respectfully receive other person’s 
opinions and views.  He also displayed great enthusiasm not just for these views, but also in the 
ensuring debate that transpired when there were differences in approaches or opinions over 
particular OHS issues.  There always appeared to be a healthy degree or level of debate and 
discussion over the issues in the OHS committee meetings of the Generative Company, with an 
open and honest exchange of opinions given by all parties, prior to the OHS committee agreeing 
as to the most appropriate way to rectify the problem or issue in question. 
 
 
5.2.3  Honesty of OHS documentation 
The OHS documentation of the Pathological Company appeared to meet all the minimum legal 
requirements as set out under the OHS Act 2004 (Vic).  The company did not ever appear to 
attempt to hide or misrepresent either company or site-specific OHS documentation to the OHS 
representative.  The Reactive Company also appeared to be very open and honest with their OHS 
documentation, never appearing to hide or misrepresent any of their OHS documentation to their 
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OHS representative, be it either company or site-specific documentation.  Again, the Reactive 
Company OHS documentation appeared to be consistent and compliant with the requirements of 
the OHS Act. 
 
All of the OHS information and or documentation from the Calculative Company and the 
Proactive Company appeared to be openly displayed and freely available to all persons on the 
site.  One interesting piece of OHS documentation from the Proactive Company was their very 
detailed OHS Induction Handbook, which was given to all employees who are inducted onto their 
worksites.  This booklet contained many of the company OHS policies e.g. Ultra Violet exposure; 
emergency procedures; first aid procedures; accident and incident reporting procedures; a 
personal protective equipment policy; safe work methods common to many of the frequent 
hazards associated with the construction industry; and, the behavioural expectations or 
responsibilities that the company expected of all workers.  There was even a section on company 
and site consultation responsibilities and procedures.   
 
The majority of the on-site OHS documentation of the Generative Company was very similar to 
that of the Proactive Company and the Calculative Company.  It included large posters exhorting 
safety and highlighting common hazards found in and around the construction industry, as well as 
OHS fact sheets and OHS hazard alerts that the OHS representative had obtained from a variety 
of sources.  Safety minutes from the safety walks and the site OHS committee meetings were also 
pinned up on a number of notice boards in and around the site amenities complex.   
 
It appeared that the concept of honesty was a hallmark of all the participants and through them, 
reflected in the organisational philosophy or approach of the companies to consultation.  
However, this did not appear to manifest itself in the involvement of any of the OHS 
representatives being consulted over long term or strategic OHS decision-making forums within 
any of the participating companies.  For example, none of the OHS representatives claimed to 
have had any input or involvement into their company OHS management system or any of the 
processes or procedures such as their organisations’ OHS policy, OHS mission statements, risk 
management strategies and other such documentation normally contained within and associated 
with a systematic OHS management system.  Nor did it appear that the OHS representatives 
played any part in, or had any contribution to, either individually or collectively via their site 
OHS committees, any auditing and/or review process of their organisations’ OHS management 
system. 
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5.3  Commitment 
5.3.1  Commitment in General 
In terms of how consultation over OHS was conducted or implemented by the Pathological 
Company, the site project manager stated that: ‘… if we’ve got a disagreement, we always 
encourage that to be done without rank or emotion in a more mature approach’.  Such a 
statement would seem to suggest that both the individual and by association, the organisation, 
have a high degree or level of commitment in terms of wanting to sit down and work through the 
issues in a mature and non-emotive manner, without the yelling and screaming that has arguably 
become part of construction industry folk-lore.  However, while the yelling and screaming may 
well be a thing of the past, the commitment to fully involve OHS representatives in the OHS 
decision-making process still appears to be a rather altruistic ideal. 
 
This was perhaps best demonstrated during one particular site safety walk of the Pathological 
Company.  In this particular walk, the OHS representative discovered that the senior management 
representative had not informed him of a decision to, in the words of the OHS 
representative‘…liven up…’ or turn on all the permanent electrical installations in a particular 
section of the project which was still under construction.  The OHS representative pointed out to 
the manager that this was not the first time that he, that is the OHS representative, had been left 
out of the decision-making process, only finding out about a critical OHS decision after the 
decision had already been made and implemented.  The OHS representative duly proceeded to 
question the manager about whether all the workers in the particular section of the project, which 
potentially would be affected by this decision, had been informed of the decision, and had a 
toolbox meeting been held to discuss any concerns that the workforce might have?   
 
The manager replied that the workers had not been informed of the permanent power being 
turned on, and his failure to communicate this to both the OHS representative and to the workers 
in general, had merely been an oversight on his behalf.  He had, in the words of the manager ‘… 
simply run out of time…’ .  The manager apologised for this oversight in not consulting with the 
OHS representative and the workers, and further claimed that it was not a reflection of his 
opinion or thoughts on consultation or towards the OHS representative’s role.  However, the 
manager did not respond with any remedial or future action that would perhaps prevent such an 
occurrence from happening again and merely continued on the safety walk.  For his part, the OHS 
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representative did not request any type of follow up action or propose any action that might also 
prevent such an event from reoccurring.   
 
While it appeared that there was a level of commitment on behalf of both the OHS representative 
and the project manager of the Pathological Company in their efforts and belief in the benefits of 
consultation, on some occasions it almost appeared to be a light-hearted exercise within the 
management team on the site.  Comments from some of the site management representatives to 
the OHS representative and the other employees on the OHS committee such as: ‘you don’t need 
to know…’ or ‘… that’s on a need to know basis only…’ does little to dispel such a light-hearted 
perception.  While such comments may well have been said in jest, it should not be completely 
dismissed that perhaps consultation was sometimes only occurring on a perceived ‘needs to know 
basis only’.   
 
When questioned as to why he believed consultation occurred on the site, the project manager of 
the Pathological Company stated ‘… because the OHS Act says it should…’. While this might 
suggest compliance to the constitutional rule of the OHS Act 2004 (Victoria), in particular 
Sections 35 and 36 of the Act, it may also suggest that perhaps consultation only occurred 
because of the legal obligation, as opposed to any type of moral or ethical belief or requirement to 
keep employees informed and ensure that they are an integral part of the construction process.  
When asked the same question, the OHS representative of the Pathological Company answered in 
a slightly more conceptual manner, believing that you engaged in consultation because: ‘… I 
reckon you just care about what you do…’.   
 
According to the site manager of the Reactive Company, from a company perspective and within 
the levels of their management operation, the process of consultation occurred on a regular basis.  
He stated that ‘…from our office side, look the consultation is good, we have our foremen (sic) 
meetings and all our (OHS) manuals are updated regularly…’.  The site manager also went on to 
explain that when there are issues of OHS to be dealt with on site, he and the OHS representative: 
‘… just sit down … we’ll talk about it, or …[Company OHS manager] will come out and we’ll go 
out and look at it straight away.  But obviously we like to try and nail everything straight 
away…’.   
 
The site manager of the Reactive Company also appeared to have a very committed approach to 
consultation over OHS with the OHS representative.  He went on to explain why he has 
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personally been engaging in consultation with many different OHS representatives on his projects 
over a number of years: ‘… that’s how I’ve been running jobs for the past eight or nine years 
anyway, … there is a benefit, because if you don’t, it’s what we said before, if you don’t have 
consultation, it ends up being a dispute.  There’s not much in between, you either talk about it or 
you fight about it, and obviously if you let it go it just gets worse…’.   
 
According to the OHS representative of the Reactive Company, the consultation process and the 
onsite OHS decision making process was primarily carried out in the following manner: ‘… 
[name of the site manager] actually makes the decision mostly, he’s first cab off the rank…’.  In 
terms of consulting and the role of involving the company OHS manager in the onsite OHS 
decision making process, the OHS representatives’ view was consistent with that of the site 
manager: ‘I’ll just get … [name of Company OHS manager] in, and then we get him involved as 
well, and then he can make the final decision, so there’s sort of mechanisms to balance 
everything out…’.   
 
The OHS representative and the site manager of the Reactive Company appeared to support and 
be committed to the process and methods of consultation that they implemented on site.  In one of 
the observation periods, the project was at a particularly crucial point for a handover of a 
particular section to the client.  Such periods are habitually fraught with timetable difficulties and 
great pressures, often causing personality clashes to occur.  However, during this often intense 
and stressful period, the site manager and OHS representative displayed neither the difficulties 
nor stress that is commonly associated with such a handover.  Indeed, they showed enormous 
support and commitment to each other and continued to talk and discuss OHS matters in what 
could be described as an adult and mature manner.   
 
In terms of the overall commitment that was displayed between the site manager and the OHS 
representative of the Reactive Company, what revealed itself over the course of the observation 
periods was the degree of cooperation and the extremely close rapport between these two 
individuals.  In the very few disagreements that did take place either on the safety walks or in the 
OHS committee meetings, such disagreements were primarily between other members of the 
walk with either or both the OHS representative and the site manager.  It was noticeable that on 
these few occasions, either one of them (that is the OHS representative or the site manager) 
would very quickly jump to the other’s defence.  This sometimes appeared to isolate other 
members on the safety walk and the OHS committee.  On some occasions, it appeared that the 
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commitment and cooperation displayed by the OHS representative and the site manager towards 
one another, may have been to the detriment of the other members on the safety walk and OHS 
committee.  Indeed, the thoughts and opinions of the other members of the OHS committee may 
not have always been given the objective hearing that they perhaps deserved, especially when 
those opinions or thoughts tended to contradict those of either the site manager or the OHS 
representative.  However, when it came to including the OHS representative in more strategic and 
influential OHS discussions and decision-making forums, such as OHS matters in relation to 
programming or the timing of the works on the project, the site manager of the Reactive 
Company made it clear that the OHS representative played no part in such discussions, ‘… the 
program is generally discussed in a separate forum, totally separate…’.   
 
The project manager of the Calculative Company appeared to display levels of commitment and 
sincerity not only to the concept of consultation, but also to the philosophy of Hudson’s (2003a) 
evolutionary safety culture model, even though this may not have been his intention: ‘… it’s the 
mind shift of people and it’s the evolution of us, you know being more aware of our, I guess our 
requirements as human beings to look after each other…’.  The following statement from the 
project manager of the Calculative Company also demonstrated his personal commitment to 
attempt to keep the process of consultation amenable and receptive: ‘…to just keep that line of 
communication open, I mean I tend to operate on a very open door policy, you know, I mean 
managers who keep a very closed door says to me that you don’t want to communicate to 
people…’. 
 
When questioned about why he thought consultation occurred on the project, the site manager of 
the Proactive Company stated:‘… because it works, and you know… I like the system, the system 
works, and it works well...’.   The OHS representative of the Proactive Company also appeared to 
be committed to the overall concept of consultation, especially when it came to the feedback 
mechanisms of what occurred and what issues were being discussed on site: ‘… the feedback 
mechanism is me… and I think that I get back and tell people, and I think that I’ve got the 
experience enough to know that if people have got concerns over what they’re doing…  if people 
bring up a concern over what they’re doing, then I’ll make sure that I get back to them, what 
we’ve done to fix it up… that’s part of the role of a full time rep, you’re walking around the job, 
‘hey boys, ya understand? … ya know what I mean?...’. 
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However, the OHS representative of the Proactive Company did believe that there was sometimes 
a lack of commitment by management, based upon what he described as:‘…based upon being 
f…...g antagonistic at times…’. This, in his opinion, was the cause of most breakdowns in the 
consultation process on the project.  However, overall, the OHS representative appeared to 
support the approach the company took on consultation claiming that : ‘…Look the reality is that, 
I’d say… that consultation does occur… in a fairly effective way, they call ya, the phone calls 
come in, and you’re gone…’.   Indeed, the OHS representative believed he had the full support 
and commitment of management, including the right to invite other third parties such as trade 
unions onto the site for OHS advice; ‘…Yeah, oh yeah, there’s no worries there…’.  The OHS 
representative did believe however, that the company too often waited and then reacted to issues, 
failing to apply their own principles of consultation before issues and adverse events occurred: 
‘…even though it’s got the potential to be a dangerous thing, until something really happens, 
people tend to be “oh yeah we’ll do that we’ll do this”, but when it happens, until it really 
happens, that’s when they really f…..g jump…’.  The OHS representative of the Proactive 
Company always appeared to take his role very seriously and appeared to show great 
commitment and sincerity on all safety walks and in the OHS committee meetings.  He never 
appeared to trivialize or downplay the importance of any OHS issue that was raised or identified.   
 
If the solving of OHS issues or problems is predicated upon the notion of consultation, then the 
commitment of the Generative Company site manager in addressing OHS issues or matters 
without delay and having the issues rectified in the best possible manner, is evident from the 
following passage.  The site manager stated: ‘…basically just demonstrating to the guys, this is 
how we are fixing these issues…every problem has the same enthusiasm to fix the problem 
applied from all aspects… Every problem has been given the same opportunity to be fixed in the 
quickest manner, in the best possible manner to achieve the best outcome, so I don’t think anyone 
or any aspect is put to the side for another…’. 
 
The OHS representative of the Generative Company believed that commitment was required not 
just for consultation, but also for overall safety on the job: ‘…we don’t want an incident to 
happen here, we want to try and prompt things, so we’re one step ahead of an incident happening 
on the job …’.  This prompting and looking for trouble and staying a step ahead is emblematic 
and reflective of how a generative company under the Hudson (2003) model of organisational 
maturity should conduct itself.  The OHS representative also believed both his and the company 
commitment to consultation ran parallel with good levels of OHS: ‘…I’ve never had someone say 
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‘no, it’s (consultation) not going to happen’.  But then again, I’m reasonable too.  I don’t go to an 
extreme, I understand everyone’s got a job to do, let’s do it smarter not harder alright?  But the 
outcome is safety…’. 
 
The commitment of the Generative Company was described by the site manager not only in terms 
of the time they are given to look at the OHS issues whenever and where ever they deem 
necessary, but also in how he continually engaged in consultation not only with the OHS 
representative, but also the workers in general;‘…the time they (the company) give us is quite 
good; because we’ve got two OHS guys plus myself and my foremen (sic).  We’re constantly 
looking for it, we’re constantly assessing what we’re doing as we move through the project and 
as we’ve seen, small issues are squashed before they become big issues is probably the best way 
to describe it and the people I’ve got…it is continuous, there is four of us continuously 
monitoring it… being the site manager you have to, it’s your job… the consultation here is 
ongoing… day in day out, I’ve made it very clear to the guys here that my phone is always on if 
there is an issue… they can always ring me…’. 
 
The OHS representative of the Generative Company appeared to believe in both the company and 
in particular the site manager’s commitment and sincerity to the process of 
consultation;‘…they’re upfront with me, and it’s beautiful, I’ve never had this on a job before...’, 
and ‘… he embraces whatever I’ve got to say, whatever I’ve got to do, he gives me 100 per cent 
support, which is very refreshing…’.  The OHS representative further claimed that the site 
manager had: ‘… made my life a lot easier, I support him he supports me one hundred and fifty 
per cent, I’ve got no issues with him, everything I ask for on a safety issue – no problem, not a 
problem…’.   
 
 
5.3.2 Commitment during safety walks and OHS 
committee meetings 
The Pathological Company site safety walks were generally undertaken by the most senior 
management representative of the company (nominated by the project manager to attend the 
safety walk), the OHS representative and depending upon who was on site at the time, two or 
three other workers from various trades or subcontractors from the project.  After attending and 
observing numerous safety walks with the group, it appeared that there were only limited 
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opportunities for the OHS representative and the other employee representatives on the safety 
walk and the OHS committee, to have any type of constructive input into matters of OHS on the 
project.  While no individual ever indicated that they had an issue or problem with the way the 
safety walk or the OHS committee was run, their silence and almost total compliance and 
agreement to virtually everything that the senior management representative said or proposed, 
would seem to be a rather unusual occurrence in the industry.   
 
While the project manager of the Pathological Company did not personally attend or participate 
in any of the safety walks during the observation periods, he did claim to sporadically attend the 
walks, but only when he deemed it necessary to do so.  According to the OHS representative of 
Pathological Company, the project manager’s presence on the safety walks was extremely rare.   
 
On one particular safety walk, where a young trainee manager was in attendance, the OHS 
representative of the Pathological Company took a much more active role and displayed a greater 
level of commitment and responsibility than he had shown in other previous walks.  The OHS 
representative appeared to take the younger and less experienced manager under his wing and 
proceeded to lead the walk.  This was something that he had not done on previous occasions.  The 
OHS representative was also observed describing to the junior trainee manager many of the OHS 
issues or problems on the site, suggesting a range of possible solutions to them. 
 
Part of the role and responsibility of this trainee manager was to conduct all the site safety 
inductions to all new workers who would work on the site.  However on the safety walk, it 
became apparent that the young manager was clearly struggling to grasp many of the basic and 
fundamental OHS concepts and issues to do with the commercial and industrial construction 
industry.  The OHS representative of the Pathological Company was not invited or allowed to 
participate in the site safety inductions, nor was he given the opportunity to introduce himself to 
any of the new workers in this forum.  This would appear to be a rather unconventional and 
slightly unorthodox approach for a company to take, in light of the apparent limited knowledge 
and experience of the junior manager and the OHS knowledge and skill that was readily available 
and accessible, via the OHS representative, to the company. 
 
The OHS representative of the Reactive Company always took a leading role on their weekly site 
safety inspections and during any discussions on the safety walk.  Unlike the Pathological 
Company, the site manager of the Reactive Company attended every safety walk.  During one 
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observation period, the site manager of the Reactive Company invited a junior supervisor of the 
company to participate in the walk.  Similar to the OHS representative of the Pathological 
Company, the OHS representative of the Reactive Company made a point of taking the young 
supervisor under his wing, playing an almost mentoring role in terms of pointing out OHS 
matters, advising on what to look for and suggesting general OHS solutions.  The site manager 
also displayed similar traits towards the junior/trainee manager.  Indeed, the three of them were 
observed engaging in close up and in-depth discussions over many OHS issues that were 
identified on the walk, almost to the exclusion of the other members of the group, who sometimes 
appeared somewhat disinterested during this particular period. 
 
In explaining who actually chaired their site OHS committee meetings and how the company 
empowered the OHS representative to have some influence in the running of the forum and 
ultimately, the OHS decision making process that occurred on site, the OHS representative of the 
Reactive Company stated that:  ‘… the chair’s actually got to be … [name of site manager], that’s 
from our federal government advisors.  I was actually chairperson at the last job, but I’ve been 
told otherwise
19
, and just from a federal government point of view, they want the boss on the job, 
so yeah, on the last job I was the chairperson, and use to run it, but not here…”.   
 
The OHS Representative of the Calculative Company believed all parties were committed to the 
decisions made by the OHS committee after going through the process of consultation, stating 
that: ‘… No one will override it because it’s a safety committee decision,…  it’s good that no one 
tries to overrule the safety committees’ decisions…’.  This arguably demonstrated how important 
it was to the OHS representative of the Calculative Company that the company and the project 
manager were committed to the OHS committee decisions, and would not try to change or veto 
the decisions of the committee.  
 
The senior management representatives of the Calculative Company chaired every OHS 
committee meeting and lead every site safety walk.  However, it should be noted that both the 
chairing of the meetings and the conduct of the safety walks were never conducted in any type of 
autocratic manner or fashion.  Rather, they were run or managed in a very open, friendly and 
                                               
19
 At the time of writing, the OHS Act 2004 (Vic) did not stipulate or mandate who can or cannot chair a 
workplace OHS committee.  The federal government advisors as referred to by the OHS representative, 
refers to the Australian Building and Construction Commission (ABCC), established under the auspices of 
the Australian Federal Government in October 2002, initially known as the Building Industry Taskforce, 
later to become the ABCC in October 2005.   
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affable style, with the manager and the OHS representative appearing to share the responsibility 
of leading or directing the safety walk.  Indeed on one particular safety walk, the OHS 
representative of the Calculative Company called all participants together, which in effect was the 
entire safety committee, to discuss the highly relevant OHS topic in the Australian construction 
industry, of the hazards and risks of working in extreme heat.   
 
On this particular day, it had been forecast to be a very hot and sweltering 40 degrees Celsius.  
With powerful and swirling northerly winds, it was rapidly approaching this temperature.  In the 
author’s experience, such adverse climatic conditions can often cause highly contentious and 
unnecessary conflict and controversy on many construction sites.  The OHS representative 
presented his arguments of the risks and hazards associated with working in such extreme 
temperature in a very structured and articulated manner.  The senior management representative 
on the safety walk listened carefully and attentively, appearing to thoughtfully weigh up and 
consider all the arguments put forward by the OHS representative.  While the management 
representative raised a number of questions and asked for clarification on a number of issues, his 
commitment and respect towards the OHS representatives’ ideas and his attentive and carefully 
listening was clearly evident.  The manager and the OHS representative then asked the rest of the 
OHS committee for their thoughts and ideas on the subject.  After considering all the various 
opinions, questions and comments, the entire committee agreed with the recommendations and 
proposals initially suggested by the OHS representative of the Calculative Company.   
 
The Proactive Company generally appeared to be committed to the process of consultation, 
although whether this level of commitment was solely due to a company policy, as opposed to 
any personal or individual commitment, remained unclear.  For example, in terms of the OHS 
committee meetings, in answering a question about who sets the agenda for the meetings, the site 
manager of the Proactive Company claimed that:‘…we virtually have a standing agenda… that’s 
the …[name of Company] policy, and that’s what we do…’.  This seemed to suggest that the 
OHS representative of the Proactive Company exerted little, if any influence over the meeting in 
terms of its time frame or agenda.  However, the agenda or pro-forma of how the committee 
meetings were structured did not appear to adversely affect or bother the OHS representative, 
who never indicated or showed any inclination towards wanting to be involved in either the 
setting of the meeting agenda, or the chairing of the meeting itself.   
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The site manager of the Proactive Company was very open and honest about the fact that he did 
not go to the OHS committee meetings very often, usually attending only when requested.  In his 
words: ‘…I’ll randomly drop in, I would think that I would probably sit in you know, as I said 
I’ve probably only been in one…since the job… ah, but as the job gets bigger I’ll probably go in 
at least once a month, and um, that’s the reason why we employ experienced site safety 
supervisors now. Previously we would have done it with a younger engineer, as a learning 
experience for them to understand the process of occ (sic) health and safety, but now as we 
employ, on larger projects, experienced occ (sic) health and safety people, they’ve got a tendency 
then to take ownership of that role … and if I’m there all the time they’ll lose control of it, and 
everybody will come to me which is not what we want’.   
 
While the site manager of the Generative Company also did not attend every site safety walk, he 
was always present at all the site OHS committee meetings.  The OHS representative was the 
person who always led the site safety walks, with a management representative substituting for 
the site manager when he did not attend the walks himself.  The OHS representative always 
chaired the OHS committee meetings and there always appeared to be a great deal of 
commitment and respect between all the participants on the committee and what the committee 
was trying to achieve.  While they may have disagreed on many issues and often entered into 
debate, which was frequently vigorous and lively, the participants on the OHS committee always 
allowed each other the time to challenge any alternate views, while at the same time always 
appearing to acknowledge the different opinions. 
 
 
5.3.3  Commitment to OHS documentation 
The OHS policy of the Pathological Company was on display on the site notice board located 
within the site amenity complex.  The OHS representative claimed that he had not had any input 
into the policy contents, even though the policy affirmed employee involvement in all facets of 
the OHS decision making process.  The OHS policy also made reference to and indeed promoted 
the importance of active and ongoing employee communication and training.  While there was a 
stated commitment to work organization and planning in the policy document, there was no 
reference to the involvement of OHS representatives or employees within such processes.  The 
site specific OHS induction documentation of the Pathological Company did make reference to 
the availability of the elected OHS representative to assist in OHS matters if required.  However, 
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according to the OHS representative, the term ‘assist’ remained open to interpretation and it 
appeared to be a rather contentious issue for the OHS representative.   
 
The OHS policy of the Reactive Company recognized and made direct reference to the valuable 
input that workers make in contributing to high levels and standards of OHS.  Such a statement 
arguably provides a framework upon which to launch a range of strategies that could increasingly 
engage and involve workers and their OHS representatives, in the endeavour to achieve these 
higher OHS standards.  However during this research, it became apparent that in terms of the 
direct involvement of the OHS representative in making or contributing to any type of major and 
or influential OHS decision making forums within the company, such a process was yet to be 
fully realised. 
 
When first joining the organisation, every new employee of the Reactive Company, both 
management representatives and construction workers, are given a copy of the comprehensive 
OHS management system of the company.  The system is upgraded annually and includes the 
company OHS performance plans, targets and mandatory management training courses, which 
must be attended by all management staff.  Interestingly, there was no reference to any such 
mandatory training requirements for any of the construction workers or OHS representatives of 
the company in the OHS management system. 
 
The level of detail and the sheer volume of the Reactive Company OHS management system 
arguably provided some evidence of their commitment to OHS and through this, the process of 
consultation.  However, there appeared to be a distinct lack of involvement and input by any of 
the company OHS representatives into the system itself or in its auditing and review.  This was 
later confirmed by the OHS representative, when he claimed that he had had no input into any of 
the company OHS policies or procedures, nor was he involved in any type of auditing process on 
the compliance of the safety management system. 
 
The OHS policy and mission statement of the Calculative Company were openly displayed in the 
site amenity complex, together with a number of other OHS posters, flyers and general OHS 
information sheets.  Much of this information appeared to take on an explanatory and educational 
role, as well as a promotional function, regarding issues such as accidents and incidents, injury 
hotspots and injury statistics specifically related to the site. 
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The sheer volume of OHS documentation in and around the Proactive Company site appeared to 
provide evidence of their commitment to OHS.  The documentation included the company OHS 
policies, procedures and flow charts for different work processes, detailed information on workers 
compensation entitlements and how the different OHS structures established within the company 
operated.  All this information was also contained within the company OHS management system.  
However, the OHS representative claimed to have had no input into the design, content or review 
or auditing of the system. 
 
Rather than having a stand-alone OHS management system, which all the other companies who 
took part in this project had, the Generative Company OHS management system was contained 
within the site specific management plan.  According to the site manager, each construction site 
of the company was required to have a site specific management plan as part of their OHS pre-
commencement documentation requirements.  This effectively meant that the OHS policy and 
procedures of the company were directly incorporated within the operational structure of the 
project itself.  This is somewhat similar to the approach described by Hudson (2003a), when 
discussing the operations of a typical Generative organisation.  Interestingly, no one from the 
Generative Company on this particular site appeared to have heard of the Hudson model.  Further 
investigation revealed that as an organisation, the company was also unfamiliar with the overall 
concept of organisational and cultural maturity.   
 
The OHS representative from the Generative Company stated that he had not had any input into 
the OHS management system.  Indeed, he appeared largely unaware of the site specific 
management plan until it was shown to him by the researcher.  Upon further investigation with 
the site manager, it became apparent that the OHS representative was welcome to a copy and he 
was encouraged, by the site manager, to comment on its overall content and relevance to the 
project.  However this opportunity was only afforded to the OHS representative upon his specific 
request. 
 
 
5.3.4  Commitment to OHS training 
None of the safety management systems of the five construction companies appeared to 
adequately address or assist the level of OHS knowledge of construction workers or the OHS 
representatives.  There was no evidence provided to suggest that organisational resources were 
used to positively identify where improvement of OHS knowledge may be required, or indeed 
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where employees may have wanted specific training in terms of OHS.  This may have more to do 
with the safety management system itself, rather than the overall organisational philosophy, but it 
was an area that some of the OHS representatives felt strongly about.  According to the OHS 
representative of the Pathological Company, the company does not actively pursue or encourage 
employee OHS training.  Indeed, it was his opinion that it was more a case of an OHS 
representative or individual worker having to ask for or request specific OHS training.  He 
claimed that this would then occur, however only on the proviso that the training was deemed 
relevant and necessary by the company.   
 
This type of approach appeared to be common throughout all the companies utilised in this 
project, regardless of their deemed level of organisational and cultural maturity.  The 
management representatives who participated in the project generally appeared either unaware of 
the OHS training requirements of their organisation, or only made reference to managerial 
training options, as opposed to any type of training for construction workers or OHS 
representatives. 
 
 
5.3.5  Commitment to site safety toolbox meetings 
The site safety toolbox meetings appeared to be a common phenomenon used by all five 
companies as a means to communicate OHS messages to the site.  Many of the participants 
claimed that these toolbox meetings provided a positive forum for workers and employers to 
discuss and engage in consultation over OHS.  According to the OHS documentation of the 
Pathological Company, the toolbox meetings form an important component of their consultation 
obligations and procedures as stipulated in their OHS management system.  However the project 
manager of the Pathological Company questioned the value and effectiveness of this type of 
forum stating: ‘… I wonder whether the guys on the tools really have any say on the outcomes of 
these discussions, whether there’s any support for this?...’. 
 
The approach to consultation during the toolbox meetings of all the companies, with the 
exception of the Generative Company, appeared to be more focused on communicating a message 
or messages, as opposed to engaging in a full and frank discussion and debate prior to any OHS 
decisions being made or undertaken.  Other than the Generative Company, at all of the toolbox 
meetings there was an initial report given to the site by the nominated senior management 
representative.  The report generally consisted of what had been identified on the safety walk 
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(held on the previous day) as being unsafe, what had to be done to have the items rectified, who 
was deemed responsible for carrying out the rectification or safety work and when it was required 
to be completed.  Perhaps the only slight variation to this procedure was that on some occasions, 
it was the OHS representative of the Reactive Company who sometimes read the report out to the 
site.  Regardless of the detail, on the majority of occasions, there was little interaction or input, 
either positive or negative, from the general workforce during these meetings.  It should also be 
noted that in the OHS committee meetings and toolbox meetings of both the Calculative and the 
Proactive Companies, a report was also given by the management representatives of what works 
were coming up in terms of the program, and the potential impact this may have on levels of OHS 
in and around the project.  The reports were generally fully supported and endorsed by the OHS 
representatives.   
 
In contrast to this, the site safety toolbox meetings conducted by the Generative Company were 
somewhat different.  The Generative Company OHS representative chaired and ran the toolbox 
meetings by himself, ably assisted by the site shop steward.  The site safety toolbox meetings of 
the Generative Company were not generally attended by any management representatives and the 
meetings were used to discuss and debate, as opposed to merely communicating to the workers, 
the OHS issues that were identified on the safety walk.  The toolbox meetings of the Generative 
Company appeared to allow the OHS representative or any of the site workers, to raise and 
discuss any other OHS issues that they deemed important at that particular point in time.  There 
never appeared any time limits on these meetings, and all the workers who attended these 
meetings seemed extremely enthusiastic to attend and appeared to actively engage in the 
discussions to such an extent, that on some occasions some very robust and rowdy debates took 
place.  The exchanges of such different opinions appeared to be greeted with great enthusiasm 
and enjoyment by all participants, which then appeared to unite the workers in a common goal to 
improve the levels and performance of OHS on the site. 
 
The Generative Company was the only company who allowed the OHS representative to run the 
toolbox meetings without attendance from any management representatives.  This appeared to 
give workers the freedom and confidence to unreservedly express their thoughts and ideas 
without any potential repercussions from any management representatives.  It appeared that the 
site manager of the Generative Company also saw these forums as a means and opportunity to 
report back to the workers, via the OHS representative, about the events and issues that 
specifically related to the site.  The site manager of the Generative Company emphasised the 
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importance that he placed on these weekly site safety toolbox meetings, claiming that: ‘…I think 
the tool box meetings on Fridays just emphasizes it… how committed or emphatic we are in just 
making this a safe site and its raised every Friday, the one thing that we want from this site is it 
to be a safe site, and for everybody to go home of a night time…’. 
 
 
5.3.6  Commitment to the involvement of third parties 
It was interesting to observe and note the different approaches and opinions of the participants, 
when it came to the issue of third party involvement on matters to do with OHS on the sites.  This 
was especially so when the third party was nominated as the trade union.  The project manager of 
the Pathological Company explained that if a trade union official wanted to enter or access the 
site, the official would be required to provide what the project manager described as ‘… his (sic) 
legal right of entry (permit) …’.  The project manager was adamant that this requirement was to 
be strictly adhered to, even if the official was invited onto the site by the OHS representative, or 
simply whether the trade union official wished to enter the site to merely provide OHS advice and 
information directly to the OHS representative.  The issuing of an invitation to any person, whom 
the OHS representative wishes to assist them over matters to do with OHS, is currently a legal 
entitlement that the OHS representative has under Victorian OHS legislation. 
 
No such restrictions or barriers were imposed by the Pathological Company project manager 
upon other third parties, such as consulting engineers or other independent OHS consultants 
entering the site or project.  The project manager of the Pathological Company claimed that it was 
a company policy, as well as his own personal preference, to apply an invitation-only procedure 
when it came to trade unions visiting their sites.  He further explained that the company only 
approved and tolerated trade union assistance in matters of OHS if they, that is the trade unions, 
came onto the site to only look at one issue at a time, and then preferably only if they gave prior 
notice of the specific reasons for their intended visit. 
 
Interestingly, the project manager of the Pathological Company went on to give an example of 
where a trade union official had come onto his site uninvited and without giving prior notice.  The 
official conducted a site inspection with the OHS representative, greatly assisting in the pre-
empting and providing of control solutions to a potential problem that the site management team 
had failed to previously identify, which, in the project managers’ opinion, could have resulted in 
serious OHS implications.  The project manager stated that the trade union official ‘…was right, 
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we should have been doing more’.  The project manager then went on to state that ‘…our issue is 
that we’re code compliant on all federal government jobs, the union rep has no right of entry on 
this site.
20, so that’s always a point of tension, is he coming on for industrial issues…?’.   
 
The OHS representative of the Pathological Company believed that the project manager and the 
company in general were very wary of the trade union visiting their sites.  Indeed, the OHS 
representative believed that the project manager was only committed to outside or third party 
assistance up to a point; that point being under the strict guidelines and under the control and pre-
approval of the project manager and the company: ‘… they’ve already told me… so long as it’s 
only the issue that they’re (the trade union) coming to address, and that’s the only issue…’.   
 
The Reactive Company OHS representative appeared very committed to include all relevant 
parties in discussions over OHS ‘… just get everyone involved who’s doing the works… they’ve 
got ideas that they’ll come up with…utilize their knowledge… I’m willing to explore… explore 
other avenues… listen to other contractors and what they’ve got to say… we’ve all got to be 
involved… I mean everyone’s got to be involved in the JSA processes… you know have an 
input… we welcome anyone to come onto the job at any stage and have a look… I’d like to think 
that we listen to everyone’s opinion… we get anyone that we can, the more the better, and the 
more experienced the better…’.   
 
While this may reflect a very inclusive approach, at least on behalf of the OHS representative in 
terms of the day-to-day OHS issues, when it came to the inclusion of third parties in the site OHS 
decision-making process, it appeared that the site manager was bound by the policy of the 
Reactive Company.  This primarily required the involvement of the company OHS manager, 
prior to any major OHS site decisions being made over what the company called high risk work.  
While the site manager provided no explicit objection to third party involvement over OHS, the 
company OHS management plan appeared to be based upon an in-house or company approach, 
rather than obtaining outside advice or intervention over OHS matters. 
 
The project manager of the Calculative Company appeared to approve, if not altogether welcome, 
the idea or concept of third party advice and involvement over OHS when required, but 
                                               
20 While there are certain procedures and OHS legislative requirements and industrial relation protocols to 
follow, at the time of writing, there was no OHS legislation requirement in Victoria that prevents an 
authorized trade union official from entering a construction site without the need to give prior notice to the 
employer, if they have a reasonable suspicion or concern over suspected breaches of OHS legislation.   
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considered it pertinent to firstly have a discussion with the OHS representative to verify and 
justify why any third party involvement was required: ‘…if that was required, then you know, 
there should be a discussion about it before hand to say, hey look, I’d like to get this person 
involved…’.  On one particular occasion during the site observation periods, a senior trade union 
official did attend the site to specifically talk to the OHS representative and the other employee 
members on the safety committee about a particular site-safety issue.  The official did this 
without any prior notification or discussion taking place.  However, the project manager appeared 
to warmly and positively embrace the senior trade union official addressing not only the 
employee representatives, but invited the trade union official to address the entire OHS 
committee.  Indeed, the recommendations or suggestions made by the trade union official were 
fully and unanimously endorsed by the OHS committee, then later reinforced by the project 
manager in his discussions with the committee.   
 
The OHS representative of the Calculative Company felt very strongly about the importance and 
benefits of third party involvement and the issue of inclusiveness over OHS matters: ‘…I make a 
point of listening to the experts doing the job… , whoever’s doing the job, whether it’s a rigging 
job or whatever… we listen to them …I reckon just listening to the blokes…  you just can’t have 
too many eyes when it comes to safety, so everyone, or whoever’s got an input speaks, you listen 
to everyone, and you take it from there…’  Such statements would appear to indicate a 
willingness, at least on behalf of the OHS representative, to fully utilize the knowledge and skill 
of those workers who are entrusted to do the job.  He also believed that the site OHS committee 
operated on a very fair and equitable basis with the full support of third party involvement if and 
when required: ‘…we’re all equals, we all see each other as equals, we all participate as equals, 
we’re all the same.  We all participate as equals, everyone is on the same level… we pick 
someone out, who we want on the safety committee and like I said, if someone came up to us and 
had some really valuable information and wanted to jump in, we wouldn’t stop ‘em from 
attending…  Mostly it’s just us blokes on the safety walk… but we wouldn’t stop anyone who 
wanted to attend it…’.  Such sentiments also appear to reinforce the OHS representative’s 
appreciation, recognition and willingness to include any potential input and information that is 
available within the knowledge and skill base contained within the workforce.   
 
In terms of the OHS representative seeking and obtaining third party advice and assistance in 
matters to do with OHS, the site manager of the Proactive company claimed that:  ‘…we’d never 
stop that from happening, we’d like to have the understanding that we’d need to know about it, 
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but if one of the parties want to bring someone in because they’re more experienced on an item or 
an issue we wouldn’t have a worry in the world.  In the same instance, I know on other projects 
I’ve been in, I’ve brought WorkSafe in to work through an item…’.  The Proactive Company site 
manager also appeared to be committed to the concept of inclusiveness in consultation not just 
with the OHS representative, but with all members of the safety committee: ‘…it’s a case of 
sitting down and working through…  having a broad range of people involved in the safety 
committee…’.  The site manager also appeared to warmly welcome any outside or third party 
assistance: ‘…we’ll bring WorkSafe in, or we bring in our own management who may have more 
experience, or whether we bring in anything from outside…’. 
 
It appeared that the OHS representative of the Proactive Company was also not adverse or fearful 
of gaining different opinions from a wide range and diverse group of OHS stakeholders.  
However, he did consider that some opinions have more influence and carry more weight than 
others, especially on site: ‘…there are certain things that we’ll take other people’s opinion on in 
a bit more consideration, depending on the severity of the incident… of course people’s opinions, 
compared to other’s opinion, tend to take over, …and override the thing compared to other 
peoples, I mean I wouldn’t say everyone’s equal, I wouldn’t think that would happen anywhere in 
any forum…’.  The OHS representative would not however divulge who or where this increased 
influence came from, but he did appear very committed to the idea of inclusiveness when it came 
to obtaining the best possible OHS solutions, stating that: ‘…if someone can show you a different 
way and you can go well ok, I didn’t think of that, as a group, you know, that’s what it’s 
about…”.   
 
The OHS representative from the Generative Company was complimentary about commitment 
from an unusual source not normally associated with the industry; ‘…and I can tell you 
commitment from the actual developer… they have given me one hundred and fifty per cent 
support…’.  While the OHS representative felt this commitment and support helped improve both 
the safety and productivity on the site, there was no clear evidence that it actually influenced or 
affected the level or quality of consultation or levels of OHS on the site.  However, the OHS 
representative strongly believed that the commitment from the developer, combined with other 
factors, all provided a solid foundation for both good quality consultation and good OHS 
practices ; ‘…obviously the foreman on site from …[name of Generative Company] have been put 
there for a reason, because they’ve got good people skills, they’re up front.  Same with the 
representation from the union.  It all combines, and so far so good….  I mean from the developer 
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giving me commitment, from the builder giving me commitment, all right the subbies sometimes 
they don’t give you the commitment, but overall the buck stops with me, if I’m not happy I let 
people know…’. 
 
The site manager of the Generative Company provided a glimpse of his commitment and support 
for inclusiveness over OHS, when he provided an example of how he conducted himself and how 
he expected others to approach OHS: ‘…if they [OHS representatives and workers] want to come 
and talk to me and there is an issue then no worries.  That’s the quickest way to fix it… if I see 
something, the same thing, I’m not one to keep it to myself, and just recently we found one of the 
sheds moving, only slightly, but I actually called up my OHS reps to run through it with them; 
how we’re gunna fix it, what we’re doing…, if everybody knows about it, if you’re not kind of 
trying to sort of do it behind closed doors, at least they know about it, you’re up front, if 
something goes wrong we are all aware about it and we’re working towards fixing it…’.   
 
The following statements, also made by the site manager of the Generative Company, appeared to 
reaffirm how inclusive he was when it came to involving and consulting others about ideas and 
solutions to OHS issues:‘…we do consider everyone’s opinion; we don’t just confine the 
discussions to the four of us to make the decision for the whole site.  I’ve never been one to do 
that, I trust the guys who work on the site, I do get them involved…’ and  ‘…everybody’s opinions 
are considered… how we’re gunna do it safely and how we’re gunna do it safely in a way that we 
can progress…, we need everybody’s input…’. 
 
Further evidence to this apparent willingness and enthusiasm to involve others in OHS matters 
came to light when the site manager of the Generative Company claimed: ‘…we’re intelligent 
people, if we can’t work through it then by all means let’s go the next step, let’s get a third person 
involved, … I’m part of the committee, I’m not obviously the whole committee, but my opinion is 
if we can work it out on site, then we’re happy to go that way, then you know, that’s what we’ll 
do, there has been mentioned that on some occasions we would like advice… I’m not adverse to a 
third party if we need it and it’s required then by all means, by all means and these guys are 
aware of that…’  
 
The OHS representative of the Generative Company also felt strongly about the concept of 
inclusiveness and in his opinion, fixing the OHS problems together, rather than by just one or two 
individuals trying to solve the problems was the way forward:‘…work out what’s right and 
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what’s wrong, how we’re gunna fix it and collectively fix the problem…’.  The OHS 
representative also believed that the inclusion of others and the utilization of the knowledge and 
skills of the workers who actually do the job, was invaluable in keeping the workplace safe: 
‘…I’ve never had any issues with a third party or a fourth party,… we get a critical part when 
we’re doing shutters, or we’re doing panels, and I like to get some expertise off the floor, the guys 
who are actually doing it… there’s never been an issue with that…’.   
 
 
5.4  Respect 
5.4.1  Respect in General 
For the purposes of this project, the attributes that are commonly associated with the concept of 
respect such as admiration, esteem and/or a polite or kind regard that is felt or shown towards a 
person or quality, generally appeared to be displayed by all participants towards one another, 
even when disagreement occurred over OHS.  When such disagreement occurred on his site, the 
project manager of the Pathological Company claimed; ‘…if the OHS rep stands his dig on 
something, which he has done, then he’ll have, he’ll call the tune.  He hasn’t had a lot of issues 
that we disagree on, I think it’s a pretty equal balance, I mean on a decision-making level…’.  
However, throughout the observation periods, the decision making process of the Pathological 
Company appeared to be a little less than equal.  Indeed, it seemed that in the majority of cases, it 
was more a case of decisions that had already been decided upon by management, being 
communicated to the OHS representative, as opposed to any type of engagement or discussion 
with the OHS representative prior to any decision/s being made or agreed to. 
 
And yet throughout his interview, the project manager of the Pathological Company was very 
candid in extolling the virtues and value of the overall knowledge, skills and experience of 
construction workers, and in their ability to know what is required to perform their work in a safe 
and healthy manner: ‘… sometimes they’re better at OHS issues than I am, so why should I try 
and do all the work when I know less …, and on JSA’s and things or on construction techniques, I 
rely on their expertise you know.  I’ve never driven a crane, there’s a lot of things I’ve never 
done, and there’s a lot of things they have done and they know what’s relevant…’.   
 
For his part, the OHS representative of the Pathological Company always displayed a respectful 
and overall calm demeanour, when it came to discussing OHS matters with the project manager 
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or the rest of the management team.  In his interview, he claimed that: ‘I don’t find a use for say 
screaming and yelling… I find if you just talk to them in a proper manner, they tend to respect 
that a bit more… you learn from them too you know… they don’t mind disagreeing, you know, 
and I don’t mind either, it’s good you know… I mean look they, they disagree and then we tend to 
talk about it…’.   
 
During the observation period of the Reactive Company, not one disagreement was recorded 
between the site manager and the OHS representative, over any of the OHS issues identified on 
the site safety walks or the suggested solutions to them.  The site manager of the Reactive 
Company stated: ‘… I respect that he [the OHS representative] knows what he’s doing, and I 
think he respects my ability as well…’.  He further demonstrated his respect towards the OHS 
representative by claiming that: ‘… if it’s an issue that I believe he’s a hundred per cent right on 
I’ll back him all the way, and that’s the important thing here, and I think it goes both ways…’.:  
 
The site manager of the Reactive Company also displayed a level of respect to those OHS 
representatives with construction industry knowledge and skill built up over a period of time in 
the industry, stating that: ‘… the best OHS reps are the ones who have been in the industry and 
who have worked as labourers and have seen what actually goes on…’.   
 
The OHS representative of the Calculative Company not only displayed qualities of respect, but 
also honesty towards the project manager and the process that they engaged in during 
consultation over OHS, claiming that: ‘…everything I see I report to him and vice versa, you 
know, he never tries to hide anything from me …’.  Similarly, the project manager of the 
Calculative Company appeared to reciprocate such sentiments, claiming that when it came to 
dealing with matters of OHS: ‘…… [the name of OHS Rep] and I have a good, open 
relationship…’.  There appeared to be genuine respect and a firm belief by both the project 
manager and the OHS representative of the Calculative Company in the role that consultation has 
both within the organisation and on the project.  In the opinion of the OHS representative, 
consultation was vital because: ‘…jeeze, how many blokes would have been injured if we didn’t 
have any consultation in place on this job…’.   
 
While the OHS representative and the senior management representatives of the Calculative 
Company did not always agree with each other’s opinions and or positions on particular OHS 
issues, they nevertheless listened and engaged in what appeared to be a positive and mature 
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approach, without any screaming and yelling or ranting and raving over the issues.  Such 
behaviour, according to the project manager, doesn’t assist in solving OHS issues: ‘… having a 
screaming match with somebody when they’re at their emotional peak… it just doesn’t play out 
for a good situation, because what would tend to happen is that it would start to get personal, 
which these issues don’t need to get to that level…’.  This seemingly calm and respectful 
approach by the project manager, was also reflected by the OHS representative in how he 
believed OHS was best handled on site:‘…we’ve got a professional relationship… especially 
when it comes to safety on the job… nothing’s a rush, you know, get it safe, no matter how long it 
takes, no rush, let’s just get it safe no matter how long it takes you know…’. 
 
When describing the different levels of expertise and experience that workers have, the site 
manager of the Proactive Company displayed great respect in acknowledging their valuable input 
into levels of OHS:‘… let’s hear from the people who know what they’re talking about… 
expertise and experience, yes, without a doubt… we’ve got all levels of people… I think it’s a 
fairly open, free and sometimes heated debate which is good…’.  The site manager also expressed 
his respect for the OHS representative, and indeed all the OHS representatives on the project and 
their contributions during consultation over OHS, stating that: ‘…the workers representatives, are 
very, very good… they understand the process…  they help us work through the process…’.   
 
The respect that the Generative Company site manager had for the OHS representative and the 
importance that he placed on the overall concept of consultation, was perhaps best demonstrated 
when he stated: ‘… if you lose that ability to be able to have that discussion between yourself and 
your rep, you’ve got major problems…’.  Such respect towards the concept of consultation and to 
the OHS representative was also extended to the other members of the site safety committee, in 
both their ability to identify and resolve OHS issues, when the site manager claimed: ‘…The guys 
we generally deal with are quite good, they have the ability, they’re all involved in safety, they all 
have the ability to foresee problems… in a lot of cases where there is a problem we get the job 
done as it should be done…’.   
 
But it is not just respect in how to do the job.  It is also the recognition of new ideas and how best 
to solve any OHS problems on the job, that participants believed was important.  Such new ideas 
are often generated from the workforce and the site manager from the Generative Company 
recognised this, stating that: ‘…the guys have come up with some really valuable comments that 
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have other ways progressed the site that have been outside the box I suppose is the best way to 
put it…’. 
 
The site manager of the Generative Company also demonstrated his respect for the workforce as 
individuals: ‘… I make it my business to go around and talk to people, get to know who they are, 
get to know who is on the site, at least that way they know that you’re not a brick wall, that 
you’re not just somebody who says that I’m management so just go away, so yeah, that’s the way 
I try and run my sites…’.  The OHS representative of the Generative Company showed a similar 
level of respect in his acknowledgement and recognition of the knowledge and skills contained 
within the workforce, stating that: ‘… I respect their knowledge and their skills, I’m not a bloke 
who’ll say you know, bugger you, it’s my way or the highway, I’ll take it all in…’.  The OHS 
representative of the Generative Company also displayed his respect for the site manager and to 
the process they go through in solving OHS issues on the job, claiming that: ‘…Any time I 
highlight a problem, I sit with management, and it’s done in a meeting form; sort out the 
problem, whatever management is gunna give me as their out, how to fix it, we agree, we 
disagree, we nut it out and we move on...’.   
 
A good example of this was demonstrated when the OHS representative and the site manager of 
the Generative Company sat down to discuss the timing of concrete pours and the problems of 
commencing them too late in the day, which sometimes resulted in the work continuing very late 
into the night before the pour was completed.  The OHS representative approached the site 
manager with the idea that if large concrete pours could not commence before 9-30am, they 
should be put off until the next day.  The concern by the OHS representative also reflected the 
trouble the company was having with many of the surrounding neighbours, who were 
complaining about the noise of large concrete trucks, concrete pumps and a bevy of rowdy 
workers working late into the night on such occasions.  The result of the OHS representative 
consulting with the site manager and raising the concerns, which had also been raised with the 
OHS representative by both workers and members of the local community, was that his 
suggestion was then adopted as a site policy.  This then forced the supervisors of both the 
Generative Company and their subcontractor, together with the site manager, to take a more 
considered look at how they were structuring the program of the project for the benefit of all 
parties.   
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5.4.2 Respect during safety walks and OHS committee 
meetings 
It appeared that the OHS representative and the project manager of the Pathological Company 
and indeed all the other members of their OHS committee, displayed a genuine level of respect 
and sincerity towards each other.  From non-participative observations, it appeared that they 
always listened to each other and never openly or aggressively argued with one another over 
decisions or the suggested control solutions to the OHS issues.  In the overwhelming majority of 
cases, there appeared to be general consensus with the OHS solutions, which were in the main 
part recommended by management representatives of the company.  However, the OHS 
representative appeared to have had little input or influence into the OHS decision-making 
process of the committee.   
 
On one particular safety walk, a work area was identified as having several OHS problems.  
Included in these were: materials and equipment scattered all over the floor, the area being 
extremely overcrowded with both workers and machines, the lighting was very poor in the area 
making it quite difficult to see and it generally appeared to be in an uncoordinated and 
uncontrolled state in terms of any type of management supervision and/or direction.  The OHS 
representative commented that he ‘… won’t have to do anything; just watch management go off 
their tree with this one …’.  However, rather than ‘going off their tree’, the management 
representative simply requested that the area be immediately tidied up.  He then waited until a 
few workers cleared a path through the area, and the safety walk continued unabated. 
 
On another occasion, it was observed that another particular work area or zone was once again 
extremely overcrowded, with large elevated work platforms working in and around workers with 
no delineation or separation between machines and workers and there appeared to be no general 
traffic management control over any of the machinery.  Welders were welding in and around 
other workers with no protective screens to provide protection against potential welding flashes 
and sparks, and there appeared to be a general sense of chaos and confusion of who was or was 
not allowed to work in the area.  The OHS representative once again leant over to a number of the 
participants on the safety walk and commented ‘… it’ll be interesting to see if … [name of 
management representative] stops them, they need to be stopped, it’s far too crowded and chaotic 
in there…’.  In this particular instance, the manager took no action at all and the work and the 
safety walk continued uninterrupted.   
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In both of the above examples, rather than stopping the work himself, which under the 
circumstances and the OHS legislation, the OHS representative would arguably have been legally 
entitled to do so, or at the very least raise his concerns with the management representative on the 
safety walk, the OHS representative waited for the manager to take action - action which the OHS 
representative had no input or influence into.  While the OHS representative appeared to respect 
the decision-making ability of the manager, it was unclear whether or not the OHS representative 
of the Pathological Company had the faith and confidence in his own ability, to influence and 
make any positive change to the work environment. 
 
The site manager and the OHS representative of the Reactive Company appeared to show genuine 
respect for each other in their ability to solve OHS issues in the best and most effective manner.  
There never appeared to be any type of disagreement or obvious argument between the site 
manager and the OHS representative over OHS or indeed the suggested solutions to OHS issues 
or problems that were identified.  The number of OHS issues or problems that were identified on 
the safety walk appeared to be equally divided or distributed between the two of them, and the 
suggested solutions were rarely if ever disputed regardless of who suggested them. 
 
Similar to both the Pathological and the Reactive Companies, while the OHS representative and 
the project manager of the Calculative Company appeared to genuinely believe in and respect the 
overall concept of consultation, the OHS representative neither chaired the OHS committee 
meeting, nor formally led the weekly site safety walks.  In fairness, the OHS representative 
showed neither disappointment about, nor any great inclination to chair the meetings, and he did 
on different occasions appear to informally lead and direct the safety walks.  Regardless of his 
different feelings and opinions towards the two senior management representatives, who shared 
and alternated the chairing of the OHS committee meetings and who officially led the safety 
walks, the OHS representative displayed a great deal of respect for the management 
representatives who it must be said, generally performed their functions in what appeared to be a 
very fair and unbiased manner.   
 
Both the project manager and the two senior managers on the OHS committee of the Calculative 
Company, appeared to respect the OHS representative’s viewpoints and opinions on all the OHS 
issues that he raised and championed.  That is not to say that there was always immediate 
agreement and endorsement between the parties, in fact, it was quite the contrary.  But their 
debates and discussions, while often undertaken in a fierce and robust style, were always 
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conducted in a relatively controlled manner, whereby each party listened to the other, not unduly 
interrupting and in general, respectfully disagreeing if they could not reach an agreement.  In such 
circumstances, where a decision had to be made, both parties appeared to try to reach an 
agreement that both would accept, while at the same time not compromising the minimum levels 
or standards of safety that were required in the circumstances. 
 
On the weekly site safety walks of the Proactive Company, the OHS representative always 
appeared very assertive and confident, often leading the walks, halting works in different areas if 
he deemed it necessary and generally appearing not afraid to make a controversial decision if and 
when he thought it appropriate.  All the members of the site OHS committee, both management 
and employee representatives, appeared to respect his approach and his OHS decision-making 
ability.   
 
The site manager of the Proactive Company rarely attended the OHS committee meetings or the 
site safety walks.  The chairperson of the site OHS committee was the site safety facilitator who 
was the most senior management representative on the committee and on the safety walk.  No one 
on the committee could recall whether the nomination of the chair was a company decision, or if 
it had been decided in consultation and discussion with the committee.  According to the OHS 
representative, there was no input or discussion by the safety committee about whether the 
appointment of the site safety facilitator to always chair the OHS committee meeting was 
appropriate, or whether another member of the OHS committee wished to chair the committee.  
However, no other employee member of the committee, or indeed the OHS representative 
himself, appeared very keen to take on the role of chairperson.   
 
In the OHS committee meetings of the Generative Company and on their site safety walks, the 
respective opinions and thoughts of both the site manager and the OHS representative always 
appeared to be put forward in a forthright yet respectful manner.  While each party always gave 
their version of what they deemed to be appropriate, or what they thought to be the main issue, 
both parties always display an enormous amount of respect for each other’s opinions.  They 
would always listen to the other person without interrupting and always gave each other the time 
to finish their respective arguments, before answering or giving their own version of what they 
believed occurred or should have occurred.   
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In terms of respecting the decisions of the site safety committee, the OHS representative of the 
Generative Company believed that : ‘…decisions made by the safety committee are respected and 
we have autonomy to do whatever we want, and it’s made very, very clear by our management… 
that safety is number one at all costs…’.   The site manager had a very similar view stating that: 
‘…the decisions that we make as a committee I think are on a whole, good decisions… everybody 
respects the decisions, everybody, obviously everybody abides by them, and that’s what keeps the 
site running…’.   
 
In allowing the OHS representative to chair both the OHS committee meetings and the site 
toolbox meetings, as well as carrying out the site safety inductions for all new workers, the site 
manager of the Generative Company arguably displayed a degree of respect to the OHS 
representative, that was perhaps not as evident, or as openly displayed by the other companies 
who took part in this project towards their own OHS representatives.  The site manager claimed 
that ‘… [name of OHS representative] chairs them, and it’s fed back to us… the guy’s very 
upfront, he doesn’t hold anything back which is good…, everything is put on the table, what’s 
been raised, yeah, it’s all brought up with us, it gives us a chance to rectify it…’. 
 
This was perhaps best demonstrated in one of the OHS committee meetings of the Generative 
Company, where a discussion took place over an OHS incident that had occurred on the site the 
day before.  At the time, the incident had resulted in a major stoppage of work.  The site manager 
very calmly gave his interpretation of the events and what he thought should have happened to 
avert the stoppage.  The OHS representative then responded with his interpretation of why the 
stoppage had occurred.  Both parties listened carefully to each other, not interrupting and 
allowing the other person to fully explain his version of the events.  While the discussion ended 
with what appeared to be respectful disagreement over the process of what had occurred, they 
nonetheless agreed over the fundamental OHS concerns that had led to the initial action being 
taken. 
 
In the attempt to better understand and unpack how the principles of trust, honesty, commitment 
and respect can contribute to the notion of meaningful and effective consultation, in terms of both 
the Victorian construction industry and within the construct of organisational and cultural 
maturity, the next chapter will utilize the ideas of both Lunt et al. (2008) and Cameron et al. 
(2006) in discussing the data that has just been presented. 
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Chapter 6 Discussion  
While all the participants in this project appeared to believe in and support the overall concept of 
consultation, indicating that they were committed to fulfil and abide by their legal obligations in 
relation to the implementation and execution of the process, the purpose of this project was not to 
determine whether such legal requirements were being complied with or otherwise.  Rather, this 
research project set out to explore how issues that are generally considered necessary for effective 
and meaningful consultation, in particular the principles or issues of trust, honesty, commitment 
and respect, were applied by OHS representatives and site or project managers of five different 
construction companies, who were deemed to have reached different levels of organisational and 
cultural maturity, during their consultation over OHS matters. 
 
A descriptive narrative of what occurred during the different stages of data collection and the key 
themes or ideas that were identified during both the data collection and the subsequent data 
analysis, was provided in Chapter Five.  The purpose of this chapter is to discuss these 
occurrences and key themes and ideas in more detail, in order to assist in the understanding of 
how the issues or principles were applied and whether or not the consultation could be considered 
to be meaningful and effective. 
 
In addressing the key themes and ideas, it was considered that the concepts that both Lunt et al. 
(2008) and Cameron et al. (2006) had identified as being useful in determining how meaningful 
and effective consultation can be, would be a suitable commencement point to begin this critique.  
These concepts are provided below, together with an explanation and meaning that both parties 
applied to them: 
 
1. The scope of issues covered: do the issues relate purely to physical hazards or do they 
extend to issues such as organisational management, safety culture, etc? 
2. The objectives in developing solutions to the issues: where do the solutions rank in the 
hierarchy of risk controls? 
3. The depth of understanding: this is specifically related to the concept of understanding 
accident causation. 
4. The scope of the solutions presented: this is similar to point two above, but dealing with 
whether the solutions are aimed at prevention, e.g. through design or if they are reactive. 
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5. The ability to transfer issues: this refers to the involvement of others and recognizing 
their sphere of influence when an issue needs action, especially by those without the 
authority of the immediate manager. 
 
In order to best represent and more accurately portray both the aims and the intellectual capital 
that this project was attempting to achieve and to underpin and provide a basis for this discussion 
chapter, it was decided to bring together and condense the above ideas and themes into a more 
compact, yet sufficiently robust group of three main subject matters.  Each one of the above five 
concepts or themes was directly considered in relation to this aspiration, focusing on and taking 
account of: (i) the environment that this project was conducted in, (ii) the participants who took 
part in the project and (iii) the main consultation forums that occurred during the project.  The 
results of this process are the three concepts that are set out below, together with the meanings 
that are applied to them, specifically for this project:  
 
1. The types of OHS issues that were discussed and consulted upon during the site 
safety walks, OHS committee meetings and safety toolbox meetings.   
 Did the issues reflect or relate to long term strategic OHS issues or 
troubleshooting and/or everyday minor OHS issues?   
 Did individuals trust each other enough to allow consultation to occur over long 
term and strategic OHS issues?   
 Was the display of trust by individuals reflective in the OHS issues that provided 
the basis of the consultation?   
 
 
2. The environment, duration and the participants’ contribution to the consultation.   
 Where did the consultations forums take place?   
 How much time was allocated or given to the forums? 
 What was the level or depth of the participants’ contributions during the 
consultation?   
 Were the principles or issues of trust, honesty, commitment and respect reflective 
in the environment and the duration of the consultation forums?   
 Did participants appear to be trusting, honest, committed and respectful towards 
each other during the consultation? 
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3. Third party involvement and assistance during consultation.   
 What role did third parties play during consultation, in particular the trade union 
of which the OHS representative was a member?
21
   
 Were individuals trusting of each other in allowing free and unhindered access to 
third party assistance?   
 Were participants honest with each other in their approach and/or opinion of such 
third party assistance?   
 Were individuals respectful of the right of others to seek and gain third party 
assistance? 
 
Using these three concepts, this chapter will discuss how each company, through the participation 
of their employees, was deemed to have performed during OHS consultation.  The levels of 
organisational maturity that each company was deemed to have reached, are carefully considered 
and taken account of in the interpretation of how the principles of trust, honesty, commitment and 
respect were applied by individuals during consultation over OHS. 
 
 
6.1 The types of OHS issues discussed during consultation 
The data revealed that all participants truly believed in the value and worth of consultation and 
indeed in the principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect.  However, the data also 
showed an often inconsistent approach in the application of these principles by the participants - 
especially by those individuals whose companies were considered to be at the lower end of the 
organisational maturity scale. 
 
The lack of involvement and input by any of the OHS representatives in what this research has 
described as strategic and influential OHS decision making forums, such as company OHS 
management systems, OHS policies and procedures, or in the timing of different scopes of work 
for the construction site, became evident during both the data collection and the data analysis.  
This lack of direct involvement by any of the OHS representatives in or during such processes or 
                                               
21 Trade unions, while perhaps not specifically involved in the original consultation forums over site specific OHS 
issues, are often called upon by OHS representatives to provide both advice and support to them during consultation 
(Quinlan 2009; Walters & Nichols 2006; Cameron et al. 2006).  Such assistance is enshrined in the Victorian OHS Act 
(2004).  As previously noted (see Section 1.8), the trade union is considered to have a large influence in the industry. 
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forums, occurred regardless of the level of organisational maturity that each company was 
deemed to have reached. 
 
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the OHS representatives appeared to have more of a 
subordinate or secondary role in terms of the OHS decision-making process, rather than 
participating in the consultation process as a genuine partner with quality and informative 
decision-making capabilities.  This suggests that the knowledge and skills of the five OHS 
representatives who participated in this project, which had been obtained and collated over quite a 
substantial period of time, involving both hands-on industry experience and in some cases, either 
trade and or/formal OHS qualifications, may not have been recognised, respected or indeed 
utilized by their organisations as effectively as perhaps they could have been. 
 
For example, data collected from the Pathological Company revealed that there were little if any 
discussions with the OHS representative over any major or substantial items or issues, which may 
have had OHS implications that were planned for the site.  Nor was the OHS representative 
involved in any type of discussions regarding the programming or timing of future works for the 
project.  Issues such as these appeared to be the sole responsibility, and remained very much the 
focus, of senior management personnel of the Pathological Company.  According to the project 
manager of the Pathological Company, programming and future works were only discussed by 
senior management personnel during the site program coordination meetings.  The OHS 
representative was not part of, or ever invited to participate in, these meetings.  This effectively 
meant that the ability of the OHS representative to influence and have input into more strategic 
OHS issues to do with both the site and within the organisation as a whole, appeared to be 
extremely limited.  According to the OHS representative, he had played no part in any strategic or 
high level OHS decision-making forums, either on the site or within the organisation.   
 
In general, the consultation over OHS issues between the Pathological Company project manager 
(or the senior management representatives on the project who were the main management 
representatives on the site safety walks and on the site OHS committee) and the OHS 
representative, primarily consisted of what Lunt et al. (2008) described as basic day-to-day and 
troubleshooting issues.  These issues generally involved site cleanup, the tidying up and 
maintaining of access ways, the wearing of particular pieces personal protective equipment 
(especially safety helmets) and the stacking and storing of equipment in and around the worksite.  
However, even in discussions over these types of issues, the OHS representative appeared to play 
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more of a secondary and supporting role in the final OHS decision making process.  The OHS 
representative rarely disagreed with the manager over any of the issues, or indeed in the 
suggested solutions to any of the problems. 
 
Similar to the Pathological Company, the majority of OHS issues that were identified and 
discussed on the Reactive Company site safety walks, were also primarily confined to the day-to-
day troubleshooting matters such as electrical leads on the ground, general site clean-up, 
improving and clearing access ways and the stacking and storing of materials on site.  It should be 
noted that while these are important matters in their own right, and highly relevant on a 
construction project, and while there appeared to be a genuine sharing of solutions with positive 
input into these matters by both the OHS representative and the site manager of the Reactive 
Company, longer term and arguably influential and strategic OHS issues such as planning, 
programming and the scope of works that were coming up for the project, appeared to remain 
very much the preserve and privilege of management.  The OHS representative appeared to have 
little if any input or influence into these OHS decision making forums.   
 
While the relationship between the site manager and the OHS representative of the Reactive 
Company appeared very trusting, honest and harmonious, the site manager always appeared to be 
very much in control and in charge of the final OHS decision-making process.  Indeed, according 
to the OHS representative, any proposed OHS decisions and control solutions for the project had 
to be firstly approved by the site manager, if they were to be implemented or applied on the 
project.  As mentioned earlier in Chapter Five, the Reactive Company would also involve their 
company OHS Manager to review and oversee any controversial or what they deemed to be high 
risk type work that was to be conducted on site.  In this type of consultation forum, the role of the 
OHS representative in the final decision making process appeared to be almost marginalised and 
engulfed within an organisational and managerial hierarchy.  This hierarchy primarily consisted 
of the site manager and the OHS manager being the key OHS decision makers on the site.   
 
Day-to-day troubleshooting issues once again appeared to be very much the focus of consultation 
between the OHS representative and the project manager of the Calculative Company.  The site 
management team did however inform the OHS representative and the rest of the OHS committee 
of any upcoming works and events that could or would have an impact upon levels of OHS on the 
site.  While there was rarely any opposition by the OHS representative or the rest of the OHS 
committee over the issues that were put forward by the management team, this may have been 
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due to the fact that each time upcoming works were discussed, they were always presented to the 
OHS representative and the OHS committee in a very thorough and thoughtful manner, with little 
doubt or controversy over how, when or where the works would be carried out.  This approach 
reflected the general attitude of the management team, who appeared to be quite meticulous in 
their planning, wanting to avoid any OHS issues or problems that may arise on the site.  This was 
a trait that the project manager appeared to have heavily emphasised with all his supervisors on 
the project. 
 
The project manager and the OHS representative of the Calculative Company appeared to have a 
very honest and open relationship with each other.  The project manager always took the time to 
have regular one-on-one discussions with the OHS representative over OHS issues.  Both the 
project manager and the OHS representative reported that these meetings were very beneficial, 
and it appeared that they both actively listened and strongly considered and welcomed each 
others’ opinions and points of view on all matters pertaining to OHS.  Such one-on-one 
discussions were never mentioned or indeed observed occurring on the Pathological Company 
site, nor did it appear that they were engaged in with as much enthusiasm and/or frequency on the 
Reactive Company construction site. 
 
The majority of the issues which appeared to form the greater part of the OHS consultation 
process within the Proactive Company also appeared to be concentrated on the day-to-day or 
troubleshooting and reactive type issues or events.  However, some of the issues that were 
consulted over could be described as influential in terms of the type of work to be carried out on 
the site.  Such issues included when the next concrete pour was to occur, or when the next large 
contingent of structural steel was to be delivered and erected on site, or even when the next large 
subcontractor was due to commence work on the site.  Overall, the discussions or consultation 
over such issues took place within the confines of the weekly site OHS committee meetings, 
rather than just between the site or project manager and the OHS representative. 
 
However, the discussions that took place over the above subjects appeared to be mainly for the 
information of the OHS representative and the other employee representatives on the OHS 
committee, rather than any engagement or invitation to openly enter into a debate or discussion 
over the timing or programming of the events.  On the occasions where there were discussions 
over such issues, there was never any indication that the OHS representative or the other 
employee representatives on the OHS committee would openly challenge the timing or the scope 
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of the works.  While the OHS representative was always kept informed of upcoming and future 
works that may or could impact upon levels of OHS on the site, the final decisions over such 
issues or any other type of strategic or high level OHS issues concerning the project, appeared to 
remain in the exclusive domain of the site manager and the management team.  The OHS 
representative claimed that he had played no part in the OHS management system of the 
company, nor had he had any role in any other high level or strategic OHS decision-making 
forums either within the company or on the site.  
 
The majority of the OHS issues that formed the basis of consultation between the site manager 
and the OHS representative of the Generative Company were also confined to what has 
previously been described as the day-to-day and troubleshooting type issues.  However, a major 
point of difference between the Generative Company and the four other companies that took part 
in this research, was that the OHS representative of the Generative Company appeared to be at 
the forefront of these discussions and the solutions to the issues or problems.  A further point of 
difference was that the OHS representative of the Generative Company was the only OHS 
representative out of the five OHS representatives, that was given the autonomy to chair the 
weekly site OHS committee meetings, the weekly site safety toolbox meetings and who also 
unambiguously and openly lead the weekly site safety walks.  There appeared to be a very 
trusting, honest and respectful relationship between the site manager and the OHS representative 
of the Generative Company, with both parties appearing to be genuinely committed to the process 
of meaningful and effective consultation.  However, even after all of this, the OHS representative 
still did not play any part in, nor had any input into the Generative Company OHS management 
system or any of their associated OHS policies.   
 
A noteworthy event which, while it occurred after the data collection phase of the project had 
finished, is perhaps worthy of inclusion in this discussion chapter.  During one of his many daily 
walks or inspections around the site, the OHS representative of the Generative Company noticed 
or observed a cantilevered precast concrete balcony, which was precariously situated over a main 
work area where workers were busily going about their daily business.  The balcony had slowly 
started to crack at the point of connection to the concrete slab, beginning to tilt and separate away 
from the slab.  The OHS representative immediately removed all workers from the area and had it 
isolated so no one could enter the immediate zone below the balcony and the surrounding zone up 
to an approximate distance of fifteen meters.  Immediately after making the scene safe and 
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securing the areas potentially affected, the OHS representative contacted the site manager about 
the issue.   
 
The resulting discussions revealed that the balcony was meant to have been further supported and 
propped to prevent such cracking and potential failure, with further works programmed to 
continue to strengthen it to ensure its structural integrity and full load capacity was reached.  
However, the programming of this work had been delayed and there appeared to have been no 
review process, nor had any person been allocated to take responsibility to ensure the 
programming of this particular scope of work was implemented as planned.  The site manager 
openly and honestly admitted the failings in this instance, and duly complimented the OHS 
representative on his actions and his forthright approach in avoiding a potential disaster or 
tragedy, then immediately set about having the situation safely rectified. 
 
The above example is given to demonstrate that value of this particular OHS representative’s 
knowledge and skill in the industry and in particular to this particular company, not only in terms 
of the day-to-day operations, but also the potential value of an OHS representative being involved 
in more strategic OHS decision-making forums such as the programming, timing and scope of 
works for the project.  And yet as far as we know, even after this incident occurred, the OHS 
representative was still not involved in or included in any company or site strategic OHS 
decision-making forums. 
 
Whilst all the OHS representatives who took part in this project attended all the site safety walks, 
OHS committee meetings and all the site safety toolbox meetings, none of them were involved in 
any higher level organisational OHS decision-making forums.  Nor did it appear that they had any 
input into their company OHS management systems or any of the associated OHS policies of 
their organisation.  The overwhelming majority of OHS issues that were discussed or consulted 
on with the OHS representatives, appeared to be concentrated and limited to the day-to-day 
operational procedures and reactive or troubleshooting events or activities that occur on the vast 
majority of construction projects, such as the wearing of personal protective equipment, electrical 
leads and electrical tools on the ground, the cleaning up and tidying or work areas and the general 
storage of materials in and around the site.   
 
Again, while such issues all have a part to play in the day-to-day safe operations and functions of 
a construction project, the affect that this might have on individuals participating in the weekly 
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site safety walks and in the general sphere of the site OHS consultation forums, has yet to be fully 
explored.  Interestingly, during the very last observation phase of this project, the OHS 
representative of the Pathological Company appeared to be almost completely disinterested and 
ambivalent to the events that were occurring around him and in his role on the site safety walk 
and the OHS committee.  Admittedly, the project was in its final phase and it was coming up to 
the end of the year, but the OHS representative appeared to be merely fulfilling a role, rather than 
actively seeking out OHS issues and positively challenging management to respond to them.  
Indeed, with most of the issues identified on this particular site safety walk, the OHS 
representative of the Pathological Company appeared to constantly look for direction from the 
senior management representative on how to deal with the issues.  The issues were all minor day-
to-day, clean up type issues which appeared to be a consistent pattern or theme on all previously 
attended and observed site safety walks over the past six months or so
22
.  However, even within 
such limited or minor OHS issues, there appeared to be little consultation or discussion over the 
issues or the proposed solutions.   
 
It may well be that the daily grind of constantly reacting to such day-to-day issues rather than 
being able to contribute in any type of meaningful capacity to higher level OHS decision making 
forums, such as having input into how the site manages OHS or even into the organisations’ 
occupational health and safety management system, might have an adverse affect on the 
enthusiasm of an OHS representative.  However, the absence of input into decisions that 
potentially could have longer term and beneficial outcomes for both workers and the organisation, 
and the absence of any real and meaningful sharing of decision making powers within the 
company, may be more symbolic of how the industry often appears to operate, rather than being a 
negative indictment on one particular OHS representative or company. 
 
Frick et al. (2000) claimed that while most voluntary occupational health and safety management 
systems may include recommendations to consult with workers, the consultation process in such 
management systems typically entails very little if any sharing of the decision-making powers.  
This was later supported by Walters (2003) who argued that despite all the rhetoric that effective 
consultation supports and reinforces the notion of OHS management systems, which in turn 
should lead to increased levels of OHS performance, the majority of OHS management systems 
were generally managerialist, rather than truly participative.  In the majority of systematic 
                                               
22 All the minor day-to-day items were confirmed from the minutes of the OHS committee meetings and 
the notes and observations from previous site safety walks. 
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occupational health and safety management systems that larger organisations claim to have, 
Saksvik and Quinlan (2003) found that workers and their OHS representatives had a very limited 
role, via consultation, in the design, auditing and improvements in such systems.   
 
While all the companies utilised in this project had OHS management systems of varying degrees 
of quality, substance and detail, none of the OHS representatives claimed to have had any input 
into the system or the many policies and procedures encompassed within the system, either as 
individuals or via their site or their company OHS committees.  At the time of writing this thesis, 
the OHS legislation in Victoria appeared to only provide workers (either directly or collectively 
via their OHS committees and worker elected OHS representatives) with a very marginal role 
when it comes to any type of meaningful and effective involvement with an organisations’ 
systematic occupational health and safety management system.  According to Saksvik and 
Quinlan (2003), despite the best efforts and recurring trade union demands for greater workforce 
involvement in OHS, the dominant role of management in both the design and the 
implementation of OHS safety management systems remains.  The evidence of this research 
project would appear to support this position. 
 
Saksvik and Quinlan (2003) also believed that the dominant role management play throughout the 
majority of OHS management systems has effectively meant that, rather than having 
organisational strategies and attitudes that reflect and encompass a truly cooperative, inclusive 
and systematically controlled OHS management system, there has tended to be an approach 
whereby OHS responsibility is continually being transferred and directed away from the company 
or organisation and into a bias towards individualized OHS interventions.  Within such systems, 
the OHS representative and the OHS committee appear to be at risk of being marginalised and 
isolated from having any type of input into more strategic OHS issues.  This certainly appeared to 
be the case with both the OHS representatives and the OHS committees who were part of this 
research, even though the degree of marginalisation or isolation varied from company to 
company. 
 
While Walters (2003) acknowledged the arrangements and benefits of joint health and safety 
committees both in Australia and in the UK, he questioned their role and indeed their influence to 
play a more strategic part in keeping health and safety performance and arrangements under 
review, rather than simply being used as a mechanism to address the day-to-day issues at the 
workplace.  Such an approach appeared to be case with the companies that participated in this 
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research.  Indeed, all the OHS committees and OHS representatives observed in this research, 
primarily concentrated on the day-to-day and immediate operational issues of the construction 
site.  This then appeared to limit both the quality and the time available for debate and discussion 
via consultation, especially over more strategic and longer term OHS issues.  This was also 
reflected not only in the environment where some of the OHS committee meetings were held, but 
also in the quality and level of input that participants had during the consultation. 
 
 
6.2 The environment, duration and the participants’ 
contribution to the consultation 
The operational and procedural functions of the site OHS committee meetings of both the 
Pathological and the Reactive Companies and the environment that these meetings were held in, 
did not appear to avail themselves to any type of meaningful or effective discussion, debate or 
consultation over any type of OHS issue or their subsequent solutions.  Similar to the other 
companies that participated in this research, the Pathological Company OHS committee meetings 
were held immediately after their site safety walks.  However, the Pathological Company OHS 
committee meetings did not consist of any type of formal or sit down meeting in an office or site 
shed, where one could reasonably expect to discuss the OHS issues in a quiet and peaceful 
environment, away from (as far as practicable) the noise, dust, heat and general hustle and bustle 
and ongoing activity that typifies a construction site.  Rather, the meetings commenced where the 
walk had just finished and comprised standing around in a little huddle, with a brief and informal 
summary of the items that were recorded on the just completed safety walk given by the senior 
management representative.  There was never any rigorous or in-depth discussion or debate 
between any of the members of the OHS committee, or between the management representative 
and the OHS representative over any of the issues, or any of the future works that may have been 
planned for the site.   
 
Standing around in areas that were often exposed to extremely high winds, extreme temperature 
variations and often exposed to vast amounts of dust and noise generated from daily construction 
work, appeared to make it very difficult to conduct a discussion or engage in consultation in any 
type of comfort.  This then appeared to have an adverse effect on the potential level and length of 
debate and discussion over the OHS issues.  There was never any attempt or even suggestion by 
either the management representative or the OHS representative, to ever sit down in an 
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environment that would provide a level of comfort and civility, and which could perhaps 
encourage and facilitate a greater standard or level of debate and discussion over the OHS issues 
and their subsequent solutions.   
 
The project manager of the Pathological Company, in expressing his thoughts on how the 
consultation over OHS issues on the site was conducted or carried out between himself and the 
OHS representative and how the OHS committee operated and functioned, claimed that: ‘… there 
is a lot of informal discussion…’ and ‘…that informality needs to be built on trust, and if that 
trust breaks down, I think the next step is to go to the formal, recording, sitting around, which is 
more time consuming; it can be just as effective, but it is more time consuming…’.   
 
It should be noted that such formality was never observed or recorded occurring on the site of the 
Pathological Company, even after it was revealed by the project manager some months later, that 
the informal nature of their consultation process, including the OHS committee meetings, were 
still causing problems: ‘… I think that with the informality, is that sometimes we’ve probably got 
a little bit casual, and occasionally, you know, I’ve said I think that the place needs some 
attention…’.   
 
Indeed, the consultation over OHS issues that did take place between the project manager and the 
OHS representative of the Pathological Company appeared to only occur at the behest and 
instigation of the project manager, rather than being initiated by the OHS representative.  Further, 
the discussions often appeared to be very one sided, with the Project manager or other senior 
managers leading and heavily dominating the discussion, as opposed to engaging in any type of 
truly consultative and equal partnership approach.   
 
The forum or environment in which the Reactive Company OHS committee meetings were 
conducted was very similar to that of the Pathological Company.  There was never any formal 
approach or attempt to sit down away from the noise, dust, heat and wind of the construction site, 
to discuss the issues and possible solutions to the identified problems, nor did it appear that there 
was any genuine attempt on behalf of either the site manager or the OHS representative, to get to 
the very heart of the issues, rather than simply providing quick-fix solutions which did not 
adversely affect any type of major change to either the existing systems of work, or indeed the 
program of the project.  The level of debate or discussion over the issues raised on the safety 
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walks was always very brief and the observed OHS committee meetings never lasted any longer 
than fifteen minutes, with some of them having a substantially shorter duration.   
 
The duration of the majority of the OHS committee meetings was normally quite short, with 
many of them lasting no longer than fifteen or twenty minutes.  Whether such a timeframe is 
suitable or adequate to enable a fully informed debate and discussion to take place, over the many 
OHS issues that are generally encountered on a weekly safety inspection on a commercial and 
industrial construction project, is a question that perhaps requires a more in-depth and considered 
analysis than this project could allow for.  However, it is perhaps worthy to consider that the 
often complex procedures and processes that occur on a daily basis on a commercial and 
industrial construction project, arguably deserves both the time and the environment that 
encourages open and frank discussion, debate and contemplation of both the procedures and the 
issues, and the appropriateness and relevance of the control solutions and strategies implemented 
at the different stages of a construction project.  The duration of any OHS committee meeting that 
is considerably shorter or tighter than one would or could reasonably expect to be able to produce 
such quality discussion and debate, conducted in a somewhat less than conducive environment in 
terms of dust, noise and temperature extremes, suggests that the meetings of the Reactive 
Company OHS committee may not openly encourage nor invite any type of robust debate or 
discussion, or indeed contemplation of both the issues and the quality and effectiveness of the 
proposed control measures. 
 
It was the OHS representative and the senior management representatives of the Calculative 
Company, rather than the Project Manager himself, that were the main participants and 
protagonists on their site safety walks and OHS committee meetings.  Other members of the OHS 
committee appeared to have only limited input in both these forums.  Indeed the project manager 
of the Calculative Company stated that: ‘… there are some [members of the OHS committee] that 
participate more than others, there are some that just don’t give their opinion, or don’t say 
anything, and there are others who will voice their concerns or opinions… some people just 
don’t, I mean yes, they’re on the safety committee, but they’re not going to rock the boat if you 
know what I mean…’.   
 
In a situation such as this, where there are members of an OHS committee that potentially will not 
express their concerns, or who are unwilling for whatever reason, to engage in debate or 
discussion over OHS issues, Brookes (1987) believed that this will tend to undermine and limit 
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the influence and effectiveness of the OHS committee.  However, this should not detract from the 
level of debate and discussion that often occurred in the committee meetings, or indeed on the 
safety walks of the Calculative Company.  During both these forums, the OHS representative 
often lamented the fact that the company was in his opinion, too heavily focused on issues of 
personal protective equipment and individual worker responsibility, rather than looking at the 
overall systems, environment and the timing and scope of work that was occurring on the site.  
Overall, the site safety walks and the subsequent OHS committee meetings primarily 
concentrated on the immediate and operational functions of the work being conducted on the 
project on a day-to-day basis, as opposed to longer term or strategic OHS issues. 
 
The OHS committee meetings of the Calculative Company did however take place in a relatively 
comfortable and air-conditioned site office/meeting room.  This enabled the members of the 
committee to sit down, away from the noise, dust, heat or cold of the site, in an environment 
where they were able to reflect upon and review the items or issues identified on the walk in a 
considered and clam demeanour, and enter into (if they were so prepared and inclined) an 
informed and sometimes, robust discussion.  Indeed, this type of discussion took place on a 
number of occasions, primarily between the senior management representatives of the Calculative 
Company and the OHS representative.  No time limits ever appeared to be set for the committee 
meetings, and the debate and discussion appeared to be welcomed and encouraged by all 
members of the committee.   
 
In terms of how the site OHS committee meetings were run and the degree of influence that the 
committee appeared to exert over levels of OHS on the site, although limited to the day-to-day 
operational procedures, the Calculative company arguably demonstrated a more respectful and 
transparent approach in how OHS issues were managed on their site, compared to that of both the 
Pathological and the Reactive companies.  The degree or level of importance that the Calculative 
company gave to the opinions and input of their OHS representative over OHS, appeared to be far 
greater than that of the somewhat more restrictive and restrained approach of the Pathological and 
Reactive companies. 
 
While the site safety facilitator and the OHS representative of the Proactive Company usually 
agreed over site OHS issues, via what is perhaps best described as a consensus approach, this may 
well undermine and underestimate the value of their often rigorous debate over many of the 
issues that were identified and discussed during both the safety walks and their OHS committee 
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meetings.  It was interesting to note that while the site manager did not attend the weekly site 
safety walks and only attended the weekly OHS committee meetings sporadically, this did not 
appear to have any adverse affect on his relationship with the OHS representative.  The 
substitution or delegation by the site manager of his role to the site safety facilitator in terms of 
OHS, in effect promoted the site safety facilitator as the de-facto senior company representative 
on both the safety walks and the OHS committee meetings.  While the safety facilitator did not 
have the full discretion or decision making authority of the site manager, it nonetheless appeared 
to provide the site manager more time to devote to the programming of the project and the day-to-
day production problems of the site.  In doing this, the OHS representative and the site safety 
facilitator were arguably bequeathed, perhaps more by default than intention, the authority to deal 
with and make decisions over the more immediate day-to-day OHS issues.  However, when it 
came to any economic decisions or considerations over OHS, such decisions always required the 
approval of the site manager. 
 
In commenting on some of the difficulties that he sometimes experienced when discussing OHS 
issues on site and the level of commitment to OHS shown by management, especially when an 
OHS incident occurred, the OHS representative of the Proactive Company believed that the 
biggest problem was the lack of time and the pressure that builds up during the projects’ life 
cycle: ‘…that’s the big breakdown, you know the builder pushes and then hides his head in the 
sand, and you know, “ah I didn’t know…you need to get it done, the program the program” …’.  
This suggests that the level of commitment a company has not only towards safety, but also 
towards consultation and the quality of debate and discussion that occurs during consultation, 
may be potentially compromised if time and economic pressures are allowed to infiltrate and 
unduly affect the province of OHS.  Antonsen (2009) suggested that such pressures also have the 
potential to compromise the quality and amount of time allocated by an organisation towards the 
consultation process and that potentially, this will affect and determine what issues are deemed 
important or worthy of consideration and consultation, and what issues are not.  It is also the 
process of who is involved in these initial decision making discussions or forums, which can be 
crucial to the ultimate decision-making process (Antonsen 2009). 
 
If handled insensitively or unduly rushed or compromised, the quality and level of consultation 
could be jeopardized, as time and economic pressures take precedence over who takes part in the 
discussions and the timing of, and the time allowed for the discussions or consultation.  The 
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potential for this to occur needs to be seriously considered and positively addressed by industry if 
the terms mature, meaningful and effective consultation are to have any relevance to the industry. 
The OHS representative of the Generative Company clearly enjoyed his role as chairperson of the 
OHS committee and according to the OHS representative ‘… the challenge and stimulation that it 
provides...’.  The role appeared to allow him to develop and utilize his own OHS knowledge and 
skill while also creating the foundations of a seemingly mature, positive and trusting relationship 
between himself and the site manager.  It should be noted that no other OHS representative who 
participated in this research, openly displayed any such desire or inclination to perform or carry 
out the role of chairperson of their respective site OHS committees.   
 
However, the ensuring debates and discussions that took place within the Generative Company 
OHS committee meetings were still primarily concerned with OHS issues to do with the day-to-
day and operational functions and activities of the site.  Having said this, a key point of difference 
with these discussions, as compared to that of the other companies, was that there did appear to 
be a greater level of debate and discussion over both the issues and the solutions - especially 
where there had been a cessation of works initiated by the OHS representative for any length of 
time.  Indeed, it was only the Generative OHS representative who was observed implementing 
this right or power, a right or power that all OHS representatives have under Victorian OHS 
legislation if, in their opinion, there is an immediate danger or risk to workers health and safety in 
undertaking or carrying out their work.   
 
In the circumstances where there had been a cessation of work, the level of consultation and 
debate over the issue always appeared to be robust and rigorous, with the site manager and the 
OHS representative often disagreeing over the issues, but nonetheless working their way towards 
a solution in a mature, adult fashion.  Interestingly, such debate and disagreement never appeared 
to be avoided or shunned, if anything, it appeared to be embraced and accepted by both parties as 
a normal part of the consultation process that occurred on the site.   
 
The acknowledgment of such conflict, with its collection of different views and opinions, is 
generally accepted as a basis of how a pluralist and democratic society should operate (Alexander 
& Lewer 1994).  Indeed, such debate and differences can often bring about ideas and solutions 
that may not be unearthed or discovered had the environment not allowed such debate or 
discussion to occur in the first place.  This is especially so when both parties are willing to work 
together in a mature and constructive manner.  According to Peetz (2006), when trade unions and 
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management undertake consultation in this type of environment, it can have a very positive effect 
not just on levels of OHS, but also on the overall performance of the workplace. 
 
 
6.3 Third party involvement and assistance during 
consultation 
When reviewing the role and approach that the different companies had towards third party 
involvement and assistance during consultation, there appeared to be a common approach from 
all companies that while such assistance was acknowledged as being useful, the priority of all the 
companies appeared to be to try and resolve all OHS issues in-house, before outside or third party 
assistance was deemed necessary.  The project manager of the Pathological Company was very 
firm in his view of such third party involvement and assistance, stating: ‘… I don’t know if I’m 
happy with it… it’s accepted…’ .  He then on to say:‘… if we think we’re right, then we’re not 
happy to waste the time’.   
 
In the endeavour to facilitate and ultimately succeed in obtaining the best control solutions to 
OHS issues, any process that may not fully embrace or at the very least consider outside 
intervention or third party involvement and assistance over the issues, no matter who or what that 
third party may be, potentially runs the risk of overlooking and ignoring other possible control 
solutions which may be more effective than the ones already considered or even decided upon 
(Keltz 2001).  The involvement of third parties such as the state regulatory authority, independent 
engineers or even independent OHS consultants, appeared to be accepted and tolerated by all the 
participants.  However, the same level of acceptance or indeed enthusiasm, was not displayed by 
the majority of senior management representatives towards the involvement of the trade union of 
which the OHS representative was a member.   
 
In the UK, the role of trade unions in appointing OHS representatives, who have the right to 
represent their members at the workplace and be involved in consultation over OHS issues, and 
who have access to training and facilities needed to support such actions, has been enshrined in 
their legislation since the late 1970s (Walters & Nichols 2006).  In their research, Walters and 
Nichols (2006) demonstrated that such joint arrangements between employers and trade unions 
made for better OHS outcomes and further, that there was a positive relationship between 
managerial consultation on general issues and OHS issues.  While similar legislative 
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arrangements exist under current Victorian OHS legislation, it was interesting to note the lack of 
enthusiasm that many of the managers who participated in this research displayed towards trade 
union involvement in OHS issues on their construction sites. 
 
Other than the Generative Company site manager, who appeared to be the most relaxed and 
comfortable with the role of the trade union when discussing OHS issues, the opinions and 
attitudes of the other site or project managers ranged from being tentatively accepting of the right 
of the trade union to be involved in the discussions from the Proactive and Calculative 
Companies, through to a non-committal approach from the Reactive Company, down to the 
Pathological Company project managers’ approach of preventing or at least restricting the role of 
the trade union, in any site OHS discussions or forums.   
 
And yet, it is generally accepted and acknowledged both nationally and internationally, that high 
levels of OHS performance and standards are best achieved and maintained, where there is active 
trade union involvement.  This is especially so where such involvement includes high quality 
training and ongoing support by the trade union to their OHS representatives, thereby enabling 
the OHS representative to confidently challenge and question the OHS decisions made by 
management, in the knowledge that they can positively contribute to the OHS decision making 
process (Quinlan 2009; Peetz 2006; Walters 2003; Saksvik & Quinlan 2003).   
 
However in some quarters, the challenging and questioning of OHS decisions, especially 
decisions that have been made with little or no input by either employees or their representatives, 
are sometimes seen as a challenge not only to those decisions, but also to the authority and the 
perceived right of management to unconditionally and unilaterally determine the terms and 
conditions at the workplace (Peetz 2006; McIntyre 2005; Coates 1983).   
 
Both McIntyre (2005) and Butler (2005) referred to the term ‘managerial prerogative’, when 
describing what some managers believe is their right to manage the workplace as they deem 
appropriate.  The approach and comments that were referred to earlier in this paper by the project 
manager of the Pathological Company in restricting trade union entry to his site, arguably reflects 
this position and indeed his personal opposition to such challenging and questioning.  However 
Sargeant (2001) believed that the questioning and challenging of managerial decisions, 
particularly in terms of OHS, should be seen more as a mechanism to ensure accountability and 
responsibility over such decisions and to ensure a dialogue of considered and informed debate 
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and consultation commences prior to the final decisions being made, rather than any infringement 
or undue restrictions on management’s ability and responsibility to manage the workplace safely.   
 
Although the project manager of the Pathological Company appeared determined to restrict and 
prevent access by the trade union onto his site over OHS issues, it was his belief that on the issue 
of OHS consultation, there was now: ‘… a more mature approach in the industry…’.  Whether 
this maturity was reflected in the Project managers’ belief that the trade union only entered his 
site under the guise of OHS to simply gain access to address other issues, issues that according to 
the project manager had more to do with industrial relations rather than occupational health and 
safety, is perhaps a question worth considering. 
 
All participants who took part in the project believed that issues of OHS should remain separate 
and somehow handled differently from those issues that may be traditionally described as being 
of an industrial relations nature.  But separating OHS issues from the mainstream industrial 
relations environment is not without its critics.  According to Quinlan (2009), the argument of 
separating the OHS and the industrial relation environment and somehow treating them 
differently and handling them in completely separate ways, with no commonality between the 
environments and the issues, is both factually and intellectually flawed.  He argued that this is 
because of the very nature of the way work is organised and conducted and the way that work 
impacts upon the everyday lives of workers.  Quinlan believed that the many and varied social 
implications that work has on a worker’s life, both within and outside the workplace, has 
inextricably entwined and integrated the two environments into one which must be considered in 
its entirety, as opposed to being considered and thought of as two separate constructs.   
 
In some of their earlier work, Saksvik and Quinlan (2003) claimed that there was a: ‘… 
longstanding, artificial and historically contingent separation … between industrial relations and 
OHS found in most industrialized countries…’ (p.43), which they believed was based purely on 
ideological grounds.  Gunningham (1984) had expressed similar sentiments almost three decades 
earlier, stating that: ‘… safety, like wages and other areas of conflict, is a suitable subject for the 
normal processes of negotiation and collective bargaining …’ (p.355).  In Gunningham’s opinion, 
this approach had far more potential to reach greater levels of safety than any type of statutory 
standards.   
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Indeed, according to Walters and Nichols (2006) ‘… the preconditions for the success of 
workers’ representations and consultations are most likely to be found … where recognised trade 
unions exist and where systems and structures for industrial relations are combined with 
arrangements for occupational health and safety management…’ (p.230).  However, the 
separation between the subjects may have more to do with the exercising of power by the 
powerful, which in the majority of cases in an employment relationship, is primarily the employer 
and how, when and who determines and decides who is allowed to participate in the discussions 
and discourse over the conflict or issues in question (Peetz 2006; Gaventa & Cornwall 2001; 
Coates 1983).   
 
Antonsen (2009) referred to the terms invisible power and non-decision making power when 
describing the practice or indeed the ability of keeping potential issues out of the decision making 
process, thereby avoiding conflict altogether.  He believed that the source of this type of power is 
derived from differences in the participant’s ability to access and control agendas and discussions.  
He also argued that in organisational decision making, there are normally alternatives that are 
generally considered more viable than others, even before a decision has been finalised.  
According to Antonsen, those alternatives are primarily put forward in the interests of those who 
are able to be involved in the initial discussions, and are generally given preferential treatment 
over those ideas or alternatives yet to be suggested by those who may not yet be at the table. 
 
The manner in which some of the companies who participated in this research approached their 
OHS committee meetings, and the capacity that the OHS representatives had to influence any 
type of strategic or influential OHS decision making, both within the site via the OHS committee 
meetings, the safety walks and within their organisations as a whole, could suggest that these 
types of consultation forums were conducted according to a managerial-based agenda.  Indeed, all 
but one of the OHS committee’s was chaired and run by senior management representatives.  
This arguably suggests that the invisible power and avoidance of potential conflict over OHS 
issues, may obfuscate the application of principles such as trust, honesty, commitment and 
respect, as well as impeding and obscuring the true meaning and intent of meaningful and 
effective consultation. 
 
Finally, any restriction and/or reluctance to openly allow OHS representatives to invite or initiate 
involvement from their trade union over OHS issues, would appear to be consistent with the 
ideological and power-based agenda that some consider to be at the very heart of the separation of 
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OHS and industrial relation issues (Antonsen 2009; Saksvik & Quinlan 2003; Gaventa & 
Cornwall 2001).  If there is an ideological and power-based motivation behind this separation, 
then the prevention and/or hindrance of OHS representatives becoming involved in strategic and 
longer term OHS issues at a construction site and at an organisational level, would appear to be 
consistent with the belief that Antonsen (2009) had over the role that power plays when there is 
conflict at a workplace.  He claimed that: ‘… power emphasises the way conflicts of interests can 
be obscured in such a way that such resistance is eliminated or never created in the first place … 
and enables the dominant to influence the dominated to adopt the goals, values and attitudes of 
the dominant…’ (p.186).  Antonsen believed that this obscurity and domination then leads to a 
reduction in OHS standards because ultimately, it limits what is discussed and consulted over, 
thereby restricting the contribution of those persons involved in or invited to the discussions. 
 
 
This chapter has drawn together and discussed the concepts of consultation that are considered 
both meaningful and measurable (Lunt et al. 2008; Cameron et al. 2006), in a determination to 
evaluate how the principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect were applied during 
consultation over OHS issues on five different Victorian construction projects.  The next chapter 
will provide a summary and overall synthesis to draw a conclusion to the concepts of both 
meaningful and effective consultation in the Victorian construction industry, and the important 
role that moral and ethical principles play in the overall phenomenon of consultation. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
The notion of organisational and cultural maturity is acknowledged both internationally and in 
Australia as a useful concept that can assist organisations in achieving higher standards and levels 
of OHS.  This is especially so in high risk and hazardous industries such as the petrochemical, oil 
refinery and aviation industries.  However, organisational and cultural maturity is arguably a 
relatively new and under-researched construct in the Victorian building and construction industry.  
While the process of consultation is widely accepted and acknowledged both in Australia and 
internationally as being essential if high levels of OHS are to be achieved and maintained at the 
workplace, it is also considered that for consultation to be meaningful and effective in terms of 
achieving and accomplishing such goals and aspirations in OHS, moral and ethical principles or 
issues such as trust, honesty, commitment and respect must be both recognised and applied by all 
parties during consultation. 
 
This research project set out to examine how these principles were applied by senior site 
managers and OHS representatives of Victorian construction companies during consultation over 
OHS, and whether the consultation could be considered to be meaningful and effective. The 
companies were each allocated a level of organisational maturity that they were deemed to have 
reached, dependent upon how they managed various aspects of their business operations in terms 
of OHS.  This is the first time that a study such as this has been undertaken.  One of the main 
rationales for such an examination, is that there is a growing concern that existing legislative 
provisions and procedures that provide for mandatory consultation, may not be enough to ensure 
that consultation has any real meaning and/or effect in the endeavour to improve OHS outcomes.   
 
According to van der Molen, Lehtola, Lappalainen, Hoonakker, Hsiao, Haslam, Hale and 
Verbeek (2008), regulation alone is not an effective strategy in reducing fatal and non-fatal 
accidents and injuries at the workplace.  They believed additional strategies are required to ensure 
both compliance and improvement.  It is hoped that this research can contribute to such 
innovative strategies and procedures, in the endeavour to improve OHS standards throughout the 
Victorian construction industry.  A further rationale was to clarify if Victorian construction 
companies, regardless of how mature they are deemed to be, reflect an approach in their 
consultation forums that provide workers the opportunity and the environment to freely and 
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unreservedly have input and influence into how OHS is managed, at both a construction site and 
at an organisational level.   
 
Consistent with the belief of Hale, Guldenmund, van Loenhout and Oh (2009), it is important to 
acknowledge that any conclusions or findings arising from this research should be treated 
carefully, and are not intended to be definitive answers or solutions to any one particular problem. 
Rather, it is hoped that the conclusions and findings of this project are seen more as a valuable 
contribution to the overall debate about how the construction industry can improve the quality of 
consultation, in terms of it being meaningful and effective, thereby helping to improve levels of 
OHS, from both an organisational and an industry perspective. 
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7.1 Is there an association between organisational maturity 
and consultation? 
In its purest and simplest form, this research project utilised a model of organisational and 
cultural maturity to unpack, explore and attempt to gain a better understanding and appreciation 
of how particular moral and ethical principles were applied by senior site management 
representatives and OHS representatives of Victorian construction companies, during the 
consultation forums that took place on construction sites over OHS.  The data demonstrated that 
the higher the level of organisational maturity that a company was deemed to have reached, the 
more involved and in-depth their consultation appeared to be, with the OHS representatives of the 
more mature companies, having a higher level of input and influence during the consultation 
forums, compared to that of the less mature companies. 
 
However, the level of influence and input of all of the OHS representatives who participated in 
this project, appeared to be restricted to what we have described as day-to-day and or trouble-
shooting issues, or what may alternatively be described as the job execution stages, as opposed to 
the job or project design and planning stages of a construction project.  In the lexicon of OHS, 
these latter stages are often described as upstream issues, as opposed to the more downstream 
execution issues and/or job processes and procedures of a typical construction site. 
 
The lack of input by OHS representatives into what may be described as strategic and/or 
influential OHS decision making forums or decisions, suggests that the issues of trust, honesty, 
commitment and respect are perhaps only applied judiciously and/or selectively.  While it was 
encouraging to observe the more mature nominated companies allowing and indeed encouraging 
their OHS representatives to have a greater input and therefore potential influence during the 
consultation forums on site, it appears to remain problematic that if consultation is to have any 
real meaning and effectively impact upon levels of OHS in the industry, then upstream or more 
strategic OHS issues should also be discussed and consulted over with OHS representatives.  
However, this would appear to require the unambiguous recognition and application of the 
principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect in a far more candid and inclusive manner 
than that which was recorded and observed throughout this research project. 
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7.2 The management of knowledge and skill  
This research showed that regardless of how culturally mature organisations appeared to be in 
terms of how they managed their OHS and other related facets of their business (e.g. training), all 
the construction companies who participated in this project appeared to under-value and under-
utilise the vast array of knowledge and skills available to them, via their workforce.  
 
The data demonstrated that regardless of the level of organisational maturity the organisations 
were deemed to have reached, the OHS representatives and the OHS committees that participated 
in this research, had little if any role in any type of strategic or up-stream OHS matters either on 
site, or within their organisation.  The overwhelming majority of their time appeared to be spent 
concentrating on and limited to the day-to-day trouble shooting issues on site.  Neither the OHS 
representatives or other employee members of the OHS committees, appeared to play any part in 
any type of review or auditing of the OHS management system of their companies, or indeed in 
any type of review on the adequacy and applicability of the many documented safe work method 
procedures that are currently a legislative requirement before any type of high risk construction 
work is undertaken in Victoria.  This suggests that the OHS representatives may not have been 
trusted enough to have greater input into such matters as the OHS management system or the safe 
work procedures or methods of construction.  It also suggests that the knowledge and skill of the 
workforce and their OHS representatives may not be acknowledged as much as it perhaps could 
be.   
 
This research also highlighted some of the missed opportunities by the companies, to fully build 
upon and improve the OHS knowledge and skills of their OHS representatives through the many 
and varied OHS training courses available throughout the industry.  None of the five companies 
who participated in this research provided any documentation or evidence that demonstrated any 
specific OHS training programs for their OHS representatives.  Indeed, the question of 
commitment to fully utilise the knowledge and skill of the workforce, via the OHS representative, 
in the endeavour to improve levels of OHS, appears to remain unanswered.  Such findings are not 
altogether surprising and are in fact consistent with earlier research conducted by Walters and 
Nichols (2006), who found little evidence of any type of general health and safety training for 
workers or their representatives in OHS in the chemical industry in the UK.   
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However, it should be noted that a number of the companies who participated in this research 
project, did have specific and sometimes mandatory OHS training programs for their 
management personnel.   
 
 
7.3 Meaningful and effective worker engagement and 
involvement 
It is considered that the value of worker engagement and/or involvement is best reflected in the 
degree of input and control that workers have into the very decisions that affect them (Lunt et al. 
2008; Cameron et al. 2006; Davis & Lansbury 1996).  Further to this, both Lunt et al. (2008) and 
Cameron et al. (2006) believed that the level of worker involvement or engagement was also a 
reflection of an organisation’s level of cultural maturity.  Based upon the evidence of this project, 
it is debateable whether or not the notion of applying moral and ethical principles during 
consultation, or indeed the paradigm of organisational and cultural maturity have been 
successfully developed and adopted in the commercial and industrial sector of the Victorian 
construction industry.   
 
According to Lunt et al. (2008), past research specifically targeted at the construction industry has 
indicated that the type of involvement or engagement that the majority of construction workers, 
including OHS representatives, have within the industry, is primary focused on ‘… 
surface/reactive issues… in other words the workforce has little influence on safety management 
systems, which are generally formulated without their input…’ (p.27). 
 
Indeed, this research project revealed that in terms of how an organisation managed and 
implemented the consultation process between their most senior site management representatives 
and the site OHS representatives, even companies that were deemed to be at the highest levels of 
organisational maturity, allowed their OHS representatives no more influence or input into the 
OHS management system of the organisation, or the planning and programming into the 
construction project itself, than did the lowest performing organisational maturity deemed 
companies. 
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7.4 Legal, moral and ethical obligations 
While the legal obligations to engage in consultation are clearly articulated under many OHS 
legislative frameworks and espoused by many as being advantageous and indeed necessary to 
ensure high levels of OHS (Walters et al. 2005; Johnstone 2005; Shearn 2004; Sargeant 2001), 
the evidence of this research project suggests that even in an apparent propitious environment, 
such legal requirements may not necessarily be enough to ensure that meaningful and effective 
consultation occurs.  Walters and Nichols (2006) previously identified a number of other 
preconditions or requirements aside from strong legislative prerequisites, which they considered 
necessary if consultation and employee representation was to be both meaningful and effective.  
These included:  
 effective external inspection and control;  
 demonstrated management commitment;  
 competent hazard and risk evaluation and control; 
 effective autonomous worker representation and external trade union support; and  
 consultation and communication between workers and their representatives and their 
constituencies.   
 
Walters and Nichols (2006) believed that if the wider legal basis and protocols such as those 
highlighted above are fully and properly implemented, this would considerably improve the 
situation in terms of both consultation and overall occupational health and safety outcomes.  
However, this research demonstrated that even though such legal and general protocols are 
complied with, albeit at different levels or degrees of compliance, if the concepts and 
philosophies behind constitutive or moral and ethical principles such as trust, honesty, 
commitment and respect are not fully and unambiguously implemented, the worth and validity of 
a constitutional rule, such as the consultation requirements as set out under the OHS Act 2004 
(Victoria), may not be as effective or as meaningful as they should or could be. 
 
Indeed, when looking at how the principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect were 
applied during the OHS consultation of this research, the lack of worker involvement or 
engagement and the almost non-existent role of OHS representatives in any type of strategic, long 
term and/or upstream OHS issues, suggest that these moral and ethical principles were not 
sufficiently or adequately acknowledged or implemented by the individuals of the construction 
companies who participated in this research.  Consequently, this also suggest that moral and 
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ethical principles may have little if any effect on how consultation is conducted or carried out in 
the Victorian construction industry. 
 
 
7.5 Industrial mechanisms 
The importance of an inclusive and even-handed industrial relations regime, when trying to 
effectively implement a systematic OHS management system, which by its very nature should 
include detailed requirements for consultation during all facets of the system, was highlighted by 
Saksvik and Quinlan (2003).  They claimed that the levels of collective negotiation, regulatory 
recognition and promotion of trade unions and the mechanisms that allowed for collective 
participation, all heavily influenced and promoted meaningful and effective systematic OHS 
management.  They stated that: ‘… minimum labour standards enshrined in industrial regimes… 
provide an essential support for OHS standards generally and for occupational health and safety 
management in particular…’ (p.40).   
 
Saksvik and Quinlan believed that worker involvement in the workplace has been significantly 
undermined by inadequate enforcement and the general erosion of collective industrial relation 
laws.  They further believed that the involvement of workers in OHS was still very much 
problematic, with only trade unions providing any long term and effective logistical support to 
many formal OHS participatory mechanisms.  They argued that trade union involvement was still 
the most effective mechanism to provide a channel of independent and autonomous worker 
representation and meaningful negotiations over OHS issues with management.  Walters (2003) 
also thought this to be the case, claiming that the ability of the OHS representative to 
autonomously represent their members effectively in OHS was heavily dependent upon strong 
trade union support.  In his opinion there was:‘ …powerful evidence that trade union training 
both supported the workplace activity of health and safety representatives and acted as a stimulus 
for its initiation and development…’ (p.12).   
 
However, this research project demonstrated that even with trade union support, this does not 
necessarily guarantee or translate into an OHS representative having input into upstream and 
strategic OHS issues such as an organisations’ systematic OHS management system or other long 
term OHS decision-making forums.  The data from this project seemed to suggest that the 
majority of companies, other than the Generative Company, were wary of trade unions entering 
the workplace and engaging with the OHS representative and other workers on the sites over 
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OHS.  Indeed, the Project Manager of the Pathological Company believed that OHS issues were 
too often used by trade unions as an alias for other industrial relation purposes.   
 
Interestingly, all the participants who took part in this research project, both management and 
OHS representatives, believed that OHS and industrial relations should be treated separately and 
remain isolated from each other and preferably, resolved and dealt with as far as possible, in an 
in-house manner.  The majority of the management participants appeared to take this in-house 
approach one step further, seemingly preferring to deal with issues of OHS, not just in an in-
house manner, but as far away as possible from any involvement from the OHS representative’s 
trade union.  Such an approach is arguably at odds with much of the OHS literature and belief of 
many renowned and well respected OHS authors and academics (Quinlan 2009; Walters and 
Nichols 2006; Härenstam et al. 2006; Saksvik and Quinlan 2003; Frick et al. 2000).  According to 
Walters and Nichols (2006), when it comes to consultation over OHS issues in the UK, the 
modern day industrial practice has ‘… a preference for consultation with representatives of a 
recognised trade union…’ (p.246). 
 
All the site OHS representatives who participated in this research project were all current and 
active trade union members, with all of them were seemingly provided with positive and ongoing 
support from their trade union, via regular visits from trade union officials.  The OHS 
representatives also indicated that they had attended trade union OHS training courses and were 
regular attendees at monthly OHS information meetings conducted by their trade union.  The data 
from this project suggests that the culture of the companies deemed to be at the lower end of the 
organisational maturity scale, may not have encouraged or positively supported meaningful and 
effective consultation with the OHS representative in conjunction with their trade union, 
especially when it came to discussions and input into longer term and /or strategic OHS issues.   
 
According to Antonsen (2009), the reluctance of management to engage with and involve 
workers, OHS representatives and/or trade unions over OHS issues is often because what is in the 
interests of management may not always be in the interests of the workforce.  Antonsen believed 
that any type of scrutiny and subsequent warnings of any inconsistencies, especially by third 
parties such as trade unions, may result in unwarranted attention and even adversarial actions to 
prevent or restrict such interests from becoming a reality.  But he warned that ignoring and 
undermining the role of trade unions in OHS may be directly harmful for workers and levels of 
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OHS, regardless of the enforcement and regulatory requirements constituted under OHS 
legislation. 
 
In terms of the relationship between the application and enforcement of regulatory requirements 
under OHS law, Walters and Nichols (2006) were of the opinion that there needed to be a 
respectful and honest relationship between management and trade unions, which they believed 
was even more important than the regulatory authority enforcing the regulations.  According to 
Walters and Nichols: ‘… implementation and operation of regulations were … more dependent 
on the wider relationship between the trade unions and the management within each 
establishment than any external enforcement pressure…’ (p.250). 
 
All this would seem to suggest that unless individuals are trusting, honest, committed and 
respectful of each other, and unless the workplace environment allows workers and OHS 
representatives to unreservedly call upon whatever assistance they deem necessary when dealing 
with OHS issues, then OHS consultation is at risk of being restricted to minor or periphery day-
to-day issues.  If indeed this is the case, this would then appear to contradict the philosophical 
belief that consultation is one of the major mechanisms in achieving far reaching and effective 
OHS solutions. 
 
 
7.6 A power-based control inertia 
The research of Antonsen (2009) suggested that the issues of power and culture within an 
organisation are inextricably entwined.  Therefore, any study of organisational culture and 
subsequent safety culture, should be inclusive of an analysis of the power and conflict that 
naturally occurs within an organisation.  Antonsen believed that the safety culture of an 
organisation is not necessarily homogeneous and free of conflict, but if identified and managed 
correctly, such conflict should be seen more as a resource that is able to facilitate a learning and 
sharing process, rather than something to be feared and suppressed, or even ignored.   
 
The data from this project suggests that no matter where an organisation was deemed to be in 
terms of their level of organisation maturity, when it came to engaging in meaningful and 
effective consultation between senior management representatives and OHS representatives on 
Victorian commercial and industrial construction sites, there appeared to be what is perhaps best 
described as a ‘power-based control inertia’.  This appeared to prevent successful joint 
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arrangements in terms of consultation and shared decision making ventures from occurring to its 
full potential - especially when it came to strategic and upstream OHS issues.  This is perhaps 
both disappointing and unfortunate, because as Walters and Nichols (2006) found: ‘… joint 
arrangements involving representation and consultation with employees on health and safety 
matters lead to better outcomes in terms of health and safety awareness and performance than 
when health and safety management is left to employers to manage unilaterally…’ (p.252).  
 
Consultation, discussion or argument should not just be about what information is shared and 
revealed, but should also be about what information is not shared and/or disclosed.  According to 
Antonsen (2009), it is regrettable that many organisations, who may initially aim at controlling 
their employee’s acts, may also end up wanting to control their hearts and minds.  He claimed 
that there was: ‘… a manipulative basic attitude which is inherent, but nonetheless unspoken in 
some management theories… (and) … the pursuit of consensus which characterises many 
management theories can be ethically problematic because building consensus can easily turn into 
manipulation…’ (p.190).   
 
Any type of power-based control inertia is arguably the very antithesis of the concept of 
meaningful and effective employee empowerment and involvement and would appear to 
contradict the principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect.  Nutbeam and Harris (2005) 
believed that the process of empowering individuals is not an easy task, and is in fact very time 
consuming, which requires a great level of trust and commitment between the parties involved 
and importantly, a willingness to relinquish power.  Based upon the evidence of this project, such 
a relinquishment of power may well be one of the main stumbling blocks that prevented the full 
and unambiguous application of issues such as trust, honesty, commitment and respect.  In turn, 
this appeared to have prevented more genuine empowerment and involvement of OHS 
representatives to take part in more strategic and upstream OHS discussions, regardless of each 
organisation’s deemed level of organisational maturity. 
 
 
7.7  A hidden resistance to trust, honesty, commitment and 
respect? 
The data from this project appears to raise questions about whether or not the concept of 
organisational and cultural maturity can have any lasting effect or impact upon the notions of 
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meaningful and effective consultation in the Victorian construction industry, if the issues or 
principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect are only cautiously and selectively applied.  
This research suggests that while senior management representatives and OHS representatives on 
Victorian construction sites consult with each other over OHS, and while there appeared to be an 
amenable and dutiful acceptance towards the principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect 
by the individuals, there was also an almost hidden resistance and reluctance to fully embrace and 
apply the true meanings and philosophies behind the principles.  This was especially so when it 
came to any type of meaningful or effective consultation between the parties over what this 
research called strategic or longer term OHS issues, such as the OHS management systems of the 
construction companies, or their OHS policies and procedures or any other type of longer term 
and/or other upstream OHS issues such as planning and/or programming. 
 
This apparent resistance or reluctance to fully embrace and unambiguously apply the four 
constitutive principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect during consultation, would seem 
to suggest that the benefits that are widely and readily acknowledged from engaging in 
meaningful and effective consultation (Cameron et al. 2006; Johnstone 2005; Walters et al. 2005; 
Lingard & Rowlinson 2005) are perhaps either being ignored, or even refuted by some 
organisations and individuals.  Indeed, it has been suggested by McCallum (2008), that there has 
recently been an ascendency of pro-business ideology, which has led to a subtle yet fundamental 
shift away by many organisations in their belief about the value and worth of active worker 
participation and engagement in OHS. 
 
Gunningham (2008) acknowledged that the concept of trust is both elusive and complex and that 
it has been the subject of a paucity of past research in the area of OHS.  He believed that where a 
long term relationship can be credibly established, it is the concept of trust that plays the critical 
role, especially when interactions between the players are frequent and ongoing.  The importance 
of trust in this type of relationship was emphasised by all the participants of this research project, 
but was perhaps best demonstrated by the site manager and the OHS representative of the 
Generative Company.  Overall, all participants generally agreed that trust was the vital 
component in the consultation process, if consultation was to have any meaning and positive 
effect upon levels of OHS. 
 
If managers or supervisors are seen to be honest, genuine and committed, Conchie and Burns 
(2009) suggested that this would generate a reciprocal formula whereby workers would behave 
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and act in a positive and beneficial manner.  They believed that the best relationships were those 
that were heavily influenced and reliant upon repeated exchanges with proximal and mature 
individuals engaged in the particular relationship.  However, if such a relationship is absent or 
such engagement is sporadic, as appeared to be the case with the non-attendance of a number of 
project or site managers at various OHS safety walks and OHS committee meetings of some of 
the companies used in this research project, this may have affected the levels of trust, honesty, 
commitment and respect displayed between some of the managers and the OHS representatives 
who participated in this research.   
 
Any apparent reluctance and resistance to fully embrace and engage in the overall philosophies of 
the four constitutive principles used in this project (i.e. trust, honesty, commitment and respect) 
may also suggest that the consultation process that is thought to be occurring throughout the 
Victorian commercial and industrial construction industry, may not be operating to the expected 
or presumed levels of efficacy, that was initially anticipated from their original or indeed current 
legislative intent. 
 
 
7.8 What does it all mean for the Victorian construction 
industry? 
In determining the worth and value of consultation and worker and OHS representative 
involvement in OHS, Walters and Nichols (2006) believed that it has long been acknowledged 
that ‘… the participation of workers and their representatives in the process is widely regarded as 
a necessary element in achieving successful outcomes…’ (p.247).  If we accept this premise, then 
the data collected from this research suggests that it is the quality of the consultation and how 
principles such as trust, honesty, commitment and respect are applied by all participants, which 
will ultimately determine how successful those OHS outcomes will be.  In the determination of 
the effectiveness and meaningfulness of consultation, it is the worth of the issues and the 
influence that workers and their representatives are capable of having over the final decisions and 
when those decisions are actually being made, rather than being formally taken, that would 
appear to be the crucial triggers or measuring points (Lunt et al. 2008; Cameron et al. 2006; 
Butler 2005; Davis & Lansbury 1996). 
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Based upon the evidence of this project, it could be argued that much of the consultation that 
occurred on the construction sites utilized in this research commonly tackled the wrong things.  
Indeed, there appeared to be a very narrow focus of what the consultation was actually being built 
around.  By primarily focusing on or engaging in such a narrow field of ideas and OHS issues 
during the consultation process, such as items of personal protective equipment, general clean up 
and the stacking and storing of materials in and around the sites, which, in the majority of cases, 
was done in a most fastidious, meticulous and conscientious manner, the majority of the OHS 
representatives time appeared to be spent mainly running around the project in a reactive and 
trouble-shooting type role.  This often seemed to isolate and marginalise the OHS representatives 
to such an extent, that at best it appeared to restrict, and at worst, prevented them from becoming 
involved and engaged in more strategic and higher level OHS issues on their construction sites.  
Strategic and longer term OHS issues appeared to remain the sole responsibility and prerogative 
of the most senior management personnel from each of the five companies, with in some cases, 
assistance and advice from the company OHS manager. 
 
The evidence from this project also suggests that the relationships which appeared to reflect 
higher levels or applications of trust, honesty, commitment and respect, were those relationships 
where the site/project manager regularly attended OHS committee meetings and/or safety walks.  
High levels of trust, honesty, commitment and respected also appeared to be more evident where 
the site/project manager regularly engaged in, and specifically made time for, regular and 
ongoing one-on-one adult-type conversations or discussions with the OHS representative about 
OHS issues, and where the organisation empowered the OHS representative to lead both the 
safety walks and the OHS committee meetings. 
 
In considering all of the data collected during this research project, perhaps there is now enough 
information to commence a debate about whether or not at least some level of consultation with 
OHS representatives over more upstream, critical and strategic long-term OHS matters, may yield 
more benefits, in terms of OHS outcomes, than the consultation which occurred during this 
research.  Whilst this consultation strictly complied with the current legislative requirements, it 
tended to be confined to the day-to-day operational functions of a construction site.  Some of the 
more strategic and/or critical issues during the construction and planning stages that could 
involve a more consultative approach, could include matters that the Victorian OHS legislator 
deems to be high risk construction work.  Such work includes demolition and asbestos removal; 
the use of scaffolding and cranes (including the most suitable locations and the timing of the 
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removal and dismantling of such equipment); explicit and unequivocal agreement on the 
application of the hierarchy of controls in the provision of OHS solutions; the suitability and 
safety of specified construction materials and, the open and candid participation of OHS 
representatives in an organisations’ safety management system.  The consultation process could 
also be extended by construction companies to include a review mechanism at the end of each 
project or even at particular project milestones, to be conducted by the project or site manager 
and the OHS representative, of what has or has not been successful in terms of both OHS and 
productivity on the site.  The lessons and findings from such a review could then be taken and 
applied to the next stage and/or the next construction project, to increase and improve both the 
overall levels of OHS and organisational productivity. 
 
For all of the above to be successfully implemented, it may be necessary for some of the more 
upstream and construction design and programming matters to be brought closer together and 
better integrated into the more traditional downstream operational and/or execution stages of a 
construction project.  This should enable meaningful and effective consultation to occur with a 
greater range of participants, over a much broader array of topics, than that which currently 
appears to be occurring in the industry.  However, this would also appear to be somewhat reliant 
upon not just the levels of organisational and cultural maturity that each company or organisation 
is deemed to have reached, or indeed wishes to achieve, but how individuals unashamedly and 
unambiguously recognise and apply moral and ethical principles such as trust, honesty, 
commitment and respect, for both the short and long term future of the organisation. 
 
Based upon the findings of this research, Figure 8 provides a meaningful and effective industry 
consultation model, and the components and linkages that need to be considered to achieve this. 
 
 
 
The final chapter of this paper will recommend further research that will consolidate, compliment 
and further establish the important role that moral and ethical principles play in achieving 
meaningful and effective consultation over OHS. 
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Figure 8: Meaningful and effective industry consultation model: major components and linkages 
            (Based on Emmet 1966). 
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Chapter 8 Recommendations for further research 
 
8.1 Organisational maturity and the recognition and 
application of moral and ethical principles 
Nichols (1979) stated that ‘…since safety is a question of putting people before production, the 
people who do the producing must have the power to ensure that their safety is put first…’ (p.60).  
In most civilised societies today, such a proposition would not appear to be either unreasonable or 
indeed unworkable.  However, this research suggests that OHS representatives and workers in the 
Victorian construction industry have very little input or power in ensuring that their safety is put 
first, due to the limited influence that they appear to have in how health and safety is managed at 
their workplaces.  The data from this research also suggests that these limitations are even more 
pronounced when organisations do not appear to truly value and subsequently fully implement 
the ideals and philosophies behind moral and ethical principles or issues such as trust, honesty, 
commitment and respect during consultation over OHS matters.   
 
This is perhaps not only regrettable, but should be somewhat of a concern, as the involvement and 
engagement of workers in managing OHS is a fundamental principle of the Robens’ philosophy 
(Committee on Health and Safety at Work 1972). Of particular concern, is that it is this 
philosophy which Australian, and in particular Victorian OHS legislation, is based upon.   
 
In the context of this research, the failure to enable and provide for meaningful and effective 
input by construction workers and their OHS representatives over the management of strategic, 
long term and upstream OHS issues, arguably means there is also a wealth of underutilised 
knowledge and skill lying dormant within both construction companies and the industry as a 
whole.  The recognition, management and transfer of the knowledge and skill contained within an 
organisation and their workforce has long been acknowledged as being fundamental to the 
successful establishment and long term survival and profitability of an organisation (Robinson et 
al. 2006, 2005; Salojärvi et al. 2005; Smith 2001). 
 
If the application of constitutive and/or ethical and moral principles such as trust, honesty, 
commitment and respect within the concept of organisational and cultural maturity, are to have 
real meaning and effect within construction companies and the Victorian construction industry, 
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and if the notion of managing and transferring the knowledge and skill contained within 
organisations is to have a positive effect on levels of OHS, it is recommended that further 
research should be undertaken to explore:  
 
1. Whether the concept of organisational maturity is a viable and realistic construct for 
the construction industry; 
2. What emphasis should be placed upon, and what role should moral or ethical 
principles play, within both the construction industry and within the concept of 
organisational and cultural maturity?;  and 
3. How might the concept of organisational and cultural maturity better manage and 
transfer the knowledge and skill base of an organisation.   
 
 
8.2 Power and culture 
This research has suggested that the issues of power and control have a significant role to play in 
the ability of both individuals and through them, the organisations whom they work for, to fully 
and unambiguously apply moral and ethical principles such as trust, honesty, commitment and 
respect during consultation over OHS.  According to Antonsen (2009), it is unfortunate that the 
role of power in organisations has rarely been addressed in safety culture research.  He considered 
that such a failure in future research could jeopardize and potentially limit the concept of safety 
culture into a ‘… superficial and simplified representation of organisational life…’ (p.183).  He 
also believed that there is often a great deal missed when organisations incorrectly substitute 
culture for power and because of this, organisational safety should be analysed through a power-
oriented approach, rather than a simple cultural perspective.   
 
The issue of power and the conflict of interests that continually arise from the various interest 
groups involved within an organisation would appear to be fundamental to any study of safety 
and organisational culture (Antonsen 2009).  It would also appear that power differences, conflict 
and employee differentiation have not yet been discussed or studied in as much or as great as 
detail as perhaps they need to be in past safety culture research.   
 
In consideration of all of the above, it is a recommendation of this project that further cultural and 
organisational research be undertaken specific to the construction industry, that examines the 
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social interactions and processes which occur within both construction companies and the 
industry in general.  It is also recommended that such research carefully examine the potential 
influence and effect that both power and conflict has in terms of an organisations ability to not 
only progress along the continuum of organisational and cultural maturity, but also the affect it 
has on the ability of both organisations and individuals to recognise and unequivocally apply 
moral and ethical principles such as trust, honesty, commitment and respect during consultation 
over OHS. 
 
 
8.3 The relevance of constitutive principles  
During this research project, there was never any obvious or blatant personal opposition to the 
philosophies or principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect.  However, the data 
suggested that there was an almost hidden organisational resistance and reluctance to fully 
embrace and apply the true meanings and philosophies behind the principles.  This was especially 
noticeable when it came to meaningful and effective consultation and employee involvement in 
the OHS management systems of the organisations who participated in this research.  In the 
interest to create more sophisticated, comprehensive and inclusive models of successful and 
systematic OHS management systems, the reasons for such reluctance to fully embrace and 
explicitly apply constitutive or moral and ethical principles, thereby ensuring quality employee 
involvement within the systems, would seemingly appear to be worth solving. 
 
It is therefore recommended that further research be conducted to explore the relevance and value 
of constitutive or moral and ethical principles such as trust, honesty, commitment and respect in 
the organisational and/or corporate environment.  If they are indeed relevant, valued and 
appreciated by organisations, further research should be conducted on how the principles are best 
conveyed and what techniques are best able to allow them to permeate and establish themselves 
throughout an organisation, and the effect that this may have on an organisations’ overall 
systematic approach to managing OHS. 
 
 
8.4 Legal or moral and ethical obligations? 
This research project demonstrated that the five Victorian construction companies who 
participated in this research, were all fully capable of complying with their legal obligations in 
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terms of consultation over OHS.  However, regardless of the levels of organisational maturity that 
each company was deemed to have reached, each company demonstrated, albeit to varying 
degrees, a failure to unambiguously and fully recognise and apply the constitutive and/or moral 
and ethical principles of trust, honesty, commitment and respect during consultation over OHS.  
This suggests that consultation may only be occurring within each of the organisations because of 
the legal obligation imposed upon them, rather than engaging in consultation for all the 
acknowledged OHS benefits. 
 
If consultation is to effectively contribute in the overall endeavour and strategy to improve OHS 
outcomes, it is recommended that further research be undertaken to better understand the true 
effect of the legislative provisions for consultation and whether or not it can be improved by the 
application of moral and ethical principles.  The two questions that arguably require more in-
depth research to assist in this process are: 
 
1. What effect does compulsory consultation have on levels of OHS? 
2. What effect does the presence or failure of moral and ethical principles (such as trust, 
honesty, commitment and respect) during consultation have on levels of OHS? 
 
 
8.5 Time and consultation 
It is generally accepted that there are no easy options or short-cuts for organisations if they wish 
to consistently achieve and maintain high levels of OHS.  However, the time it takes to achieve 
this concept or ultimate goal would sometimes appear to be in conflict and competes with 
production and other economic pressures that an organisation faces (Huber, van Wijgerden, de 
Witt & Dekker 2009; Mitropoulos & Cupido 2009).  This conflict and competition would also 
appear to exist when it comes to carrying out meaningful and effective consultation over OHS.   
 
While individuals may indeed be willing to truly and unambiguously apply moral and ethical 
principles such as trust, honesty, commitment and respect during consultation, the competitive 
nature and constant economic pressures of the construction industry may be hampering and 
restricting the true application of these principles far more than is either known or acknowledged.  
The effect this has on levels of OHS within the construction industry would appear to be another 
unknown and under-researched construct. 
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In light of this, it is recommended that further research be conducted that explores the relationship 
between economic and production pressures and the time it takes to engage in meaningful and 
effective consultation, whilst applying moral and ethical principles in the construction industry.   
 
 
8.6 Upstream and strategic OHS consultation 
The final recommendation for further research arising from this research project, is based upon 
the concept or proposition that construction companies should begin to engage in and consult 
with their OHS representatives over more strategic and upstream OHS issues, far more than what 
appears to be currently occurring.  Further to this, it has also been suggested in this thesis (see 
Section 7.8) that an ‘end of project’ consultation forum could be undertaken between senior site 
or project management representatives and key OHS representatives, to more accurately 
determine what did or did not work well on a just-completed construction project.   
 
This latter process is often referred to as double-loop learning and according to Associate 
Professor J. Sillitoe (personal communication, Ballarat University, April 13
th
 2011), is predicated 
upon a shared commitment to learning amongst all levels of an organisation.  He believed that the 
successful implementation of double-loop learning requires a culture of learning to be embedded 
throughout the organisation, which should then involve and encourage a reflection and a re-
framing or re-shaping of the underlying patterns of thinking that occurs throughout the 
organisation.  According to Sillitoe, this should then encourage stakeholders to challenge and ask 
questions about how problems are initially identified, what processes are used to understand 
them, and why specific actions are chosen as a way to fix them. 
 
If such an approach could be applied and utilised in the construction industry, it may well have a 
positive effect in the effort to continually improve levels of OHS.  It is therefore a 
recommendation of this research project, that further investigation be conducted on both double-
loop learning and upstream and strategic OHS consultation with OHS representatives, that 
specifically targets and examines the effect that these processes may have on levels of OHS in the 
construction industry.   
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Appendix A 
Summary of expert panel analysis of observable measures of companies 
 
 
Each cell represents a question or observable measure at each of the particular levels of the Hudson model of organisational maturity.  Each panel 
members’ answer was entered by a letter/s which represented the particular level of maturity (i.e. Pa - Pathological; R – Reactive; C – Calculative; 
Pr – Proactive and G – Generative) that they believed the particular company had achieved at these observable measures - based upon the 
information provided in the dossier (see Appendix D). 
 
For the purposes of this project, the panel members then gave each company an overall rating that best represented, in their opinion, the 
organisational maturity level of each particular company.  
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Key to symbols     Pa – Pathological;   R- Reactive;   C – Calculative;   Pr – Proactive;   G – Generative 
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C C C C R 
 
C C C C Pa 
 
Pr C Pr C C 
 
Pr Pr G Pr Pr 
 
Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr 
 
Pr Pr Pr Pr 
Pr 
 
Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr 
 
G Pr Pr Pr Pr 
 
Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr 
 
Proactive 
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Appendix B 
Summary of numerical results from expert panel analysis of observable measures 
 
 
COMPANY PATHOLOGICAL 
(PA) 
REACTIVE  
(R) 
CALCULATIVE 
(C) 
PROACTIVE 
(PR)  
GENERATIVE 
(G) 
OVERALL  
SELECTION  
1 29 11 0 0 0 Path. 
2 14 25 1 0 0 Reactive 
3 0 3 35 2 0 Calculative 
4 2 4 32 2 0 Calculative 
5 4 8 28 0 0 Calculative 
6 0 0 0 34 6 Proactive 
7 0 21 19 0 0 Reactive 
8 0 0 2 36 2 Proactive 
9 29 11 0 0 0 Pathological 
10 0 4 28 6 2 Calculative 
11 1.5 16 20.5 2 0 Calculative 
12 0 3 18 19 0 Proactive 
13 26 12 2 0 0 Pathological 
14 6 24 10 0 0 Reactive 
15 1 0 4 22 13 Proactive 
16 0 0 25 14 1 Calculative 
17 1 18 20 1 0 Calculative 
18 2 13 25 0 0 Calculative 
19 5.5 21.5 13 0 0 Reactive 
20 1 1 11 25 2 Proactive 
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Appendix C   
Comparison of expert panel and authors’ analysis of observable measures 
Key:   1 = Pathological;   2 = Reactive;   3 = Calculative;   4 = Proactive;   5 = Generative  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
        Total:  5 
  
 
 
COMPANY 
EXPERT 
PANEL  
SELECTION 
          
           X  
AUTHORS’ 
SELECTION 
 
          
          Y 
(DIFFERENCE) 
 
 
 
           D        
(DIFFERENCE 
SQUARED) 
 
 
        D² 
1 1 1 0 0 
2 2 2 0 0 
3 3 3 0 0 
4 3 3 0 0 
5 3 3 0 0 
6 4 5 1 1 
7 2 2 0 0 
8 4 4 0 0 
9 1 1 0 0 
10 3 3 0 0 
11 3 2 1 1 
12 4 3 1 1 
13 1 1 0 0 
14 2 2 0 0 
15 4 5 1 1 
16 3 3 0 0 
17 3 2 1 1 
18 3 3 0 0 
19  2 2 0 0 
20  4 4 0 0 
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Spearman Rank Correlation Test 
R = Σ d²= 5 
 
n = 20 
 
Z =    6R −n(n² - 1) 
          n (n + 1) √n-1 
 
 
=    6 x 5  −  20 (399) 
      20 (21) √19 
 
 
=    30 − 7980 
           1831   =    −4∙34 
 
 
Critical value Z 95%   =  1∙64;  therefore we reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the sets (Kanji 1999). 
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Appendix D 
Dossier of company information for allocating companies into organisational maturity model 
 
 
 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 1 No formal OHS 
department or 
allocated OHS 
coordinator or 
manager.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
OHS procedures 
required from 
subcontractors, 
but are often 
very different to 
what occurs on 
site.  Duty to 
produce 
procedures 
heavily 
influenced by 
potential legal 
implications. 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cursory checks 
by middle 
management.  
OHS reps often 
take on this 
responsibility.  
Site safety 
committee 
inspects site 
once a week. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
No obvious 
interest.  OHS 
issues and 
information 
generally passed 
onto workers 
only after the 
regulatory 
authority (i.e. 
Worksafe) have 
visited sites.  
Site specific 
OHS 
information not 
always freely 
available to 
OHS rep. 
 
Deemed level? 
Priority is to limit 
liability and 
prevent or limit 
any blame onto 
company.  
Accidents are not 
always reported by 
management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed Level? 
OHS audits and 
reviews 
unstructured; 
will normally 
only occur after 
a serious 
accident or 
incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Safety meetings 
generally held 
weekly or less if 
able to.  Run by 
management.  
Grudgingly 
accepted by 
management as 
necessary.  OHS 
issues 
sometimes 
trivialized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Not encouraged, 
but not openly 
discouraged.  
Often after 
accidents or 
suggested by 
external parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 2 No formal OHS 
department.  
OHS position 
‘honorary’ and 
added onto other 
formal roles.  
OHS influence 
very limited.  
Much OHS 
advice sought 
from outside 
consultants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedures 
sought from all 
subcontractors; 
reflecting more 
of a legal 
implication 
rather than pure 
safety.  Many 
procedures not 
reflective of 
actual site 
conditions.  
Generally 
reviewed for 
relevance only 
after an accident 
or incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Cursory checks 
by site/middle 
management.  
OHS reps often 
seen as the 
enforcer of OHS 
rules rather than 
management.  
Safety walks by 
safety 
committee once 
a week.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Interest varies 
and wanes; 
depending on 
the issue and 
how it relates to 
productivity.  
Safety posters 
and stickers 
from WorkSafe 
encouraged to 
be displayed on 
site notice 
boards.  Site 
specific OHS 
information not 
always made 
available to 
OHS rep. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
General approach 
of company seeks 
to apportion blame 
onto the 
workforce.  Seeks 
to legally distance 
the company from 
the event.  
Reporting the 
event often needs 
to be encouraged 
by others.  Limited 
follow up. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
OHS audits and 
reviews are 
sometimes seen 
as a nuisance.  
Happier to audit 
subcontractor’s 
OHS systems 
and procedures.  
Audits generally 
occur after an 
accident or 
serious incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
OHS committee 
meets weekly; 
less if able to.  
Short term and 
smaller, more 
immediate OHS 
issues such as 
PPE and 
housekeeping 
are mainly dealt 
with.  Agenda 
generally set by 
management 
with little 
worker input or 
involvement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Training 
supplied if 
requested.  
Prefers 
workforce to 
train in their 
own time rather 
than company 
time.  Mainly 
OHS reps 
provided with 
training.  
Management 
provided with 
limited 
introductory 
OHS training. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 3 Designated OHS 
person, who 
reports to HR / 
Construction 
manager.  
Positive, albeit 
limited input 
into site and 
general OHS 
conditions and 
issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedures used 
to prove safe 
systems of work 
and to prevent 
adverse 
consequences 
occurring during 
the work 
process.  All 
subcontractors 
required to have 
them and cannot 
commence work 
without them.  
Used as the 
basis for toolbox 
induction 
meetings. 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
Site activities 
checked by both 
management 
and OHS reps.  
Productivity 
issues generally 
take precedence 
over OHS issues 
when being 
checked by 
management.  
Serious breaches 
halted; many 
minor issues 
overlooked and 
allowed to 
continue.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
Genuine interest 
shown by 
company OHS 
officer via OHS 
bulletins, 
stickers and 
posters form a 
range of 
sources.  
Generally a top 
down approach; 
OHS reps also 
encouraged to 
source OHS 
information.  
Generally 
forthcoming 
with site specific 
OHS 
information for 
OHS reps. 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Concern for 
victims, but also 
company statistics 
and general 
standing or how it 
reflects on the 
company itself.  
Investigation run 
by management 
with limited 
workforce and or 
OHS rep influence.  
Reporting 
requirements 
adhered to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Regular audit 
review process.  
Happy to review 
both company 
and 
subcontractor’s 
systems of work 
and procedures.  
Audits not 
always focusing 
upon major 
issues and may 
tend to gravitate 
towards so 
called minor and 
easy fix 
solutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Weekly OHS 
committee 
meetings.  
Worker input 
into solutions 
limited to 
immediate, 
rather than long 
term planning 
and complex 
OHS issues.  
Time limit set 
for OHS 
meetings.  Both 
management 
and workers 
sometimes need 
encouragement 
to attend. 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
OHS training 
never refused, 
but generally 
reserved and 
provided for 
OHS reps, or 
those who 
specifically 
request it.  
Limited 
management 
OHS training 
given. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 4 Seen as 
important, but 
designated OHS 
manager 
initially given 
position when 
no other suitable 
position was 
available.  OHS 
manager reports 
to IR/HR 
manager.  
Decisions can be 
and are often 
vetoed by 
IR/HR manager.  
IR/HR manager 
has major 
influence over 
OHS decisions 
and policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
Very strict 
policy for all 
procedures to be 
fully 
documented.  
Heavy emphasis 
on the legal 
requirements to 
have the 
procedures 
documented.  
Procedures often 
in conflict with 
reality of site 
conditions; 
especially when 
time becomes an 
issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
Safety checks by 
management 
focus more on 
productivity.  
Genuine 
consideration 
given to serious 
OHS issues, 
however conflict 
and inconsistent 
approach arises 
if issue is 
perceived to be 
interfering with 
productivity.  
OHS reps 
expected to 
inspect and 
report OHS 
issues. Limited 
regulatory 
inspections 
welcomed to 
justify 
procedural and 
regulatory 
compliance. 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Information and 
communication 
of OHS issues 
on management 
terms.  
Management 
generally 
decides what 
OHS 
information will 
be 
communicated 
and passed onto 
the OHS reps 
and general 
workforce.  
Heavily 
promotes their 
own company 
OHS 
paraphernalia.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
General concern 
how the accident 
will reflect on their 
own statistics.  Sub 
contractor 
generally left to 
‘explain’ reasons 
for incident.  
Investigations run 
by management 
with little OHS rep 
input or 
recommendations.  
Reporting of 
accident can be a 
little slow.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Has a regular 
auditing 
schedule.  More 
inclined and 
happier to audit 
sub contactors 
OHS 
management 
systems.  
Auditing of 
systems carried 
out only by 
OHS manager 
and other 
management 
members; little 
OHS rep 
involvement.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level?  
Meetings often 
taken up solving 
minor issues 
(e.g 
housekeeping, 
PPE) rather than 
major planning 
OHS issues.  
Management 
generally set 
agenda and 
leads the 
meeting, 
although 
sometimes 
‘chaired’ by 
OHS rep.  
Worker input 
valued more on 
minor issues and 
issues that do 
not require 
major changes. 
Information not 
always made 
freely available 
to reps and 
worker 
representatives. 
 
Deemed level? 
OHS training 
acknowledged 
and promoted; 
especially for 
OHS reps.  
Training in 
company time 
not seen as an 
issue.  
Management 
training mainly 
‘in house’.  OHS 
rep training 
mainly external.  
Training in 
company OHS 
policy and 
procedures 
provided.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 5 No formal OHS 
department.  
Nominated OHS 
manager also 
has other roles 
within the 
company; OHS 
role seen as 
important but is 
often secondary 
to others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
OHS procedures 
seen as 
important for 
both legal 
compliance and 
safe work 
practices.  
Conflict arises 
when time and 
costs become 
factors of 
influence on 
productivity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Middle 
management 
and OHS reps 
check on OHS 
and general site 
conditions on 
informal safety 
walks 
throughout the 
day.  
Management 
generally 
looking at 
productivity but 
overall will 
acknowledge 
and respond in 
kind to OHS 
issues.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generally a top 
down approach 
to 
communicating 
OHS issues.  
Not a lot of 
OHS rep or 
worker input 
into the issues 
communicated.  
Posters, stickers 
and WorkSafe 
OHS literature 
are major 
components of 
the OHS 
communication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Concerned over 
potential statistical 
analysis of 
company.  
Generally 
investigations run 
by management 
and management 
of sub contractor/s.  
Little OHS rep 
involvement, 
hence little or no 
OHS rep 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Happy to audit 
sub contractors, 
less enthusiastic 
about auditing 
themselves.  
Haphazard 
program for 
auditing.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Management 
generally set the 
agenda.  OHS 
issues discussed 
with input from 
OHS reps.  
Timeframe set 
for meetings and 
discussion times 
over issues.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Training seen as 
a positive; 
however prefer 
OHS reps do 
training that is 
recommended 
by the company.  
Training mainly 
promoted for 
elected OHS 
reps rather than 
the general 
workforce. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 6 Large and 
important 
department 
within the 
organisation.  
OHS personnel 
professional and 
knowledgeable.  
Department has 
much influence 
within the 
company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Procedures seen 
as very 
important within 
the organisation.  
All sub 
contractors 
cannot 
commence work 
without them.  
Time and money 
are not always 
the primary 
considerations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Management 
expected to 
check on a daily 
basis, together 
with the OHS 
reps.  Lines of 
communication 
between the two 
parties seen as 
very important 
to identify and 
solve issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
All types of 
OHS 
information 
sought and 
displayed 
around sites.  
OHS reps have 
own computers 
to access OHS 
information at 
will.  
Management 
regularly ask for 
advice from the 
OHS reps over 
OHS issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
First priority is for 
the welfare of any 
injured workers.  
Investigations 
focus generally on 
both immediate 
and underlying 
causes.  Senior 
management and 
OHS reps fully 
involved with 
investigation and 
all 
recommendations 
are positively 
sought.  Fully 
compliant with all 
regulatory 
reporting 
requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Extensive audit 
programs.  Bias 
of ‘internal 
auditors’ 
recognized and 
accounted for.  
Input from OHS 
reps welcomed 
and actively 
sought.  Audits 
seen as a 
positive tool to 
improve overall 
OHS levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Meetings take 
place in an open 
and relaxed 
manner.  All 
issues discussed 
with a view to 
providing 
positive 
solutions.  
Feedback given 
to workforce 
and time is 
generally not an 
issue.  Meetings 
can be called by 
any member of 
OHS committee 
if required.  
Meetings are 
generally 
eagerly awaited. 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
OHS training 
seen as positive 
and greatly 
encouraged both 
for management 
and workers in 
general; 
especially OHS 
reps and 
committee 
members.  
Training seen as 
integral for the 
workings of the 
company OHS 
management 
system and the 
general overall 
safety of their 
construction 
sites. 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 7 Designated OHS 
manager.  Small 
department, with 
limited 
influence; 
especially in 
relation to 
changes that 
may be required 
after accidents 
or serious 
occurrences.  
Normally called 
in and utilized 
when there are 
disputes or 
disagreements 
over OHS issues 
on sites. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
Procedures 
viewed as 
important; 
arguably more 
so for legal 
compliance.  All 
sub contractors 
required to have 
safe work 
procedures, but 
these may not 
always be 
reflective of 
how work is 
carried out.  
Quality of 
procedures used 
as a guide when 
choosing sub 
contractors for 
particular works 
on projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
Middle 
management 
(i.e.area or work 
supervisors) 
responsible to 
check safety 
daily.  OHS reps 
encouraged and 
expected to 
check safety, but 
sometimes this 
role is in 
substitution for 
and not just as a 
compliment to 
the supervisor’s 
role.  
Productivity can 
sometimes 
override and 
often appears to 
unduly affect 
and influence 
the quality and 
prominence 
given to OHS 
issues. 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
Management 
shows a general 
interest, but 
usually OHS 
information is 
communicated 
on their terms.  
Generally 
displays OHS 
posters and 
information 
sheets from 
various sources; 
but no formal 
OHS 
information type 
meetings to 
directly discuss 
the OHS 
message 
displayed in the 
information on 
display. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Reporting of 
accidents generally 
good.  Concern 
shown over 
accident victims; 
however there is a 
lack of follow up 
over victim/s 
welfare and 
recovery.  
Accident 
investigation 
emphasis focuses 
on how to prevent 
accident from 
reoccurring so 
productivity is not 
halted or slowed 
down in future, 
and is normally 
directed by site 
management with 
token OHS rep 
input. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
No regular audit 
schedule or 
program, 
although site 
audits are 
conducted.  
Happier to audit 
sub contractors; 
self audits 
display inherent 
bias towards 
their system and 
its’ operation / 
implementation.  
Little worker or 
OHS rep input 
into audits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Site safety 
committees 
generally meet 
weekly.  
Meetings 
generally ‘run’ 
by management.  
OHS rep and 
employee input 
welcomed; 
degree of their 
influence is 
debatable.  OHS 
committee 
meetings are 
generally well 
attended and 
eagerly awaited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS training 
acknowledged 
and encouraged; 
although 
generally for 
elected OHS 
reps.  
Management 
OHS training 
limited to 
compulsory ‘in 
house’ training 
and instructions.  
OHS reps able 
to train in 
working hours 
and able to 
upgrade their 
skills when 
required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 8 Well resourced 
and staffed OHS 
department.  
OHS manager 
specifically 
chosen for his 
experience, 
knowledge and 
skill in the field 
of both OHS 
and the industry.  
OHS manager 
reports directly 
to the top 
management of 
the organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
Procedures seen 
as a way to 
encourage both 
compliance and 
improve work 
practices in 
general.  All sub 
contractors 
require safe 
work procedures 
and are 
prevented from 
commencing 
work if they are 
not first 
submitted to site 
management.  
Constant review 
of procedures; 
procedures 
begin to 
outweigh and 
surpass time and 
money 
considerations.  
Procedures not 
always 
reflective of site 
conditions 
Deemed level? 
 
Site supervisors 
and OHS reps 
will check safety 
on a daily basis.  
Often this 
process is done 
in tandem, but 
on other 
occasions alone.  
While 
productivity 
remains the 
overall project 
objective, 
positive 
dialogue 
between 
management 
and OHS reps 
ensures a high 
profile for safety 
on the job. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS 
information 
obtained from a 
variety of 
sources.  
Positive input 
and feedback 
sought from 
OHS reps and 
workforce in 
general about 
the value of the 
information.  
OHS reps 
encouraged and 
provided with 
the resources 
and facilities to 
source relevant 
OHS 
information.  
Site specific 
OHS 
information 
freely available 
to OHS reps. 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Quick response to 
welfare of any 
victim/s.  Follow 
up could be 
improved; 
however 
investigation 
generally looks for 
both immediate 
and underlying 
causes.  
Investigation 
normally headed 
by senior 
management and 
company OHS 
manager, OHS 
reps fully involved 
along all stages 
and their input is 
actively sought.  
Transparent 
reporting process 
generally carried 
out without delay. 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Well resourced 
audit program 
carried out 
throughout the 
company; 
examines both 
in house and sub 
contractors.  
Seen as a 
positive tool.  
Looks for 
potential 
problems and 
values 
workforce input, 
although 
workforce not 
directly 
involved in the 
process itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Broad range of 
OHS issues 
discussed at 
weekly OHS 
committee 
meetings; not 
just the 
immediate 
issues.  Positive 
involvement 
from all sides.  
These meetings 
are seen as a 
positive tool for 
site OHS levels 
and are always 
well attended 
and eagerly 
awaited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS training for 
both 
management 
and OHS reps 
encouraged.  All 
OHS reps and 
OHS committee 
members 
encouraged to 
upgrade their 
skills in OHS.  
OHS training 
seen as a natural 
process for both 
management 
and OHS reps.  
However, 
general 
workforce OHS 
training left up 
to individual 
subcontractors 
to carry out and 
implement. 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 9 No one person 
specifically 
appointed OHS 
manager or 
officer.  Position 
appears to be 
taken up by 
whoever is free 
at the particular 
time it is 
deemed 
necessary.  
Appears the role 
or position is 
absorbed into 
the HR side of 
the organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Requirements 
for procedures 
appear to vary 
from manager to 
manager, issue 
to issue.  Openly 
acknowledged 
that procedures 
are required to 
satisfy legal 
requirements in 
case things go 
wrong.  
Documents can 
be vastly 
different to the 
actual work 
environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
The checking of 
safety appears to 
occur in an ad-
hoc and 
haphazard 
manner.  
Supervisors on 
projects appear 
to have little 
time to carry out 
daily safety 
checks; workers 
and reps (where 
available) are 
left to ‘enforce 
and abide’ by 
the OHS 
procedures and 
safe work 
practices as best 
they can. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
OHS 
information 
sparingly 
promoted.  
Basic 
information 
made available 
if required; 
workers 
frequently told 
to be more 
careful and not 
to cause trouble 
if reporting OHS 
issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Workers often 
blamed or held 
responsible for 
either being 
accident prone or 
not abiding by 
company 
instructions.  
Reporting of 
accidents to 
regulatory 
authority not 
consistent or in 
some cases carried 
out.  Concern over 
record of 
company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
No official 
audits carried 
out.  Reviews of 
procedures 
generally occur 
only after an 
accident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Meetings have 
little positive 
worker planning 
or involvement.  
Will meet OHS 
committee due 
to legal 
requirements; 
OHS issues 
often merged 
into other areas 
(e.g 
productivity, 
programs, HR / 
IR issues). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Training 
completed only 
if required by 
regulatory 
authority.  
Reluctant to 
give workers or 
reps time off 
work to attend 
or complete 
training.  
Management 
OHS training 
occurs rarely; 
learning on the 
job training 
valued as a 
substitute and 
alternative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 10 Designated OHS 
manager and 
OHS 
department.  
OHS Manager 
reports to the 
company HR 
and General 
Manager of 
operations.  
Tend to 
emphasize 
company and 
regulatory 
policies more 
than creatively 
design and 
create new and 
far reaching 
policies.  
Produces many 
statistical 
reports for the 
company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Have many 
procedures and 
requires OHS 
procedures from 
all 
subcontractors.  
Procedures can 
however be 
different from 
actual site 
environment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Site activities 
regularly 
checked by site 
management, 
however OHS 
issues 
sometimes 
overlooked; 
especially if 
matters are not 
perceived to be 
‘serious’ and 
may impact 
upon timeframe 
of the project.  
Inspections are 
aimed at 
regulatory 
compliance.  
Supervisors, 
while 
encouraged to 
check on safety 
on a daily basis, 
sometimes rely 
on OHS reps to 
be their eyes and 
ears in regards 
to OHS issues 
onsite. 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
Management 
generally shows 
a reasonable 
level of interest 
communicating 
OHS issues.  
Lots of posters 
and stickers are 
provided for site 
use.  However 
tends to come 
from the top 
down, with 
employee input 
restricted to the 
format of the 
information as 
opposed to the 
subject and 
content of the 
OHS 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Priority is 
generally for any 
injured persons, 
however the 
company accident 
statistics are also 
of high concern.  
While the 
investigation 
process is run by 
management, it 
does have 
involvement from 
OHS reps, and 
generally attempts 
to get to the 
underlying causes.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Has a regular 
audit program in 
place.  Focus is 
primarily on sub 
contractors OHS 
system and 
procedures; but 
the company 
does self audit, 
although with 
little worker 
input.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
Has OHS 
committees on 
all sites that 
generally meet 
once a week.  
Meetings 
generally run by 
management, 
who generally 
set the agenda, 
but they 
welcome 
positive 
workforce 
involvement and 
participation.  
These meetings 
are generally 
seen as a 
positive tool, 
and in general 
committee 
members look 
forward to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
OHS training 
acknowledged 
and encouraged; 
especially for 
OHS reps.  Seen 
as an ongoing 
knowledge and 
skill 
development 
program for the 
company as well 
as for the 
individual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 11 No designated 
person or 
department 
within the 
company 
specifically for 
OHS.  OHS 
responsibility 
primarily rests 
with site 
managers on 
each site. 
Company 
directors may be 
called to assist if 
required.  
Company 
directors have 
no specific 
training or skills 
in OHS.  
Outside OHS 
consultants used 
occasionally for 
expert advice. 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
 
Has procedures 
and requires 
them from all 
subcontractors.  
Procedures 
generally 
accepted as a 
way to try and 
prevent 
accidents, but 
they are often 
subject to 
change due to 
cost and time 
implications and 
are not always 
reflective of site 
conditions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Site managers 
expected to take 
daily inspections 
for site and OHS 
conditions.  
Program of 
works often 
influence how 
thorough theses 
inspections are.  
OHS reps are 
sometimes 
‘delegated’ 
these OHS 
inspections, but 
have little 
control over 
changing 
conditions or 
work processes 
if required.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Management 
generally do not 
have a problem 
promoting or 
communicating 
OHS 
information.  
Happy to 
provide posters 
and pamphlets, 
and will 
generally rely on 
the OHS rep to 
source and 
obtain whatever 
material the reps 
can.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Error by the 
workforce is 
usually the first 
reaction, and while 
concern is with 
any victim/s, the 
company still 
bemoans the 
stalling of progress 
on the job.  
However, will 
involve OHS reps 
in investigation to 
help understand 
and attempt to 
prevent 
reoccurrences.  
Reliable in their 
endeavors to abide 
by regulatory 
requirements for 
reporting accidents 
and incidents. 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
With no OHS 
department or 
specific OHS 
personnel, audits 
and reviews do 
not occur on a 
regular basis.  
Specific site or 
procedure audits 
may occur on a 
site by site 
basis; however a 
systematic 
approach is not 
found within the 
company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Safety meetings 
are conducted 
with site safety 
committees on a 
weekly basis.  
Management 
tend to run the 
meetings and set 
the agenda.  
However, 
workforce 
involvement is 
encouraged; 
albeit on a 
somewhat 
limited platform 
of influence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Standard OHS 
training given to 
OHS reps and 
committee 
members if 
requested.  
Training neither 
discouraged nor 
encouraged.  
Management 
OHS training 
mainly on the 
job and via 
experience in 
the industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 12 Has a designated 
OHS officer 
who has many 
years of 
experience in 
the industry, but 
has no formal 
OHS 
qualifications.  
This person 
coordinates 
OHS training for 
the company 
(when required) 
and prepares 
their statistical 
reports.  The 
OHS influence 
is limited, but 
nevertheless 
enthusiastically 
undertaken. 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
 
Requires all 
subcontractors 
to have and 
submit 
procedures prior 
to commencing 
work.  
Requirements 
are for both 
legal purposes 
and also to help 
prevent 
accidents and 
serious 
incidents.  
Procedures 
generally 
compliant to the 
work 
environment but 
under 
production and 
cost pressures 
sometimes 
breakdown in 
their application. 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Site supervisors 
are required to 
check safety on 
a day to basis; 
they do this 
generally with 
the assistance of 
the OHS rep.  
Emphasis is 
generally on a 
compliance 
scale, as 
opposed to a 
‘can we do it 
better’ approach.  
Nonetheless, 
Safety 
inspections 
generally 
undertaken and 
performed in a 
concerted and 
collaborative 
manner. 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS 
information 
sought from a 
variety of 
sources and 
openly and 
enthusiastically 
displayed and 
discussed.  OHS 
reps are 
encouraged to 
provide and 
display various 
OHS 
information 
from various 
sources, and 
given time to 
obtain such 
relevant 
information.  
Site specific 
OHS 
information 
freely available 
for OHS reps. 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Genuine concern 
shown for any 
victims.  
Investigation is 
open and 
transparent, with 
positive workforce 
involvement and 
opportunity to 
comment and 
make 
recommendations.  
Generally happy to 
abide by reporting 
requirements and 
procedures.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Audits and 
reviews are 
conducted, but 
not on a 
particularly 
planned or 
scheduled basis.  
Happy to audit 
subcontractors, 
less so about 
their own 
systems.  Little 
worker 
involvement in 
the process 
when it does 
occur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Enthusiastically 
attended; 
weekly OHS 
committee held 
on sites.  
Generally run by 
management, 
but relies on 
positive 
workforce and 
OHS rep input 
and 
involvement.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS training 
encouraged and 
provided for 
OHS reps.  
Management 
OHS training 
tends to ne more 
spasmodic.  
OHS training 
seen as a 
positive element 
for the 
company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 13 Has neither a 
person nor a 
division within 
the company to 
specially deal 
with and 
coordinate OHS 
issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
Procedures are 
required from all 
subcontractors; 
however these 
appear to be 
more for legal 
requirements, as 
many of them 
simply bear little 
reflection of the 
site conditions, 
or the processes 
that occur on the 
projects.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety checks 
often left to the 
OHS reps.  
Issues that arise 
are often left for 
the OHS reps to 
resolve, 
provided that the 
resolutions and 
the solutions do 
not, or are not 
seen to interfere 
or adversely 
affect the 
projects’ 
programming.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Limited OHS 
information is 
allowed to be 
displayed on 
projects.  
Management 
decides what 
information is 
displayed and 
from where it is 
sourced from.  
Little worker or 
OHS rep 
involvement is 
sought.  
Management 
decides what 
information will 
be given to the 
OHS rep. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Initial 
investigations 
often attempt to 
apportion blame 
onto the 
workforce.  
Priority of 
company is to limit 
damage to the 
company and their 
‘records’.  Often 
require reminding 
to abide by 
regulatory accident 
and incident 
reporting 
mechanisms; 
workforce is 
sometimes 
transferred after 
accidents, thus 
hampering 
investigations.  
Investigations 
heavily influenced 
by management 
with little 
workforce input. 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
No regular or 
programmed 
audits.  If and 
when audits are 
carried out, they 
are conducted 
by management 
with very little 
worker input.  
Results of audits 
are not generally 
communicated 
to OHS reps. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS committee 
meetings run by 
management 
and held once a 
week; workers 
input tolerated, 
mainly due to 
legislative 
requirements, 
however the 
extent of their 
influence 
remains 
questionable.  
OHS issues 
raised by 
workers are 
sometimes 
trivialized or 
downplayed by 
management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS reps given 
training only on 
request.  
Management 
OHS training 
normally 
provided by the 
company.  
Company 
prefers training 
to be conducted 
outside of 
working hours. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 14 Nominated OHS 
coordinator.  
Has little overall 
influence, 
answers to other 
persons higher 
up in the 
company.  Used 
more as a 
compliance 
officer.  Often 
uses outside 
consultants for 
advice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While 
procedures are 
required from all 
subcontractors, 
they are often 
not reflective of 
site conditions.  
Sometimes 
written after an 
incident occurs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS reps 
generally take 
on this role, 
although site 
management are 
normally 
expected to 
carry out this 
function.  No 
formal 
inspection 
program other 
than weekly 
OHS committee 
inspections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
OHS issues and 
information 
displayed.  
Generally a top 
down approach, 
but OHS reps 
given some 
freedom of 
where to source 
and obtain OHS 
information.   
Site specific 
OHS 
information 
available to 
OHS reps upon 
request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Generally tries to 
limit any potential 
damage to the 
company.  While 
genuine concern is 
shown for any 
injured persons, 
management often 
annoyed at delays 
resulting from any 
incident.  
Investigations 
primarily run by 
management.  
Begrudgingly 
accepts worker and 
OHS rep 
involvement. 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Audits of 
company OHS 
system occurs 
but on a very 
unstructured 
basis.  Little 
worker or OHS 
rep involvement 
in the overall 
audit process.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
Weekly OHS 
committee 
meetings; 
primarily run by 
management.  
OHS rep and 
worker 
committee 
member 
involvement.  
Meetings 
normally on a 
strict timeframe.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS training 
provided for 
OHS reps.  
Subcontractors 
expected to 
provide their 
own training if 
they are on the 
OHS committee.  
Extra OHS 
training for 
management 
appears to be 
provided only 
on request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 15 No one person 
particularly 
designated sole 
responsibility 
for OHS 
throughout the 
company, 
therefore no 
‘official’ OHS 
department or 
division within 
the company.  
All senior 
project 
managers 
expected to take 
responsibility on 
their particular 
projects.  
Executive 
director of the 
company sees 
OHS as one of 
his main 
responsibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
Procedures 
required by all 
subcontractors. 
Procedures are 
generally 
consistent with 
site conditions, 
they can 
however be 
influenced by 
project pressures 
and timelines.  
A general 
degree of non 
compliance is 
accepted if it 
can be shown 
that the non 
compliance is 
still a safe way 
to conduct the 
work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Site / project 
managers and 
the OHS reps 
generally 
inspect the site 
together.  OHS 
reps will walk 
the site at other 
times during the 
day, engaging in 
discussion with 
all parties where 
issues arise.  
OHS reps are 
generally 
confident 
enough to stop 
work in unsafe 
and dangerous 
situations, and 
are not 
intimidated or 
fearful; leading 
to open and 
effective 
solutions to any 
OHS problems 
encountered. 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS 
information 
sought and 
displayed from a 
variety of 
sources.  Time 
given to OHS 
reps to source 
whatever they 
deem necessary 
and required in 
terms of OHS 
information.  
Particular site or 
project OHS 
information 
made freely 
available to 
OHS reps.  
Computers and 
internet access 
for OHS reps to 
assist in the 
process, and 
their input and 
feedback 
actively sought. 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Immediate concern 
is for any injured 
persons.  Tries to 
get to the 
underlying causes.  
Investigations 
conducted with 
senior 
management, OHS 
rep and worker 
representatives 
input. 
Recommendations 
from these 
investigations 
highly sought and 
valued in solving 
issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
No set schedule 
for audits and 
reviews   Relies 
on site or project 
progress and 
subsequent 
analysis of 
project overview 
to determine 
whether OHS 
was managed 
effectively.  
Appears to value 
opinions of OHS 
reps in terms of 
how particular 
projects have 
managed OHS, 
and any 
particular 
problems that 
may have 
occurred on the 
project.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Weekly safety 
meetings held 
on all sites.  
These meetings 
seen as a 
positive way to 
determine how 
safety on the site 
is being 
managed and 
conducted on 
the site.  
Positive 
involvement 
from the 
workforce and 
the OHS reps 
are a feature of 
these meetings.  
Meetings are 
eagerly awaited 
by all parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS training 
positively 
encouraged.  
Training in work 
hours not seen 
as a problem.  
All OHS reps 
given training as 
standard and 
encouraged to 
update and 
further their 
knowledge and 
skill.  
Management 
personnel given 
basic OHS 
training and 
encouraged to 
further their 
knowledge and 
skill in OHS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 16 Seen as an 
important and 
integral part of 
the organisation; 
personnel 
selected for their 
knowledge and 
skill in the field 
of both OHS 
and construction 
in general.  OHS 
manager reports 
directly to the 
CEO of the 
company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
Procedures seen 
as an important 
process to both 
maintain and 
improve OHS 
standards on all 
projects.  All 
sub contractors 
require 
procedures prior 
to 
commencement.  
Procedures are 
however 
vulnerable to 
corrosion in 
applicability 
when tight 
programming 
and scheduling, 
together with 
economic 
restraints, begin 
to appear within 
project 
timelines.   
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Site activities 
expected to be 
checked by site 
management on 
a daily basis, 
however 
sometimes this 
fails to 
eventuate due to 
programming 
issues and 
problems.  This 
process is often 
then delegated 
to the OHS rep, 
but they are not 
given the 
authority to 
change the work 
process without 
first seeking 
management 
consent or 
authorization.  
Inspections 
appear to take 
more of a 
compliance role. 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Management 
keen to share 
and promote 
OHS 
information.  
Provides many 
posters and OHS 
information 
sheets for each 
site / project.  
Generally a top 
down approach, 
but are not 
averse to 
allowing OHS 
reps to source 
and display 
OHS 
information that 
the OHS rep 
deems 
necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
While concern is 
generally shown 
for any injured 
parties, the 
company also 
reveals their 
concern over any 
adverse statistical 
impact of the event 
by generally 
focusing on the 
‘victim’ or the 
victims’ employer 
and their role in 
the event / 
incident.  
Investigations 
generally run by 
top management, 
OHS rep and 
workforce 
involvement 
tolerated, but with 
limited influence. 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Regular audit 
program in 
place.  
Enthusiastic to 
audit sub 
contactors, less 
so for 
themselves; 
although this 
does occur.  
Worker and/or 
OHS rep 
involvement and 
input is limited 
in audit 
program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Regular safety 
OHS committee 
meetings 
conducted on all 
projects.  
Generally run by 
management, 
but overall 
welcomes and 
encourages OHS 
rep and worker 
involvement and 
input.  OHS 
issues raised 
given due 
consideration 
and respect in 
terms of 
possible 
solutions.  
Meetings are 
generally well 
attended and 
positively run 
and promoted. 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Training 
generally well 
accepted and 
encouraged for 
all parties.  OHS 
rep training and 
committee 
training 
provided to all 
appropriate 
personnel.  OHS 
reps encouraged 
to further 
upgrade and 
enhance their 
knowledge and 
skill. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 17 Has an 
appointed OHS 
manager.  The 
OHS department 
is small, with 
questionable 
influence; 
especially when 
cost and time 
matters begin to 
manifest 
themselves upon 
projects.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
All sub 
contractors 
required to have 
OHS procedures 
for their work.  
History of 
company 
operation 
suggests that 
such documents 
are primarily 
used as legal 
coverage in case 
of accidents.  
Many 
procedures can 
be different to 
the actual work 
being performed 
out on site. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
There is an 
expectation that 
site managers 
are to check the 
safety of the site 
on a daily basis; 
however 
program and 
production 
pressures often 
find this process 
either relegated 
upon a scale of 
importance to 
when time 
permits, or 
delegated to the 
OHS reps.  For 
their part, the 
OHS reps are 
not always given 
the influence or 
autonomy to 
change unsafe 
practices 
without first 
getting approval 
from 
management. 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Flavor of the 
month issues 
readily 
displayed 
around sites.  
General 
literature and 
displays sought 
from regulatory 
authority.  Third 
party OHS 
information not 
generally 
encouraged.  
Generally a top 
down approach 
in terms of what 
types of 
information is 
allowable and 
able to be 
displayed and 
shared. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
General concern 
over impact upon 
company statistical 
reports in terms of 
how the company 
manages safety.  
Initial concern 
over any injuries 
suffered by 
workers.  
Investigations run 
by management, 
with token input 
by OHS reps.  
Reporting 
requirements 
generally adhered 
to; although 
sometimes 
begrudgingly so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Review and 
audit procedures 
are somewhat 
haphazard and 
vary from site to 
site.  Happier to 
audit sub 
contractors.  
Generally little 
worker or OHS 
rep involvement 
when OHS 
audits or 
reviews of 
procedures are 
conducted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS committee 
meetings 
conducted 
weekly.  
Generally run by 
management; 
with workforce 
input limited to 
regulatory 
requirements.  
Meetings 
normally run to 
an agreed 
timeframe; with 
OHS issues 
often held over 
to the next 
meeting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS rep 
training 
provided and in 
some cases 
encouraged to 
be undertaken 
and increasingly 
upgraded.  
Management 
training in OHS 
kept to ‘in 
house’ 
provisions and 
training in the 
company OHS 
system.  OHS 
training for OHS 
reps during 
working hours 
generally not an 
issue, but less so 
for management 
staff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 18 Appointed state 
OHS manager 
who has control 
of a relatively 
small 
department.  
Influence on 
production 
processes is 
questionable; 
used more for 
compliance and 
justification of 
approaches 
when issues 
arise on 
projects.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
All 
subcontractors 
require OHS 
procedures for 
work on 
projects; 
however 
sometimes these 
are not always 
made available 
to either reps or 
other third 
parties.  On 
occasions, some 
procedures 
appear to 
conflict with the 
actual work 
being conducted 
on site, 
especially when 
time pressures 
begin to exert 
influence upon 
project 
operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Managers 
expected to 
perform this 
function; 
together with the 
OHS rep.  On 
occasions OHS 
rep is left to 
perform this 
duty alone, but 
with little 
autonomy.  
Systems for 
follow up 
inspections 
when incidents 
may occur are 
often only on an 
ad-hoc basis.  
Goal of 
inspections 
appears to be 
only on 
compliance; best 
practice 
influences 
generally 
ignored. 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS manager 
actively engages 
in and 
encourages OHS 
information 
flow and 
generally has no 
preference as to 
subject matter or 
supply of 
information.  
OHS reps do 
however appear 
reliant upon the 
management 
direction in 
terms of 
information 
sources and 
subject matter.  
Sufficient time 
not always 
forthcoming to 
OHS reps to 
report on OHS 
issues and 
information to 
their 
constituents. 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
First concern is 
generally over the 
welfare and 
wellbeing of any 
injured or 
potentially affected 
workers.  
Investigations tend 
to be directed 
towards a 
limitation of any 
proportion of 
blame on the 
company, and 
often revert to the 
human error factor 
in the incident.  
Investigations 
generally run by 
management with 
OHS manager 
taking a lead role; 
input by OHS reps 
while not 
discouraged, is 
often negated by 
attempted use of 
scientific and or 
technical 
information. 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Has a structured 
audit and review 
process in place; 
primarily 
auditing 
subcontractors, 
but does audit 
their own safety 
management 
system.  Very 
little or limited 
worker and OHS 
rep involvement 
throughout the 
process.  Audit 
process seen as 
justification for 
the OHS 
management 
system of the  
company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS committee 
meetings 
conducted on 
most sites 
weekly, and 
generally seen 
as a positive 
way to review 
safety on the 
project.  
Meetings 
generally run by 
management, 
but with 
workforce 
involvement via 
OHS reps and 
other elected 
worker 
committee 
representatives.  
Genuine 
attempts to solve 
OHS issues 
sometimes 
curtailed due to 
time restraints 
putting some 
issues off till the 
next meeting.   
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Training 
actively 
encouraged and 
recommended; 
especially for 
OHS reps.  
Training in 
working hours 
generally 
approved, 
provided it is 
kept to a 
reasonable limit; 
such limit often 
in disagreement 
between OHS 
reps and 
management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 19 OHS ‘manager’ 
has other 
managerial 
positions within 
the company.  
OHS position 
allocated to this 
particular person 
for reasons other 
than their 
knowledge of 
OHS.  Use of 
outside 
consultancy 
services both 
prior to and post 
OHS incidents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While sub 
contractors 
require 
procedures for 
site work, the 
site conditions 
and work 
processes can 
often be 
different from 
what the 
procedures state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Site managers 
are expected to 
carry out this 
process, but this 
does not always 
occur.  
Generally it is 
left to the OHS 
rep to ensure 
and check on 
site OHS 
conditions and 
procedures; 
however the 
OHS rep is very 
rarely given 
unlimited 
autonomy to 
exert the kind of 
influence that is 
often required to 
implement 
positive action. 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS 
information 
flow generally 
positive; most 
projects have 
vast amount of 
OHS 
information.  
Not generally a 
problem of 
where 
information is 
sourced from, 
however 
management 
may, on various 
projects, attempt 
to decide what 
can or can’t be 
displayed and 
shared. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Concerns both to 
potential injured 
personnel, and 
company 
reputation almost 
run parallel on 
levels of 
importance.  
Investigations 
generally run by 
management, 
tolerating OHS rep 
involvement 
mainly due to 
regulatory 
requirements.  
Reporting of 
accidents and 
incidents are 
sometimes slow 
and deliberately 
measured in both 
approach and 
detail. 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Conduct of 
audits and 
reviews 
primarily 
depends on the 
individual 
project.  
Appears to be 
no formal or 
structured 
mechanism that 
the company 
implements in 
any holistic 
manner.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Quality of 
weekly OHS 
committee 
meetings depend 
on site 
personnel; 
ranging from 
very informative 
and positive to 
very poor and 
trivial.  Short 
term solutions 
are more often 
favored over 
long term major 
changes in 
systems and 
planning 
processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
 
Training 
allowed and in 
certain cases 
encouraged for 
certain 
individual OHS 
reps; but for 
others seen as 
problematic in 
terms of agreed 
time off and 
locations.  
Standard OHS 
training that 
may be required 
under legislation 
requirements is 
generally the 
agreed approach 
taken by the 
company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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 Size and status 
of the OHS 
department? 
OHS 
procedures: 
What are their 
purposes and 
are they 
reflective of site 
conditions? 
Who checks 
safety on a day 
to day basis? 
Is management 
interested in 
communicating 
OHS issues and 
information 
with the 
workforce? 
How does the 
organisation react 
after an accident? 
OHS audits 
and reviews. 
Site safety 
meetings: how 
are they 
conducted? 
Training in 
OHS? 
Overall 
deemed 
level of 
HOMM. 
Company 20 Nominated OHS 
manager’s 
position.  
Manager has 
reasonable 
knowledge and 
skill in terms of 
OHS and 
construction, but 
appears to have 
limited 
influence in 
terms of many 
site managerial 
decisions.  
Performs 
company 
statistical 
reports.  OHS 
manager reports 
to other 
managers within 
the company 
hierarchical 
structure. 
 
Deemed level? 
 
 
 
 
Has many 
procedures both 
for own 
company and 
requires 
procedures from 
all sub 
contractors.  
Seen as a way to 
implement 
compliance and 
abide by legal 
requirements.  
Procedures often 
break down; 
especially when 
external time 
and cost 
pressures begin 
to exert 
influence over 
the project.   
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Site managers 
expected to 
perform this 
function, in a 
cooperative and 
positive manner 
with site OHS 
reps.  Often it is 
the site OHS rep 
who will 
perform the duty 
on their own if 
production 
pressures begin 
to bear too 
heavily on the 
project.  
Generally, site 
management 
treat the 
opinions and 
judgments of the 
OHS reps with 
great respect. 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS 
information seen 
as vital to the 
project and the 
workforce.  
Sourced from a 
variety of 
places, and 
prominently 
displayed in and 
around the 
project.  Time 
generally given 
to OHS preps to 
discus the OHS 
issues with their 
constituents.  
Overall, 
workforce 
feedback 
actively sought 
and welcomed 
by management. 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Genuine concern 
shown for any 
accident victims.  
Investigation 
generally looks for 
underlying causes 
to prevent any 
reoccurrences.  
While 
investigations are 
generally run by 
management, they 
welcome and 
encourage OHS 
rep input, 
recommendation 
and any external 
advice that the 
OHS rep may seek. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Has a structured 
and 
comprehensive 
audit policy and 
procedure for 
both company 
and 
subcontractors.  
OHS rep and 
worker input is 
limited, but 
generally 
welcomed if 
pressed for 
involvement.  
Audits and 
reviews 
generally seen 
as a positive tool 
to help maintain 
and increase 
safety on sites. 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
Site safety 
committee 
meetings held 
weekly.  Overall 
meetings are 
seen as a 
positive tool, 
and OHS issues 
raised are 
positively 
discussed with a 
firm view of 
resolution.  
Meetings seen 
as a positive 
tool, and OHS 
reps given time 
to give feedback 
to their 
constituents.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
 
OHS training 
positively 
encouraged; 
especially for 
designated and 
elected OHS 
reps.  Training 
seen as an 
ongoing skill 
development 
process for 
employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deemed level? 
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Appendix E  
Key sensitizing concepts  
Item Definition
23
 Artefact Behaviour / Outcome 
Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reliance on; confidence  
in; faith; to allow 
someone to  
do something. 
 
A firm belief in the 
reliability or truth or 
strength of a person or 
thing.  A confident 
expectation. 
 
 
A concept of people’s 
expectations towards 
others; a willingness to 
become vulnerable to 
others (Costa 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OHS documentation 
Language and presentation of documentation (legalistic / 
scientific or everyday language) 
 
 
 
 OHS committee meeting minutes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Computer / internet and other such equipment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Availability and ability to copy OHS 
documentation? 
 Time allowed to access documentation and 
information? 
 Ability or capacity to understand 
documentation. 
 Are worker recommendations implemented or 
ignored? 
 Major or minor OHS issues discussed? 
 Minutes clearly articulated or are they 
reported in a confusing and obfuscating 
manner? 
 Are minutes regularly accepted by participants 
as accurate, or are there subtle omissions, 
deletions or inaccurate reporting. 
 Availability for OHS reps own unhindered, 
unrestricted and private use of computers? 
 Availability and ease of access to other 
electronic equipment?  
 Interaction between management and OHS 
rep? 
 Mannerisms and general ease of interaction 
between the parties? 
 Manner of discussions (clear and easy to 
understand or confusing and/or obfuscating 
manner or language)? 
 Open door policy for OHS discussions? 
 Time limits for OHS discussions and/or on the 
roles of individuals empowered to carry out 
this function? 
                                               
23
 Definitions taken from The Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus (1990) and Concise Oxford Dictionary (1990) unless otherwise specifically stated. 
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Item Definition Artefact Behaviour / Outcome 
Honesty Genuine; not false or 
misleading; 
Characterized by 
sincerity; reliable; 
reputable. 
 
 
Being honest, 
truthfulness, not cheating, 
free of deceit, sincere. 
 OHS documentation. 
 
 
 Language and presentation (legalistic / scientific 
or everyday language)? 
 
 
 
 Documentation regarding feedback mechanisms 
on OHS decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Minutes from safety meetings 
 
 
 
 Internal memo’s 
 
 
 
 Is available and relevant OHS information 
openly and freely exchanged during OHS 
meetings and discussions 
 
 
 
 OHS policy displayed 
 
 
 Availability and ability to access and copy all 
relevant OHS documentation? 
 
 Time allowed to access documentation and 
information? 
 
 Ability or capacity to understand 
documentation? 
 Decisions via consultation and consensus or 
via managerial prerogative. 
 
 Discussions carried out clearly and in easy to 
understand language or in a confusing and/or 
obfuscating manner? 
 
 Site ‘report back’ meetings over OHS issues? 
 
 Clearly written in plain English; minutes 
displayed for all to see? 
 Interaction between management and OHS 
rep? 
 General interaction and ease of interaction 
between management and OHS rep. 
 Mannerisms and general ease of interaction 
between the parties. 
 Open door policy for discussing OHS issues? 
 Are OHS principles (from the OHS policy) 
espoused and adhered to? 
 Sharing and sourcing OHS 
knowledge/information. 
 
 
 
 
270 
 
Item Definition Artefact Behaviour / Outcome 
 
Respect An attitude of deference, 
admiration 
or esteem; regard; 
consideration;  
polite or kind regard; 
 
 
Deferential esteem felt or 
shown towards a person 
or quality, to heed or 
regard. 
 
 
 Do all participants receive copies of the OHS 
committee meeting minutes as soon as they are 
available, or do some participants only receive 
them at the next meeting; giving them little time 
to read and scrutinize them for their accuracy 
and relevance to issues raised at the previous 
meeting? 
 Open or closed door policy on OHS 
discussions? 
 Who chairs the OHS committee meetings 
(shared or managerial prerogative)? 
 General interaction and ease of interaction 
between management and OHS rep. 
 Active and positive listening between parties? 
 Are final and agreed OHS decisions ever 
vetoed by others? 
 Value of input by OHS rep (utilized or 
ignored?). 
 Access / availability to OHS information / 
document. 
 Ability and opportunity for OHS 
representatives to have meetings with their 
constituents over OHS issues and feedback 
OHS information. 
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Item Definition Artefact Behaviour / Outcome 
 
Commitment An obligation; pledging;  
responsibility; to pledge 
or align  
oneself; to carry out; 
to enact;  
 
 
Process or an instance of 
committing oneself, an 
undertaking 
 
 Transfer and sharing of OHS documentation and 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 Formal recognition and acknowledgement of the 
OHS roles within the site/project. 
 
 
 
 Documented OHS training programs / timetables 
for all employees; both management and  
        workers 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Willingness to share OHS knowledge and skill 
with others. 
 Willingness to engage in consultation / 
discussions. 
 Positive approach and feedback on OHS 
issues that are raised for discussions. 
 OHS site safety inductions carried out by 
manager and OHS rep. 
 Willingness to actively and positively listen to 
and take account of alternative viewpoints. 
 Willingness to allow all employees time off 
work to attend OHS training courses. 
 Willingness to engage in consultation / 
discussions. 
 Positive approach and feedback on all OHS 
issues and on OHS committee meetings? 
 OHS policy implemented and espoused? 
 Final decision making process. 
 Feedback mechanisms on final decisions (e.g 
site report back meetings?). 
 Issues of OHS discussion. 
(minor or major OHS issues?) 
 Are report back meetings over OHS issues and 
discussions carried out with all affected 
workers. 
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Appendix F  
Questions for semi structured interviews for the project: 
 
Consultation and organisational maturity in the Victorian construction industry. 
 
The research questions focused on how, within the commercial and industrial sector of the 
Victorian building and construction industry the issues of trust, honesty, commitment and respect 
that are generally considered necessary for effective and meaningful consultation to occur, 
particularly in the area of OHS, were applied by five construction companies who were deemed 
to have reached different levels of organisational maturity.   
 
A senior management representative from the project management group or company (either 
project manager or site manager) and the elected employee OHS representative were the 
interview participants.   
 
All interviews took place in a confidential manner (i.e. in a private office or site shed on the 
construction site) during working hours of the construction site.  All interviews were conducted 
separately using the exact same questions. 
 
Participants were encouraged to provide examples which could assist them in the explanation of 
their answers. 
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1. Tell me about how the consultation process over OHS issues occurs or fails to occur on 
this site?  
 
 
2. How would you describe what makes up, what constitutes or what is involved in 
obtaining meaningful and effective consultation in regards to OHS issues?  
 
 
3. In your opinion: 
I. Is the type of consultation over OHS as you just described, adequately reflect how 
OHS consultation is carried out at this work site? 
II. Is the timing of consultation and the amount of time given for it to occur on this 
site adequate?  
III. Do you consider that negative or bad news about the site or project, in terms of 
OHS issues, are fundamentally welcomed or dealt with in the same manner as good 
or positive news?  Reasons? 
 
 
4. Why do you think the consultation process over OHS occurs or fails to occur on this site? 
 
 
5. (i) When consultation over OHS occurs, do you consider that everyone’s input in these 
OHS discussions are valued equally and/or holds equal weight against those of others 
taking part in the discussions?   
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6. (i) In terms of OHS committee meetings, how it is decided what is to be discussed at the 
meetings? 
 
(ii) Do you think that OHS information that the participants have in relation to the OHS 
matters raised, flows openly and freely to and from all participants in the OHS 
meetings/discussions? 
 
(iii) How do you personally participate during OHS committee meetings? 
 
 
7. (i) How is it decided who can attend OHS meetings or who gets involved in the discussions;  
 
(ii) Are the participants (i.e. OHS committee members) allowed to invite, with a view of 
active participation, other third parties for OHS advice and assistance?   
 
 
8. How would you describe the types of OHS issues and their subsequent outcomes that are 
generally discussed in the OHS meetings/discussions that occur on this site?   
 
 
9. Do any of the decisions made during site OHS meetings/discussions require approval from 
other persons not initially involved in the consultation, or indeed are any decisions ever 
vetoed by a third party at a later stage ?  
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10. (i) Do you consider that the OHS issues raised during consultation are adequately finalized 
or solved during the consultation process? 
 
 
(ii) Are feedback mechanisms (if there are any) adequate to communicate this back to the 
person or persons who first raised the issue or concern and to those workers who may be 
affected by the final decision? 
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